

Université de Montréal

**Homogeneity and heterogeneity of political traditions in the
remaking of world order**

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Ce mémoire intitulé:
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order

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Résumé

Deux décennies après la chute de l'URSS (1991), ce mémoire propose une réévaluation de la thèse de Francis Fukuyama sur la *Fin de l'Histoire*, élaborée en 1989, qui postule qu'avec la chute de l'URSS aucune idéologie ne peut rivaliser avec la démocratie libérale capitaliste; et de la thèse de Samuel P. Huntington sur le *Choc des civilisations*, élaborée en 1993, qui pose l'existence d'un nombre fini de civilisations homogènes et antagonistes. Pourtant, lorsque confrontées à une étude approfondie des séquences historiques, ces deux théories apparaissent pour le moins relatives. Deux questions ont été traitées: l'interaction entre *Idéologie* et *Conditions historiques*, et la thèse de l'*homogénéité intracivilisationnelle* et de l'*hétérogénéité antagoniste intercivilisationnelle*. Sans les invalider complètement, cette recherche conclut toutefois que ces deux théories doivent être nuancées; elles se situent aux deux extrémités du spectre des relations internationales. La recherche effectuée a montré que les idéologies et leur poids relatif sont tributaires d'un contexte, contrairement à Fukuyama qui les pose dans l'absolu. De plus, l'étude de la Chine maoïste et particulièrement de la pensée de Mao Zedong montre que les traditions politiques locales sont plus hétérogènes qu'il n'y paraît au premier abord, ce qui relativise la thèse de Huntington. En conclusion, les rapports entre États sont plus dynamiques que ne le laissent penser les thèses de Fukuyama et de Huntington.

Mots clés: Chine, Choc des civilisations, Construction de l'État, Construction de la Nation, Fin de l'Histoire, Fukuyama, Huntington, Mao Zedong, Relations internationales, Traditions politiques

Abstract

The central purpose of this research is a revaluation, two decades after the 1991 demise of the USSR, of Francis Fukuyama's 1989 *"End of History"* theory, which postulates that with the fall of the USSR no major ideology is a challenger to the domination of liberal capitalist democracy; and of Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 *"Clash of Civilizations"* theory that postulates the existence of a finite number of antagonistic homogeneous civilizations. When confronted with the actual unfolding of historical events, these two absolute and uncompromising theories appear increasingly relative. Two questions were researched: the interaction between *Ideology* and *Historical conditions* in the case of Fukuyama, and that of the presupposed *Intra-civilizational homogeneity* and *Inter-civilizational antagonistic heterogeneity*. This research, not dismissing them totally, comes to the conclusion that they constitute the two opposite poles of a continuum that encompass most types of interactions between polities. First, this thesis comes to the conclusion that ideologies and their relative weight are part of a broader picture rather than absolutes in themselves, as Fukuyama argues. Furthermore, the study of Maoist China and especially of the thoughts of Mao Zedong strongly suggests the heterogeneity of political traditions locally, contrary to Huntington's thesis. In other words, interactions between polities seem more dynamic than the simplistic linear approaches of Fukuyama and Huntington.

Key words: China, "Clash of Civilizations", "End of History", Fukuyama, Huntington, International relations, Mao Zedong, Nation building, Political traditions, State building.

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List of acronyms

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CFA: Communauté Financière Africaine
COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPC: Communist Party of China
ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
NAM: Non-Aligned Movement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLA: People's Liberation Army
PRC: People's Republic of China
RAF: Rote Armee Fraktion
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
USA: United States of America
USSR: Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WWII: World War Two

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I would also like to extend my thanks to Professor Mamoudou Gazibo with whom, as a specialist of comparative politics, I had several exchanges over Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"* and Samuel P. Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"*. Although Professor Gazibo's commitment in favour of democracy, a most sensible one, surfaced here and there, he referred me to articles discussing both theses. It allowed me to gain a greater understanding of the debate around them and, of course, its limitation.

Finally, I would like to thank my father, Professor Bernard Schiele, who, as an academic, has built a most impressive library over the years. Although he is not a researcher in my field of study, his library contained many titles that directly or indirectly contributed to my own research. Furthermore, through all these years he passed on to me the growing passion for academic research.

Introduction

The cold war ended two decades ago. The fall of the USSR made the United States of America (USA) the world's only superpower. But now, quite a few researchers identify the emergence of an ever more "polycentric" world.¹ This is not a new situation, quite the contrary. Before the 20th century, Europe was split among powerful states. Although they were global colonial empires, they were regional powers, with mostly regional issues. The threats they faced originated from their direct neighbours, so to speak. Only during the 20th century did global confrontations arise: the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and Germany in the first half, the United States and the USSR during the second half. Nonetheless, all these powers share a common background. This does not imply that in other regions of the world great powers have not emerged, quite the contrary, and China is a case in point. However, many of these regions have only been in regular contact for a little over 200 years.

The violent contact of the non-European world with Europe spawned modernist tendencies and at the time, modernization may have meant the same thing as Westernization. The West, first Europe and then the USA, have imposed their cultural hegemony through violent military conquests, which has made them central political actors²; their culture and worldviews were at the same time imposed on and emulated by weaker nations.³ By the same token, the West has also managed to dominate international trade, spreading its cultural values through its products. No country has been left untouched by Western culture and values, which reinforced Western cultural imperialism. At the dawn of the 21st century, new world powers are emerging in a world seemingly free of ideological competition. Today, neither North America nor Europe is the only political center.⁴ The ensemble of countries commonly known as the BRICS is on the rise. Although not superpowers, together, they can challenge U.S. supremacy: Brazil, in South America; Russia, in Europe; India and China, in Asia, and South Africa, in Africa. The European Union is also a challenge for the United States. On a regional scale, countries like Iran in the Middle East, South Africa, Libya and Egypt in Africa, Pakistan in South Asia, and Indonesia in South-East Asia, and so on, are playing an increasing role in regional affairs.⁵

¹ HEISBOURG, François, "La nouvelle donne de la mondialisation" ?" in *L'Atlas des Civilisations*, Hors Série, Le Monde, 2009-2010, p.70-71.

² FANON, Frantz, *Pour la révolution africaine*, Paris: La découverte, [1964] 2006, p. 65.

³ FANON, Frantz, *Peau noire, masque blanc*, Paris: Seuil, [1952] 1971, p. 16.

⁴ HEISBOURG, François (2009-2010), op. cit., p.70-71.

⁵ NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, "Rising powers: the changing geopolitical landscape" in *Mapping the global future: report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 project*, December 2004, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_s2.html#state (Accessed on November 10, 2010)

In this context, is it advisable to completely disregard the role of local and regional cultural and philosophical traditions? If local cultural traditions do play an integral part in the international political process, then how is it possible to ignore these elements and have a clear understanding of international politics, let alone study foreign states? Political thoughts are central to any political science studies: western students of politics and diplomacy read Plato, Aristotle, the Bible, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Tocqueville, Marx and Nietzsche, to name but a few.⁶ Today, in a world where the West is no longer the only center of power, it is obvious that approaches based solely on Western political traditions are increasingly ill-equipped to understand the new realities in international relations in our new century. Still, it is not enough to know and understand Western and non-Western political traditions; one must understand how they interact.

1) *"End of History", "Clash of Civilizations" or neither?*

This thesis explores the nature of post-Cold War international relations. Breaking away from classical realism and neorealism, the hegemonic paradigms at the time, two political scientists have had a major influence on the post-Cold War international relations field with competing theses: Francis Fukuyama with his 1989 *"End of History"*, which proclaims that it is now inevitable that the world becomes liberal and unified in the future⁷; and Huntington with his 1993 *"Clash of Civilizations"* that paints a gloomy future where homogenous cultures will increasingly become antagonistic.⁸ This thesis aims to discuss both models, models that seem to be the opposite extremes of a continuum.

The Cold War (1947-1991) is often described as an ideological struggle between Liberalism and Communism, and that all aspects of international relations during that period fell into the scope of this struggle. Since the end of the Cold War, two non-realist competing explanations of international relations prevail. Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"* says that the end of the Cold War marks the end of all

⁶ For recent examples:

SIMARD, Augustin, POL 1200 - Pensée politique, Automne 2010, Université de Montréal, http://www.pol.umontreal.ca/cours/Plans_de_cours_Automne%202010/POL%201200%20-%20Simard.pdf (Accessed on November 10, 2010);

COUTURE, Yves, POL 1201-10, Pensée politique classique, Automne 2009, Université du Québec à Montréal, http://www.politique.uqam.ca/upload/files/automne2009/notes_de_cours/POL1201-10_Plan12.pdf (As of 11/10/10); COUTURE, Yves, POL 1701-30, Pensée politique moderne, Hiver 2009, Université du Québec à Montréal, http://www.politique.uqam.ca/upload/files/hiver2009/notes_de_cours/Pol-1701-30_PlansDetaillies.pdf (Accessed on November 10, 2010).

⁷ FUKUYAMA, Francis, "The End of History?" in *The National Interest*, issue 16, summer 1989, p. 3-18.

⁸ HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilizations" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), p. 22-49.

ideological struggles; for him, "Liberalism" is the triumphant ideology to which all nations will be converted, both ideologically and politically. The world will become more "homogenous", more "free", more "prosperous" and so on.⁹ His thesis gained momentum at the turn of the 1990s, as it first appeared a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

On the other hand, Samuel P. Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"* argues that now that the ideological struggle has come to an end, cultures and traditions can express themselves more freely, without being linked to either one of the former competing ideologies. As cultures and traditions become more homogenous within a civilization, they become more impervious to cultures and traditions of other civilizations. The antagonism between civilizations would be such that their borders will increasingly become "fault lines".¹⁰ His thesis gained momentum at the turn of the century, in the aftermath of the 9/11 Islamist terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, for many, the heart of modern Western civilization.

The two main theories revolve either around Western universalism or conflicts between civilizations; however, would not an explanation revolving around dynamic interactions between civilizations -- conflict being a possibility but not the only outcome -- give a more complex and more accurate picture of international relations? To this end we must first determine to what extent political traditions influence modern political behaviour. We therefore need to look for examples during the ideological Cold War, but also after, when a sole ideology is said to dominate without effective challenges.

A second consideration is that since political tradition does in fact influence modern political behaviour, we must study international relations from the point of view of political tradition. The aim is to determine if international relations today follow more accurately the *"End of History"* model of Francis Fukuyama, the *"Clash of Civilizations"* model of Samuel P. Huntington, or an intercivilizational dynamic in the middle of the continuum.

2) Complex world, complex interactions

⁹ FUKUYAMA, Francis, "The End of History?" in *The National Interest*, issue 16, summer 1989, p. 3-18.
<http://www.unc.edu/home/rlstev/Text/Fukuyama%20End%20of%20History.pdf> (As of 09/14/10)

¹⁰ HUNTINGTON (1993), op cit.

Political traditions in any political entity influence modern political behaviour beyond political ideologies. Even if an ideology becomes a global norm, as Fukuyama argues, local political traditions are present nonetheless. Although not as obvious, they were present during the Cold War, and reasserted themselves when the ideological struggle came to an end. Even if there were a rise in the number of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, would it imply "clashes of civilizations", as Huntington predicted, especially when alliances, such as the ASEAN, unite countries of different civilizations around common goals. The interactions between civilizations seem more complex than the deterministic passive-conversion-to-liberalism theory of Fukuyama or the fatal theory of Huntington; in truth, intercivilizational relations seem much more dynamic.

3) Outline of the thesis

To study modern political behaviours and international relations in the wake of the end of the Cold War, we must describe how they are different from Cold War political behaviours and international relations, if they in fact were different. In other words, the first step is to recall the major events of the Cold War, more precisely the period in which the Cold War took place. Many changes in national and international power relations that occurred during this period greatly influenced post-Cold War politics. More precisely, the question asked here is whether events, and history for that matter, can be explained by a single factor, or by a plurality of causes. Such a plurality of causes would not only imply the complexity of events but also of the variables at play. This will be covered in Chapter 1.

Only with such an understanding could we then, and only then, present the two main theses of post-Cold War international relations, those of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington, and the criticisms they face. Since Francis Fukuyama's thesis also extends to the 1989 Communism to Liberalism transition, in other words explaining the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR, it should be examined first. Samuel P. Huntington's thesis, being an answer to Fukuyama, will be examined afterward. Because all theories are normative, and these two being among the most mediatised, it is important to confront them with the reality of modern International relations. This will be covered in chapter 2.

If the theories should prove too simplistic, and the variables used too static to accurately account for modern International relations, and of course if their critics did not challenge the variables themselves, it would follow that any refinement of the understanding of International relations should focus on the dynamics of International relations rather than on the static variables on which the *"End of History"* and

"*Clash of Civilizations*" theories are built. Specifically, shouldn't it be that any given polity is influenced not only by its own political traditions but also by other polities' political traditions through exchange? The hypothesis implies that it would seem very unlikely that one particular set of political traditions would impose itself at the expense of others, or that civilizational cores cannot be redefined. This question will be dealt with in chapter 3.

Chapter 4 is a case study that aims to show how complicated the influence of political tradition upon modern political behaviour is. It will focus on 20th century China, and especially Mao Zedong's China (1949-1976). This case study was deliberately chosen outside what is traditionally called the West, because Fukuyama and Huntington give a special status to the West. China is now a world power, yet it is often criticized by Western governments and media for not abiding by the conventions of the International Community. Furthermore, China's tumultuous 20th century, ideologically, politically, socially and economically, doesn't seem to fall within either author's framework, thus making it an interesting case study. This case study, we believe, will help demonstrate the complex interactions between ideology and political traditions, and between internal and external influences.

4) Approach and methods

This thesis will primarily revolve around a review of pertinent literature from historical, political and sociological accounts of the creation and evolution of polities within their internal and external contexts and from International relations analyses during and after the Cold War in order to give a clearer picture of the elaboration of political traditions and of their influence on modern political behaviours. It also relies on a specific case study to show how different political influences affect the interpretation of current issues, especially in relations between the West and East Asia. China is an interesting case study. Until the mid-19th century, China saw itself both in terms of power and culture as the center of the world (the Middle Kingdom), thus strictly enforcing its culture and institutions. As the Europeans, and later Japanese, powers swept across Asia, China shut itself off from the world stage. The question that dominated China until now is: how to make China strong and independent again, while remaining China? For most of the 20th century, China was in the midst of Revolution, nationalist first and communist later, and only started to open up to the world in the late 1970s. Thirty years later, as China becomes the world's second economic power while remaining a single party State, how to describe its behaviour on the world stage: does Fukuyama's "End of History" account best for this case? Is it Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations"? Or is it more complex? These are the questions that lead us to believe that China is a

worthwhile case to study in depth, especially the Maoist period since it aimed to entirely rebuild China on new foundations.

We tried to avoid falling into four traps: intrinsic "universalism", understood as the idea that some principles or values are in themselves superior or truer than all the others, because they exist by themselves, independently from man; "idealism", understood as the explanation that reality is solely derived from ideas, or its mirror image, culturalism, understood as the explanation that culture is the prime motor of human behaviour; "historical determinism", understood as the theory that the future can be predicted from past and present events; and, finally, "cultural relativism", understood as the total and absolute equality of all ideas (this concept is mainly negative). These four traps deter any objective attempt to explain events.

Our view is that in an undeniably economically, socially and politically globalizing and integrating world, state-centrist explanations must not be overstated while, for the very fact the world is still in globalizing and integrating processes, social and cultural constructivist explanations must not be understated. We will rely on an historical approach because human societies are historically constituted from the interaction of historically changing ideational and material forces. We do not subscribe to the idea that one should be exaggeratedly downplayed at the expense of the other in any explanation. Human societies are shaped not only by their past but also by their present, as well as they are shaped by their understanding thereof. To sum up, this research led us to believe that any explanation must be multi-dimensional¹¹ because multiple forces are at play in shaping our interdependent multileveled world.¹² Thus, if we accept the idea of the anarchy of the international system (i.e, the absence, for the time being, of a central authority above States with the legitimate monopoly of violence to regulate international and transnational relations), we reject the idea of an ahistorical international anarchy in favour of the idea of an evolving anarchy¹³. Ontologically speaking, we tend to believe in the external and internal co-evolution of agents and structures.¹⁴

¹¹ DUFOUR, Frédéric Guillaume, LAPOINTE, Thierry, "La sociologie historique néowébérienne" in MACLEOD, Alex, O'MEARA, Dan Ed., *Théories des relations internationales, Contestations et résistances*, 2e édition, Montréal: Athéna, 2010, p. 393.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Partial autonomy of structures and agents; Idem; For a discussion of the hegemonic paradigm in International relations (realism and liberalism, both in their classical and neo-forms), c.f. *infra* p. 68-70.

The theoretical framework adopted in this thesis has much in common with *historical sociology*, "a multidisciplinary and historical approach [to understand and explain intra- and international] social processes, structural change and social institutions".¹⁵ In other words, it advocates methodological pluralism¹⁶ as the best approach to address the post-Cold-War period. Methodological pluralism implies that to explain and understand the complexity of events, trends and dynamics, we should not reduce them to a single factor, but understand the constellation of causes and significations, something that can only be done by mobilizing multiple methodological approaches. It does not imply that all causes weigh the same, but that for different events or contexts, the weight of the same causes vary. Finally, we acknowledge that no theoretical framework can entirely be free of normative ends.

5) Sources of information

Historical and anthropological studies in French, and especially English, are readily available. Also, nowadays, academic journals are often published in electronic versions, allowing direct access to the materials. Canonical texts, Western or non-Western, have been published for some time now, and are also available from various sources. Materials about official policies are easily accessible from newspapers, studies and government documents. In the case of Maoist China, Mao Zedong being the dominant figure at the time, his articles and essays are essential.

6) Importance of the topic

The debate that rages on between the "*End of History*" and "*Clash of Civilizations*" theories still dominates post-Cold War interpretation of international relations. Fukuyama and Huntington are probably two of the most important political scientists of the post-Cold War period, and yet both their theories are simplistically deterministic. The contribution of this research stresses the condition of mutual understanding, not for an idealistic but a methodological purpose. Furthermore, governments make political choices, in foreign and internal policy, according to theoretical models of international relations ("*End of History*", "*Clash of Civilizations*", dynamic interactions, etc.). Every world view has major strategic implications and unforeseeable consequences. Because we are still in the transition from the

¹⁵ DUFOUR, Frédérick Guillaume, LAPOINTE, Thierry, "La sociologie historique néowébérienne" (Our own translation from a citation on page 379) and "La sociologie historique néomarxiste" in MACLEOD, Alex, O'MEARA, Dan Ed., *Théories des relations internationales, Contestations et résistances*, 2e édition, Montréal: Athéna, 2010, p. 379-420.

¹⁶ DAVIES, E. Brian, *Epistemological pluralism*, 2006
<http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3083/> (Accessed on June 5, 2011).

Cold War, these political choices will have consequences for our future. The aim of refining our understanding of modern International relations is to make more enlightened appraisals and policies.

Political science graduates, whatever their specialities, need to have knowledge of non-Western political theories and traditions, which are not taught in the West. A better knowledge of non-Western political philosophies and theories would probably lead political science to reform in order to move beyond the restrictive Eurocentric worldview to a more encompassing view, more in accordance with the scientific method. Being subjected to the constraints of time and space allowed for a Master thesis, this research relied mainly on an analytical framework to deconstruct the theses of the *"End of History"* and the *"Clash of Civilizations"*, and did not endeavour, at this point, to propose any new theory.

Chapter 1: The post-World War II world (1945-2000)

Both Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington intended to give a more accurate picture of post-Cold War international relations, now that the ideological struggle between Liberal capitalist democracy and Communism is over. Thus, to discuss their models, that have for their premises a post-ideological world, we must put them into a perspective, that is, to understand the changes that occurred with the end of the Cold War. The study of the Cold War period tends to undermine the mainly Western belief that it was only a clash of ideologies.

* * *

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Eastern bloc, a powerful ensemble of States with the USSR as its core, was peacefully breaking up at an unprecedented speed. A superpower for most of the second half of the 20th century, the USSR is now defunct and its main successor State, Russia, is struggling to maintain its unity and a regional power status. On the other side of what used to be called the *Iron Curtain*, the USA remains the world's only superpower, and the Western bloc is enjoying stability and prosperity. The Cold war ended abruptly after forty-five years of diplomatic and military conflicts between the two worlds. Before focusing on the period immediately following the Cold War, let alone on the first years of the twenty-first century, we must shed light on the dramatic changes that occurred during the Cold War. To this end, we consider five defining moments, each fifteen years apart: 1935, the European-dominated world; 1950, a world divided; 1965, the rise of the Third World; 1980, U.S. decline?; and 1995, the fall of the USSR.

1) 1935: The European-dominated world

In 1945, the Second World War ended in total defeat for the Third Reich, which only a few years before held most of Europe within its grasp. The European theatre extended over most of geographical Europe: the Atlantic in the West, Moscow in the East (the Urals being the easternmost limit of geographical Europe), the Mediterranean and Caucasus in the South, and the Bosphorus in the South-East.¹⁷ The traditional powers of Europe for the last hundred years: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, had been bled to death and laid to ruins, as had most of the European belligerents. Total war meant unconditional victory or unconditional defeat at the price of total destruction.

Until WWII, the United Kingdom (UK), the first State to experience the advent of Capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, had been the world's dominant power. It had presided over most of European

¹⁷ DUBY, Georges, *Atlas historique, l'histoire du monde en 317 cartes*, Paris: Larousse, 1987, p. 94.

affairs in the first half of the nineteenth century and over most of world affairs from its second half onward. Western Europe, especially Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, was the *de facto* economic, political and cultural center of: geographical Europe; the European-Inherited Region (the American continent, Australia and New Zealand); and much of the rest of the world, through its colonies, prior to the war, even during the onset of the Great Depression. Taking into account the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe, perhaps it is more realistic to consider the leading European powers to be cores in themselves, and unrealistic to consider Western Europe as a single core.¹⁸

From the end of the nineteenth century to the *Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact* of 1939, the main European regional powers were also the main regional powers of Africa (Belgium, France, UK and, to a lesser extent, Portugal), Asia (France, the Netherlands and UK), the Middle East (France, UK) and Oceania. (UK). The American continent is the only exception: it is the most Europeanized region but the first one to be almost entirely free of European political control, the USA being its paramount regional power.¹⁹ By defeating the moribund Spanish empire in 1898, the USA cut the last direct European political link to the American continent and gained a foothold in the Pacific and Asia (the Philippines).

On the other side of the Pacific, Japan was rising as an Asian regional power threatening European dominance in the region, notably defeating Russia in 1905. During the Asia-Pacific War (1937-1945), Japan invaded China; took over the Dutch and French colonies; invaded Thailand that had won a short war against France in 1940-41; occupied Burma and threatened British India; and even forced back, for a time, the U.S. presence in the Pacific. By 1942, Japan was the *de facto* dominant power of Asia. But its fate was to be the one of the Third Reich: total destruction and total defeat.

2) 1950: A world divided

2.1) The last European power struggle

The situation in Europe, and, by way of consequence in the world, changed three times between 1939 and 1945. The Third Reich swept through neighbouring countries with ease and, in the first half of 1941, it and its satellites, and the USSR and its satellites, shared most of Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea. They were then the two dominant powers of Europe, but were only regional powers.²⁰ The

¹⁸ Idem, p. 86-87.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 285.

²⁰ JORDAN, David, WIEST, Andrew, *Atlas of World War II*, London: Amber Books, 2004, p. 24.

main colonial empires *de facto* lost their status as global powers, while the British Empire was on the verge of breaking up. Only the U.S. industry and, after December 7th, its war effort managed to keep the UK afloat. Thus, the USA *peacefully* took over the dominant role in world affairs that the UK had enjoyed until the war. In the second half of 1941, the Third Reich invaded and swept through the USSR until the defeat it suffered at Stalingrad in 1943. For more than a year, the conquest of the USSR was a serious possibility, while the Third Reich seemed to be Europe's sole superpower.²¹ Total mobilisation of its human and material resources along with U.S. backing enabled the USSR to push back the Germans and take Berlin while U.S. forces were advancing eastward, signalling and assuring the Third Reich's total defeat.

By 1945, Western Europe could not possibly or legitimately enforce its pre-war dominance. Two powerful armies now faced each others in Europe, only one of them European (USSR), the other from the EIR (USA). Both, however, were in the periphery of the traditional center of power both in Europe, since the nineteenth century, and the world, for the past hundred years. Europe had then also lost most of its moral credibility, many Nation-States having forcefully or willingly collaborated with the Third Reich, and participated in the Shoah. Even the United Kingdom lost some of its moral credibility during the *Exodus* incident in 1947, when it prevented the disembarkation of Shoah survivors and expelled them back to Europe from British occupied Palestine.²² Nevertheless, the total victory over the Third Reich earned both the USA and the USSR a profound recognition worldwide, giving them moral credence and entrenching their unparalleled superpower status. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, however, somewhat tainted the U.S. prestige.

2.2) The New World Order

The wartime idea of setting up an organisation of nations to solve conflicts and to prevent war among them was finally realized in 1945. After the Great War, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson pushed forward the idea of a League of Nations, which existed from 1920 to 1946. World War II signalled its failure. The idea behind the United Nations (UN) was to give the assembly an executive arm, the Security Council, which could intervene as it saw fit in order to preserve peace and the world order. Fifty-one nations then constituted the General Assembly²³, with eleven forming the *Security Council*, five of which

²¹ Idem, p. 104.

²² *Le capitaine de l'"exodus" n'est plus*, Libération, December 24, 2009.

²³ United Nations, *UN at a glance*,

<http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml> (Accessed on September 5, 2010)

were permanent members with veto power, and six elected by the *General Assembly* for two-year terms but without veto power. To pass a resolution, seven votes were required, including all the permanent members.²⁴

At first it appeared that the UN General Assembly was void of power while only the Security Council wielded real power, especially its permanent members. The permanent members were the victors of the War: the USA and the USSR undeniably; the UK to a very lesser extent; Free France very much doubtfully; and the Guomindang-led Republic of China, whose sacrifice and determination was unquestionable but whose contribution to the victory over Japan was less certain. With the USA as the dominant American regional power, France and the UK sharing most of Africa and the Middle East, the UK having an extended Asian colonial empire, and China being the historical dominant Asian power, saw themselves as the designated representative of their Regions. Europe received three representatives: France, UK and the USSR, since major wars originated and were fought in Europe for the past two hundred years, the idea being to prevent the emergence of a single political center.

2.3) The New World Order cracks

2.3.1) The USSR

i) The USSR, superpower

By 1950, the USSR was not merely an European power, but a superpower. Inheriting most of the territories colonized by Imperial Russia, stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific and ruling over central Asia, it was the biggest country in the World, although most of its population was concentrated West of the Urals. It had liberated most of Eastern Europe from the Third Reich, making it a vital area under its influence, thus freeing itself from the sanitary cordon that the other European powers imposed in the wake of their failed intervention against the Bolsheviks during in the Russian Civil War (1917-1920).²⁵

The main fear of any power, whether local, regional or global, is to lose its influence and dominance to another power, existent or rising. It then strives to secure its position, either by containing

²⁴ United Nations, Scanned copy of the signed UN Charter, <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf> (Accessed on September 5, 2010)

²⁵ DUBY, Georges (1987), op. cit., p.174, 176-177.

their rivals or would-be rivals, or defeating them.²⁶ Both the USA and the USSR achieved a status unequalled in History: that of global superpower. Classical realism argues that within a multipolar system balance of power, and thus balance of threat, is more easily achieved than within a bipolar system. As such, multipolar systems are more stable, a statement that appears to be corroborated by historical facts: when multiple regional powers face each others, complex shifting alliances tend to regulate their interaction as in Europe from the Vienna Conference in 1815 to the end of the century. On the other hand, when two powers (Athens vs. Sparta; Rome vs. Carthage; the UK vs. Revolutionary/Napoleonic France), or two rigid alliances of powers (the Triple Entente vs. the Triple Alliance) face each other, tensions often lead to Total War.

Thus the possibility of direct conflict between the USA and the USSR, each trying to maximize its power, was increasingly probable, as exemplified by the Berlin crisis of 1947. The Atomic bomb gave an edge to the USA, but only for a limited time. The Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949 wrote a new page in strategic history: mutually assured destruction, i.e., the absence of victory and total destruction of all belligerents in any conflict opposing nuclear powers. Global destruction became a probability in a conflict between the only two global superpowers.

ii) The USSR, Marxist-Leninist alternative

The USSR was also the bearer of a universal revolutionary ideology and project. Marxism-Leninism defended the idea that history is the result of Class struggles. The identity of individuals and groups is determined at the most basic levels by their relationship to the ownership of the means of production. The development of human society was dominated by the concentration of those means of production in an ever smaller group, which exploited the ever growing number of propertyless and alienated producers. This socioeconomic organisation prevents the full development of human possibilities, the great mass of humanity working solely in the interest of the owners, whose only goal is the maximization of profit. According to this theory, the capitalist system must fall, because no system lasts forever; but its course leads to the complete destruction of what society has accomplished until then, and its own destruction in the process. But, in the process, the development of capitalism increasingly socialized both the mass of producers and the means of production, allowing for a more democratic

²⁶ CHÂTELET, F., DUHAMEL, O. et PISIER, É., "Thucydide, 460?-395 av. J.-C., Histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse" in *Dictionnaire des œuvres politiques*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, p. 1162-1164.

organisation of production in the interest of all. Only a workers' revolution abolishing property and radically transforming the political order could save human society from regressing into barbarism.²⁷ Colonies and semi-colonies could also be actors of the revolution because they are part of the capitalist chain, and its weaker link. Independence and the struggles for independence in the colonies would be a catalyst for revolution in the colonial powers, the industrial heartlands.²⁸

The USSR's socioeconomic and political organization was the total opposite of the other industrial countries: the means of production were entirely the property of the State and under its direct control. Central plans had greatly accelerated the development and modernisation of the country, achieving the transition from a mostly agrarian society to an industrial society rivalling other European industrial powers in a few decades. Although its socialism was somewhat remote from the one that may have been dreamed of, rather than actually theorized, the USSR stood out as a model for economic development and emancipation for colonies, semi-colonies and dependant States.²⁹

The USSR feared a military invasion by the USA and its mostly European allies. It therefore created satellite regimes in the areas under its direct control. The capitalist USA feared the expansion of both Soviet influence and communism. In Western Europe, the U.S. organized and funded the *Marshall Plan* (1947-1951) to allow reconstruction and strengthening of its satellites and allies, who, as weakened States fear invasion and as capitalist States fear revolution. The USSR felt increasingly isolated within the UN Security Council: France and the UK, as Western European states, were both directly threatened by the USSR and revolution. The Security Council, which was to ensure peace and stability to the world, was soon paralysed. In 1948, the Western European Union was established between Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK to promote economic recovery and mutual defence in the face of the soviet threat. One year later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a military alliance, was created by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the USA to counter any invasion by the USSR, or any other member of the Communist bloc.³⁰ During the second half of the 1940s, Greece was in

²⁷ STALIN, J. V., *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, New York: International Publishers, [1938] 1970, p. 43-44.

²⁸ STALINE, J. V., "La question nationale" in *Les principes du Léninisme*, Tirana: Naim Frashëri, [1924] 1970, p.71.

²⁹ HOBSBAWM, Eric, *The Age of Extreme, The Short Twentieth Century: 1914-1991*, London: Abacus, 1995, p. 435.

³⁰ European Union, History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm (Accessed on September 5, 2010)

the midst of a civil war between Communist and royalist forces. Fearing open conflict, neither the Western nor the Eastern bloc intervened directly, although informal support allowed for a non-Communist victory.³¹

2.3.2) The colonial and dependent world question

The New World Order rested partly on a U.S./Western European-dominated world, echoing the nineteenth century inherited colonial system. But colonies longed for independence from their colonial powers. Decolonization would thoroughly affect global power relations, economic and market relations and so on. The loss of the French and British colonial empires would directly challenge the status they enjoy in the UN Security Council, questioning even its relevance. The colonial system rests on direct violence exercised by the colonists and the colonial agents on the colonised.³² The development of a native elite and the spread of nationalism³³ are usually met by an increase in colonial violence and repression. The accession to independence in 1947 of India and Pakistan, the crown jewel of the British Empire, in spite of harsh colonial violence and repression, was a major blow to this New World Order. Indochina was in the midst of a brutal liberation war from the French empire. Indonesia (the Dutch Indies), the main colony of the Dutch empire, won its independence in 1949, after four years of a brutal war. The historical colonial powers were increasingly ill-suited to hold onto their colonies, and their defeats served to empower the dominated peoples.

The already anti-communist strongly U.S.-backed Guomindang-led Republic of China, in the midst of a civil war with the Communist Party and its People's Liberation Army (PLA), further isolated the USSR, paralyzing the Security Council. The victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949 and the retreat of the Guomindang to the Island of Taiwan, dramatically transformed East Asia. The Guomindang-led Republic of China, retaining its permanent member status in the Security Council in the wake the proclamation of the Communist People's Republic of China, further demonstrated the will to make the Security Council a tool of a U.S./Western European and anti-Communist agenda (The PRC only took over the duties of the Republic of China at the UN in 1971, at a time when tensions between the two

³¹ LE ROBERT DES NOMS PROPRES, *Grèce*, Le Robert: Paris, [1974]2002, p. 875.

³² FANON, Frantz, *Les damnés de la terre*, Paris: La Découverte, [1961], 2002, p.42.

³³ HOBBSBAWM (1995), op cit., p. 208-209.

Communist giants made the PRC a better geostrategic partner than the Republic of China).³⁴ The Council therefore only existed in name, not in practice.

3) 1965: The rise of the Third World

3.1) The Korean War

The first major conflict of the Cold War took place in the Korean peninsula: the Soviet-backed north crossed the 38th parallel, the delimitation of both Koreas, and invaded the U.S.-backed south in June of 1950. In a divided world, it was immediately seen as an aggression by the Soviet-led Eastern bloc on the U.S.-led Western bloc. The UN Security Council with Resolution 84, of July 7th, authorized the use of force under the UN flag against the North. Four of the permanent members voted in favour (France, UK, USA and the Guomintang-led Republic of China), three non-permanent members abstained (Egypt, India and the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia) while three voted in favour (Cuba, Ecuador and Norway). Technically Resolution 84 should not have passed, the veto-wielding USSR could have pursued the objective of protecting its area of influence. But it had been boycotting the Security Council since the beginning of the year over the fact that, in spite of the Guomintang losing the mainland, it retained its permanent member seat.³⁵ The voting shows the division between the two blocs, one being fundamentally under-represented; it also shows the emergence of a new group of countries, mostly non-European and formally European-dominated, that wished to support neither bloc.

The UN intervention further demonstrates this division. The UN forces comprised Australian, Belgian, British, Canadian, Colombian, Ethiopian, French, Greek, Luxembourgian, Dutch, New Zealander, Pilipino, South African, Thai and Turkish contingents, in addition to an important U.S. expeditionary force, alongside the South Korean army: in other words, mainly U.S., Western European and commonwealth troops. Their only foe was the North Koreans until December, when a massive PLA contingent, the People's Republic of China (PRC) armed forces, came to the help of North Korea, alongside a comparatively small Soviet contingent. In 1953, after three years of bitter fighting, the war ended at a stalemate on the very same 38th parallel. The victorious nations of World War II, and the

³⁴ United Nations, Resolution 2758 (XXVI), *Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations*. October 25, 1971.
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement> (As of 05/22/11).

³⁵ Time magazine online, *Strength on Double Seven*, Monday, July 17, 1950,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,934971,00.html> (Accessed on September 5, 2010).

historical Western European powers, were kept in check by an underequipped opponent. This war can be seen as a struggle between the communist world and the rest, or a war between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc; but the conflict can be seen in another light: national sovereignty and national reunification.³⁶

Until 1945, the Korean peninsula had been part of the Japanese colonial empire since the end of the nineteenth century. Korean nationalism became a central force³⁷, and during the war, numerous resistance groups sprung up, and two became paramount: the Allied-backed Korean Liberation army and the Communist-backed Korean Volunteer Army that was to become the Korean People's Army. Just like Germany, Korea was split between the occupying forces of the two superpowers. The resistance groups fought for the liberation of all of Korea from foreign occupation, while the imposed division and foreign troops contradicted that end. North Korea fought for national reunification and sovereignty, with the help of the People's Republic of China who also fought and won a long war on the mainland for the same goals against the same enemies. The war was fought by both Koreas for reunification, the North and the PLA for Korean national sovereignty, while the UN forces were fighting to prevent the spread of Communism and the expansion of the Soviet bloc. The absence of military victory in a major conflict opposing two former dependent agrarian countries (the PRC and North Korea) against a coalition of industrial countries, some of whom were colonial powers, was a major victory for the dependent and colonised world.

3.2) The end of colonial empires

The absence of victory for the U.S.-led Western bloc in the Korean War translated into political and economic integration in Western Europe and further military integration in NATO. First, the Coal and Steel Treaty of 1951 placed the heavy industries of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany under a common management, to prevent an arms race in Western Europe that could lead to war, especially when the Soviet bloc appeared increasingly unified (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - COMECON, 1949). Then in 1956, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic

³⁶ COCKRELL, Cathy, *North Korea's official propaganda promotes idea of racial purity and moral superiority, scholar says*, News Center, University of California Berkeley, February 19, 2010
<http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2010/02/19/northkorea/> (Accessed on May 22, 2011).

³⁷ GI-WOOK Shin, *Ethnic pride source of prejudice, discrimination, Blood-based ethnic national identity has hindered cultural and social diversity in Korea, expert say*, The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University,
http://aparc.stanford.edu/news/koreas_ethnic_nationalism_is_a_source_of_both_pride_and_prejudice_according_to_giwook_shin_20060802/ (Accessed on May 22, 2011).

Community, a Western European common market.³⁸ In parallel, Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. The fighting in Korea and the necessity to integrate Western Europe to ward off any threat from the Eastern bloc made it incredibly difficult for the colonial powers to maintain their empire. France, like the Netherlands, stretched its military capacity to the limit first in Indochina (1946-1954), then in Algeria (1954-1962). In Indochina, France suffered a major defeat at Dien Bien Phu, resulting in its withdrawal, but secured the partition of Vietnam, allowing the establishment of a friendly State in the south (Geneva Accords). In Algeria, the Front de Libération Nationale's guerrilla made the territory ungovernable, again forcing France's withdrawal (Évian Accords).

Direct political control of colonies for Western European States, let alone large overseas empire, became increasingly difficult both economically and militarily, especially in the face of a possible invasion by the Soviet-led Eastern bloc, whose military was almost fully integrated in the Warsaw Pact, under Soviet leadership, since 1955. Colonial powers peacefully relinquished their direct rule over the colonies and, by the mid-1960s, most African and Asian colonies gained their independence.³⁹ A large number of new States were then integrated into the United Nations, which forced an important reform in 1965: the Security Council was enlarged from eleven to fifteen numbers, ten elected by the general assembly and the extension from seven to nine votes to pass a resolution.⁴⁰

3.3) The Non-Aligned Movement

But the former colonial powers sought to maintain "preferential" relations with their former colonies, comparable to the ones the USA enjoyed and maintained with Latin America, or that France and the UK enjoyed in the Middle East. And this is where these "preferential" relations were first questioned: as long as its constituent states, or any states for that matter, were pawns in the hands of other countries, they could never be independent. Development and national sovereignty mobilized opinions against the traditional monarchies, which mostly sought to maintain their status and privileges at the expense of the State and the Nation.⁴¹ The 1950s and 1960s saw modern revolutions in Egypt (1951), Syria (1954) and Iraq (1958 and 1963), in the wake of the massive military defeat suffered against the young State of Israel

³⁸ European Union, History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm (Accessed on September 5, 2010)

³⁹ United Nations, *Trust and non-self-governing territories, 1945-1999*, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust2.htm#us> (Accessed on September 6, 2010)

⁴⁰ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations (amended)*, Chapter 5, Article 23.1, 27.2, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml> (Accessed on September 6, 2010)

⁴¹ CORM, Georges, *Le Proche-Orient éclaté 1956-2007*, Paris: Folio, 2007, 268-269.

in 1948. This allowed for a rejuvenation of Arab nationalism, of which Gamal Abdel Nasser was a central proponent: Arab unity was the condition for the independence of the region. But a major obstacle prevented it: Israel, a newly settled and established mostly European country, split the Arab world in two at the junction of North Africa and the Middle East. Israel became the focus of Arab nationalism.⁴²

The 1955 Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, in the newly independent Indonesia, gathered twenty-nine newly independent states, representing more than half the world's population. Three leaders stood out: the Chinese Zhou Enlai, the Egyptian (Arab) Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Indian Jawaharlal Nehru. Being young countries, they were politically and economically weak, although they may have been symbolically strong. They had common enemies: the former colonial powers but also the new superpowers, which all looked to maximize their geostrategic interests. These new countries were racing to develop in order to ensure their independence; in other words, they were in nation-building processes.⁴³ And to this end, the Bandung Conference reasserted the Westphalian principles of national sovereignty in a world divided by two superpowers and their satellites. It also upheld the need for collective solidarity and security between the members of this new and un-aligned third world in order to assert their national sovereignty in the face of their common enemies.⁴⁴ The post-World War II divide between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc increasingly became a divide between a North-Western and a North-Eastern bloc while the South, the majority of the world's population and landmass, was collaborating in order to maintain its neutrality in a conflict that did not concern it. In this light, the Cold War could be seen as more of a regional conflict than a global conflict.

National affirmation in the non-Soviet-led world (Asia, Africa and spreading to Latin America) was a threat to the U.S.-led Western Bloc interests. In particular the USA, a global superpower, could not tolerate the receding of its global influence especially in Latin America. In a world where only one superpower had worldwide force projection capacities (USA), the other (USSR) became the unlikely ally of Nation-States, striving for national sovereignty and emancipation. The Suez Canal crisis, sparked by its nationalization in 1956, was ended by the conjoint muscle-bending of both superpowers, which signalled the end of direct Western European involvement in their former colonial empires and, as a result, in world

⁴² GALLISSOT, René, "Libération nationale et Communisme dans le monde arabe" in DREYFUS, Michel et al., *Le siècle des Communismes*, Paris: Seuil, [2000] 2004, p. 391-392.

⁴³ HOBBSAWM (1995), op cit., p. 357.

⁴⁴ Non-Aligned Movement, XV summit, History and Evolution, <http://www.namegypt.org/en/AboutName/HistoryAndEvolution/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed on September 6, 2010)

affairs. But Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, over the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil company, and Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán in 1954, over a land reform that expropriated unused land of large plantations (notably from the U.S. United Fruit Company), were both victims of coups fomented by the USA. Notwithstanding, the resolution of the Suez crisis also emphasized the end of massive military interventions by the U.S. military and Western European militaries over entire regions.⁴⁵

The 1959 Cuban revolution, in this respect, was a major blow to the USA, which made the island for more than half a century a dependent nation. Like Algeria, Egypt, India, the People's Republic of China, the new regime engaged in a course to develop itself and assert its national sovereignty, literally under the nose of a superpower and the regional dominant power. Just as Egypt promoted Arab nationalism, Cuba engaged in the promotion of Pan-Americanism, believing that only the unity of Latin America would contain the USA and ensure national sovereignty.⁴⁶ Against all odds, it defeated the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, a U.S. funded and trained operation, making it a central actor of the Third World. But a year later, Cuba, and the Third World by association, suffered a lasting defeat. Constantly threatened by invasion, Cuba turned to the USSR for backing, giving it a foothold on the American continent. The covert construction of nuclear missile bases in Cuba sparked a global crisis that further fed the fears of nuclear war. To preserve its own interests, the USSR halted their construction, while the missiles would have been a guaranty of Cuban and Latin American sovereignty.

The USSR could no longer hide the fact that it had become imperialist, no different from the USA at that time and what Western Europe had been.⁴⁷ At the beginning of the 1960s, the two Communist giants split over the attitude to adopt toward the U.S.-led Western bloc; the USSR opting for *détente* and the PRC for confrontation. To fend off both U.S. and Soviet imperialism, the Third World now needed an independent organisation to turn to. In 1961, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (an autonomous socialist federation landlocked between both the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc in Europe and threatened by both), twenty-five countries founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), under the common leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah and the

⁴⁵ HOBBSAWM (1995), op cit., p. 360.

⁴⁶ "CHE" GUEVARA, Ernesto, "À la jeunesse de l'Amérique Latine" in Textes politiques, Paris: La découverte, [1965, 1968] 2001, p. 25-35.

⁴⁷ MAO Zedong, *On Krushchov's phoney communism and its historical lessons to the world: Comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (IX)*, July 14, 1964, <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1964/phnycom.htm> (Accessed on November 23, 2010).

Yugoslav Josip Broz Tito.⁴⁸ While the 1965 reform of the UN Security Council maintained the power of the original five veto-wielding permanent members, among which four were imperialists, the NAM provided at times, a common front for its members (although more symbolic than effective) during conflicts with the other two other worlds. Time showed that a loose movement of States in a Nation-building process can find unity, but only with difficulty.

4) 1980: U.S. decline?

In 1945, of all the pre-war major powers, the USA was the only one to have its infrastructure and economy intact. The war kick-started an era of unprecedented growth that contributed to the emergence of the consumer society. The major Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand) also benefited and witnessed the transition to this new society. With the increased enmity between the two superpowers and the threat of revolution, the USA backed the reconstruction of the post-war societies. Western Europe, the Republic of Korea, the Guomindang-led Republic of China, West Germany and Japan, all received economics aid, enabling them to reclaim their pre-war status of major economies. But in this divided world, the USA had no rival in the Western bloc. But does being the world's factory, with unrivalled military capacities, ensure sustained, or even increased dominance?

4.1) The Vietnamese quagmire

Less than ten years after its indubitable victories in Europe and the Pacific, the USA and its mainly Western European allies could not defeat an underequipped enemy on a single front. The Korean War ended in a draw, which was clearly a great victory for the dominated and former dominated world. UN troops needed to entrench along the 38th parallel, and still do today. In the early 1960s, the USA replaced the French in South Vietnam. The country was divided between a French, then U.S.-backed unstable government in the South, a mainly nationalist government in the North, born out of the decolonization and whose aim was unity and complete independence from former and would-be foreign rule. Non-compliance with the Geneva Accords by South Vietnam led guerrilla groups to take up arms. The Republic of Vietnam army, unable to defeat or even contain the insurgency, was relieved by the massive arrival of foreign troops, mainly U.S. troops, by the mid-sixties. Even with foreign intervention, the Republic of Vietnam was increasingly becoming a nominal government, most of the country being in

⁴⁸ Non-Aligned Movement, XV summit, History and Evolution, <http://www.namegypt.org/en/AboutName/HistoryAndEvolution/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed on September 6, 2010).

the hands of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, under the North's leadership.⁴⁹ What made this war different from the Korean one was the lack of UN endorsement or Western European involvement. Most troop support came from the Asia-Pacific region: Australia, Laos, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The USA was therefore isolated in the international community. The USA thus fought the war as if it was a total war, resorting to the military draft and massive use of technology, stretching its resources to the limit.⁵⁰ The 1968 North Vietnamese Tet offensive overran most U.S. and allied positions, although it was defeated, spelled the impossibility of an allied victory.

4.2) Mobilizations and demonstrations back home

Unprecedented economic and population growth in a climate of Keynesian economics sparked social transformations (rural flight, urbanization and democratization of education) on an unprecedented scale. These social transformations had to be met with political change as new political forces engaged in a power struggle with conservative forces (i.e., forces that predate and were not affected by these transformations). Thus, in the wake of social transformations, political change is not automatic. The Civil Rights Movement (1955-1968) shook the democratic USA to its core; it fought for civic equality between races in a country built upon segregation. This movement linked its struggle for emancipation to the struggle of colonial emancipation. Massive opposition, demonstrations, strikes, civil disobedience and solidarity with the Third World during the Cold War, especially in the core of the Western-bloc, meant the political division of the electorate and potential political instability.⁵¹

By the second half the 1960s, the Vietnam War polarized public opinion, especially among the youth. Opposition to the draft and to a cruel war against a people fighting for emancipation resonated across the USA, especially after the disclosure of secret documents about U.S. atrocities, especially the 1968 My Lai Massacre and the secret bombings of North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.⁵² The Civil Rights Movement, the Student Movement (fighting for freedom of speech on campuses) and the Anti-War Movement converged, thus making the opposition to the war a vector for political change at home: women's right, gender issues, state-society relationships, intra-society relationships, parents-children relationships, professor-students relationships, autonomy of the individual, and so on.

⁴⁹ DUBY, Georges (1987), op. cit., p. 237.

⁵⁰ JOHNSON, Paul, *A history of the American people*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 736-737.

⁵¹ ALINSKY, Saul D., *Rules for Radicals*, New York: Vintage Books, [1971] 1989, p. xxiii.

⁵² ELLSBERG, Daniel, *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers*, London: Penguin, 2002.

These movements sprang up in most Western-bloc countries and were usually accompanied by massive workforce strikes. States reacted with political repression, the 1968 Tlatelolco student massacre in Mexico and the 1970 Kent State University shootings, being the most extreme examples. Taking into consideration the size of the movements, the demands and the effects upon society, we can consider that a worldwide revolution took place between 1965 and 1975. For some organisations, change was not fast and important enough, leading them to resort to armed struggle: the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF), among others, in West Germany; the *Brigate Rosse* in Italy; a new wave of *Irish Republican Army* activities in Northern Ireland; the *Weather Underground* in the USA; the *Front de Libération du Québec*; *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) in the Basque Country; and so on.

4.3) Oil as weapon

Israel twice defeated the flag-bearers of Arab nationalism, first in 1967 and then in 1973. During the 1967 *Six-Day War*, Israel invaded and occupied the Golan Heights in Syria, the West Bank in Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai in Egypt. The defeat and the humiliation was unthinkable for those states that were to be the future of the Arab world. Then in 1973, because of stalling negotiations over the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, Egypt and Syria tried liberating them by force. Israeli defeat was a distinct possibility. However, the U.S. came to their help, providing material resources, while being denied the use of Western European airspace except for Portugal's.⁵³ While the loss of the Western-bloc beachhead in the Middle-East, close to Soviet territory, was unthinkable for the USA, and although the Arab advance was broken and pushed back, the USA found itself even more isolated than during the Vietnam War.

During the war, a new actor became involved, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC-founded 1960), a mainly Middle-Eastern organization regrouping Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya (a revolutionary Arab nationalist State since 1969), Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. It imposed an oil embargo on most of the U.S.-led Western bloc, against which the USA could do little or nothing. As a result of oil shortages, the cost of living skyrocketed, causing mass unemployment. The three decades of economic growth were coming to an end, being replaced by a new economic situation: stagflation, combined stagnation and inflation. The Soviet-led Eastern bloc under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev became united and strong, although it was called "stagnant" by later reformers.⁵⁴ This situation could be called a U.S. defeat.

⁵³ HOBBSAWM (1995), op cit., p.245.

⁵⁴ HOBBSAWM (1995), op cit., p. 244.

4.4) The USA and the Third World

In the U.S.-led Western bloc, the Cold War was advertised as a conflict between the Free World and, as it implies, a Non-free World. Free World meant democracy, capitalism being its corollary and condition. But the Third World was ripe with nationalist and revolutionary impulses threatening both U.S. geostrategic and economic interests, while the large numbers of U.S. troops in Vietnam were fighting an unwinnable war. Unable to intervene directly to safeguard its interests, its resources being stretched to the limit, the USA resorted to backing authoritarian governments, mostly military dictatorships, which gained power through coups, some against democracies, as in Greece, 1967, and Chile, 1973, some not, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1965, in Indonesia, 1966. Fascist-leaning Franco and Salazar, the last remnants of pre-war Europe, became heroes of the Free World. By 1980, most of Latin America and the Asia-Pacific was under U.S.-backed authoritarian rule. Africa was split between pro-U.S. (e.g. South Africa), pro-Soviet (e.g. Algeria) and non-aligned (e.g. Egypt) States.⁵⁵

The USA retreated from Vietnam in 1973 and, without direct U.S. support, South Vietnam fell two years later. Vietnam was finally unified under the North's Nationalist Communist government. Laos and Cambodia also became Communist regimes in 1975. In 1967, South Yemen became a Communist state. In 1970, in Africa, Congo also became a Communist State, followed by Ethiopia in 1974. In 1975, after a long war of decolonization against Portugal, Angola and Mozambique followed the same path. South Africa militarily intervened for the Western bloc, while Cuba intervened for the Eastern bloc during the last years of the decolonization war in Angola. Most foreign troops were pulled out in 1975, while Cuban troops stayed. The same year Benin also became a Communist state and Somalia in 1976. In 1978, Afghanistan became a Communist regime. More problematic for the USA, Granada, in Latin America, became a Communist regime in 1979. The same year, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua revived the U.S. fears of Communist infiltration, especially when Communist guerrillas were operating in Colombia, Panama, Peru and San Salvador. Most of these coups or revolutions were also strongly nationalist. A new threat emerged in the Middle-East: political Islam, partly grown out of the failure of Traditional Monarchies and Arab nationalism, triumphed in Iran in 1979.

5) 1995: The fall of the USSR

⁵⁵ *Le "monde libre" et ses dictatures* in Histoire Critique du XXe siècle, L'Atlas histoire, Hors Série, Monde Diplomatique, 2010, p. 56-57.

5.1) The Afghan quagmire

In 1979, the Soviet army came to the help of the Afghan Communist government, fighting a counter-insurgency war against Islamist guerrillas opposed to women's right, among others.⁵⁶ Later that year, over matter of policies, the USSR invaded Afghanistan in order to ensure the Communist government's loyalty to Moscow. Most of the new Communist regimes, born out of coup or revolution, were home-grown and often nationalist, requesting Soviet-backing without relinquishing national sovereignty. Communist or pro-Communist did not mean submission to the USSR, though the loss of a satellite regime was unthinkable for it. However, the invasion was denounced as an aggression against Islam and Islamist militants poured in from all the Muslim world; with the backing of Iran, of the traditional monarchies and the USA (to help the local guerrillas). Over time, the war became unwinnable for the USSR, as it had been for the USA in Vietnam. Its resources were stretched to the limit and the war became increasingly brutal. Political Islam replaced Arab nationalism as the main force for social change in the Middle East. The Eastern-bloc was often compared to an Empire under Soviet rule, but no Warsaw Pact ally was directly involved in the war as compared to the quelling of the 1968 Prague Spring.

5.2) The Reagan presidency

Out of the commotion of the rapid social and economic transformation, the Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War, the Anti-War Movement, the social and political change demands of the urban youth, of the stagflation, the spread of Communist regimes in the Third World, the non-alignment and nationalism of Third World countries, the Iranian Islamic revolution, the U.S. hostage crisis in Teheran, in another word, out of the nostalgia of the 1950s when the USA were the strongest and unchallenged, Ronald Reagan, with a staunchly nationalist, anti-Communist and neo-liberal program, became president of the USA in 1981. Under his presidency, direct confrontation with the USSR through an intense and costly nuclear and space arms race, indirect confrontation with Communist regimes or Communist movements, and indirect aggressive promotion and defence of U.S. interest in the Third World became the administration's policy. Reagan's presidency revolved around replacing the Cold War policy of Containment of Communism with the Rollback of Communism, with the firm belief that the USA had not only the best political, economic and social system, although threatened from outside and

⁵⁶ HOBBSAWM (1995), op cit., p.479.

inside, but that it was also inherently good.⁵⁷ The U.S. support for the Contras, united only in their fight against the Sandinistas, is one of the most important foreign policy aspects, and scandals, of the 1980s.

5.3) The USSR in the 1980s

The command economy dating back to the Stalin years was the engine of the rapid development, modernisation and urbanization of the USSR. If this form of economy, truly existing socialism, allowed for the rapid transition of an agrarian society to an industrial society, the economic infrastructures of a developing country were ill-suited for a superpower. Yet the USSR became in the wake of World War II a developing country with a superpower status. The economy could not provide what the arms races, the Space Race, support and domination of the satellite states, the war in Afghanistan and the Soviet population needed. Shortages were becoming increasingly normal, although the satellites' economic infrastructures were designed to serve the needs and interests of the USSR. Until the mid-1970s, the Eastern bloc economies were nonetheless relatively sound, but the 1973 Oil Shock accentuated the stress. As with any situation where resources, or in this case products, are scarce, inequality, privileges and corruption tend to flourish, especially when the political elite has no confidence in the project that this society set out to build. Nonetheless, the USSR was stable, with no strong political opposition.

The privileged tended to ensure the perpetuation of the system; but when three conservative gerontocrats died in the space of five years (Leonid Brezhnev - November 1982, Yuri Andropov - February 1984, and Konstantin Chernenko - March 1985), the system needed a younger leadership, and often a younger leadership means a reform-oriented leadership. Reform of the system (*Perestroika*) could only come from the top, while the main obstacle was the top level of the system itself. Freedom of information (*Glasnost*) was conceived as a tool to mobilize outside of the official structures in order to shake the system. It was not the fact that the state harboured a poor economy that weakened the system, but the contradictions between the authoritarian conditions of the reform and the powerful undermining force of freedom of information.⁵⁸ This contradiction led to the disintegration of the structures of the USSR.

5.4) The Eastern European satellite States

⁵⁷ ROSENFELD, Stephen S., "The guns of July" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64, (Spring, 1986), pp. 698-714.

⁵⁸ HOBBSAWM (1995), op cit., p. 481-482.

Most of the Eastern European states were born out of nationalist movements and the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German empire, the Russian and the Ottoman empires. They have strong national identities⁵⁹ and have always been threatened by the two strong regional powers that were Germany and Russia.⁶⁰ World War II and occupation by the Third Reich and its satellites spawned resistance movements, either along nationalist or communist lines. But during the 1930s and the war, most Eastern European Communist party leaderships were in exile in the USSR and most of them were purged when Stalin asserted his implacable power over the Party which came directly under his authority. Nevertheless, grassroots communist movements developed during the war advocating national ways to socialism, taking into account the national conditions. Thus, when the war ended and the Cold War set both superpowers against each other, Eastern Europe was to be a buffer against Western Europe. Countries with similar political, economic and social structures tended to have common interests, but were subject to the USSR. National ways to socialism were as much a threat to the USSR as nationalism, while the existence of a Socialist Yugoslavia entirely liberated without foreign aid provided a non-Soviet socialist model. With massive purges, Stalin held Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania, firmly within his grasp.

With the death of the all-powerful Stalin in 1953, the new Soviet leadership was struggling to impose itself, thus opening the way for reformist possibilities. The system was authoritarian, conservative, ineffective, involved high social costs, and was ill-fitted to the national conditions of most countries. Berlin revolted, but was put down by the Soviet army. The Warsaw Pact of 1955 was an acknowledgement by the USSR that it could not maintain its order in Eastern Europe with only its own military. In 1956, the new leadership publicly condemned Stalin's crimes and system during the 20th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.⁶¹ The satellite States engaged in new ways to build socialism, ways that would be less socially costly. Poland and Hungary were the countries with the most reformist movements especially in Hungary; however it ended in failure.

Most satellite regimes adopted reform-oriented policies, often associated with some form of nationalism, which massively developed and urbanized Eastern Europe while more and more students

⁵⁹ HUGHES, H. Stuart, *Revolutionary Years: Comparing 1848, 1990*, Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1990.

⁶⁰ DUBY, Georges (1987), op. cit., p. 165-167.

⁶¹ KRUSHCHEV, Nikita S., *The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, http://ia310842.us.archive.org/1/items/TheCrimesOfTheStalinEraSpecialReportToThe20thCongressOfThe/stalin2_t_ext.pdf (Accessed on November 23, 2010).

attended school and university. In 1968 Czechoslovakia, the new leadership tried to implement "socialism with a human face" to answer the need grown out of the social transformation of the previous decade. But social and political change in one satellite country could inspire demands in others, thus changing the power relations between the satellites and the USSR, but also within the society of each satellite state. As a result, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the USSR, as part of the Warsaw Pact, invaded and quelled the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia. Under Brezhnev, the satellite states' interests were subordinated to Soviet interests, but the leadership of these States reasserted their powers within their own societies, increasingly fearing change.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the economic situation grew worse and the opposition movements no longer came from within the parties or the intellectual spheres, but from the workforce. Strikes were then the weapon of choice to challenge the regimes; demands for the improvement of living conditions was much more powerful than demands for a better system, although they amount to the same thing. The creation of an organization, especially a union, outside party control was the main threat. After the 1980 massive Gdansk naval shipyard strike, Solidarnosc, in 1981 Poland, was the first such organization to be created, and to survive. A union is a powerful tool because it organizes the opposition, and Solidarnosc successfully challenged the Polish Communist government. The economic situation strengthened the organization during the following years, while the government was increasingly unable to improve the economy and the living conditions.⁶²

The absence of Soviet military intervention emboldened the opposition, forcing the government to dialogue with it in 1988. The USSR was in no situation to act while its official policy was reform-oriented, thus opposition formed in other East European countries in the second half of the 1980s. The satellite regimes were not powerful enough to resist widespread opposition on their own, while their population wished to free themselves from Soviet and Russian tutelage. Thus, by the beginning of the 1990s, free or partly free elections were called; the Communists were ousted from office; the Berlin Wall fell; and the German Federal Republic extended its border to the Oder. The opposition also spread to the Baltic Soviet republics, which had suffered Russification like all federated Soviet republics, and whose leadership publicly defied the Soviet leadership.

⁶² SOLIDARNOSC.ORG, *About us*, <http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/en/about-us.html> (Accessed on November 25, 2010)

A failed coup by Soviet conservative apparatchiks in August 1991 gave the last blow to the unity of the USSR. The Baltic republics asserted their independence from a weakened Soviet leadership. Meanwhile, the new power rested in the group around the Russian Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, who defied and broke the coup. On December 8, 1991, the Soviet republics of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine proclaimed the dissolution of the USSR and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, whereby each State retained its sovereignty. The dissolution was ratified by all Soviet republics.

Conclusion: The Cold War, one conflict among many

Until the mid-1950s, the West directly or indirectly dominated a World that could not resist in any ways. Most conflict for world dominance took place in Europe among European States. Yet, WWII changed the balance by shifting power to the periphery of Western Europe: the USA and the USSR, while Western Europe, in ruins, still ruled over its colonies. The New World Order, symbolized and institutionalized in the United Nations Organization, meant to ensure peace and stability and, above all, prevent another War of the magnitude of WWII, rested on shaky foundations. The executive power remained in the hands of the victors, but in such a way that the Communist superpower was isolated.

Rivalries between two superpowers, one could say Empires, one with limited international leverage, led to the Cold War. Although present, the ideological struggle was not as strong as it was in the wake of the October revolution and the Russian Civil War. On the other hand, WWII gave confidence to the colonies that they could break their shackles. Decolonization, sometimes very violent and sometimes peaceful, further affected the balance of power. The Soviet model of development inspired national liberation movements, although nationalism was the central feature. Non-Western nations defeated major world powers that lost their empires, yet these former nations kept their control over international organizations. By the end of the 1980s, even the U.S. seemed to be losing some of its hegemony with the expansion of Communism, the non-alignment of the Third World, its reliance on authoritarian regimes, its defeat in Indochina and its dependency on foreign energy.

The fall of the USSR was the result of a combination of inadequate economic infrastructure to supply the needs of a superpower and the need for reform, with the USSR trampling all attempts at political reform in satellites that would undermine its hegemony. Communist regimes became increasingly nationalist over the years as their elites sought to stay in power. Reform of the economic and political system required going beyond the established interests, thus the need to mobilize outside the

formal structures. The reforms could only be applied in an authoritarian way, yet democratization impeded this process. Nationalist demands, and not only the belief in democracy, led to the fall of the Eastern bloc.

The ideological Cold War was only one aspect of the post-WWII period, though an important one. Yet, Fukuyama and Huntington limit the period to this element and to this element only. This casts doubt on all models that are built on a single premise, the end of ideologies, such as they themselves have proposed.

Chapter 2: The post-Cold War world interpretations

In the wake of the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR, after almost fifty years of analyzing U.S.-Soviet relations, their derivatives and implications, a new analytical era was opening. Most of the theoretical models elaborated prior to 1990 became outdated; the world was no longer divided between two competing superpowers or two competing ideologies or two different socioeconomic and political systems. New observations had to be made, new theories elaborated and new predictions made. Two major theories were elaborated in the USA during or shortly after the end of the Cold War: Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"* (1989-1992) and Samuel P. Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"* (1993-1996).

This chapter is divided into two parts, first, the presentation of Fukuyama's thesis and a critical discussion of his arguments; and secondly, the presentation of Huntington's thesis and a critical discussion of his arguments.

1) Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"*

1.1) The "End of History"

Francis Fukuyama first wrote about his *"End of History"* in the 16th issue of *The National Interest* of summer 1989 under the title "The "End of History?"⁶³ and further developed his thesis in his 1994 best-selling book, *The "End of History" and the Last Man*⁶⁴. Drawing upon Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968), he reaffirms the unilarity, directionality and finality of History: the progressive emancipation and affirmation of reason through the dialectics (internal contradictions that are solved following this process: thesis - antithesis - synthesis) of Ideas, ideas that must here be understood as worldviews. The emancipation and affirmation of reason is the emancipation and affirmation of liberty and equality. The final embodiment of reason is the State and, according to Hegel, the Robespierist-Napoleonic State born out of the French revolution is the final stage of this process because it could suffer no fundamental improvement, or improvements. According to Hegel, and pinpointed by Fukuyama, the Robespierist-Napoleonic State is Kant's Universal and

⁶³ FUKUYAMA, Francis, "The End of History?" in *The National Interest*, issue 16, summer 1989, p. 3-18.

⁶⁴ FUKUYAMA, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, [1992] 2000.

Homogenous State, the inevitable globalization of which will lead to a perpetual peace.⁶⁵ All further improvements could only draw upon, but not affect, the original spirit.⁶⁶

Thus according to Hegel, Napoleon's victory against the Prussian monarchy at Jena in 1806, where Hegel lived at the time, was the catalyst of the internationalization of this State, embodied in the Napoleonic code which was to be imposed in all the territories under French rule. History was at an end because liberty and equality, in their final most definite form, could only spread forward. No viable alternative worldviews could compete with the principles of the French revolution. The emergence of the Kantian "Universal Homogenous State" was made inevitable by Napoleon's victory at Jena, although it might not take place in the foreseeable future.⁶⁷ Kojève, Hegel's greatest 20th century interpreter according to Fukuyama⁶⁸, acknowledging the turbulent 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, said that the last great challenge to reason and freedom, fascism, suffered a lasting defeat from which it could not regenerate itself.⁶⁹ After the Second World War, Liberalism and Communism, the two apparently competing forces aiming to establish the Kantian Homogenous and Universal State, were converging to the same final point because, according to Kojève, Liberalism and Communism are synonymous names for the final stage of society, a politically stable class-less society.⁷⁰ In fact, for Kojève, the European Community, a post-war ongoing building process which ever more integrated the liberal democratic States of Europe, embodied the *"End of History"* because it achieved both abundance and stability in conjunction with a class-less society. Kojève was convinced that the class-less Eastern bloc would soon provide abundance, thus making it indistinguishable from the European Community.⁷¹

Fukuyama, although following most of Kojève logic, breaks from him on the question of the convergence of Liberalism and Communism, the latter having led to tyranny.⁷² He argues that from the 1970s onward, two challenges, or would-be challenges, to Liberalism emerged: right-wing authoritarianism and left-wing totalitarianism.⁷³ At the end of the 1980s, Latin American and Southern European right-wing authoritarian regimes had given way to liberal democracies while Central European

⁶⁵ Idem, p. 60.

⁶⁶ Idem, p. 288.

⁶⁷ Idem, p. 64.

⁶⁸ Idem, p. xxi.

⁶⁹ Idem, p. 67.

⁷⁰ Idem, p. 66.

⁷¹ Idem, p. 67.

⁷² Idem, p. 43.

⁷³ Idem, p. 39.

left-wing totalitarian regimes were threatened to the core, and ultimately liberal democracy triumphed there a few years later. This worldwide liberal revolution was the product of the victory of the idea of liberal democracy.⁷⁴ The best loam for the ideal of liberal democracy to thrive on is the middle class, while a growing middle class makes the victory of liberal democracy all the more likely. Over time, it marginalizes the other interests in society, weakening both the right wing authoritarian and the left wing totalitarian regime, both having thrived in underdeveloped countries characterized by a large peasant class. It is the changes, development and modernization they initiated, encouraged or tolerated that lay at the core of their demise.⁷⁵

By the end of the 1980s, in the liberal democratic countries, Communist party memberships had fallen and the overthrow of the capitalist liberal State was no longer seen as inevitable or even as desirable as it used to among intellectuals. Conservative parties with strong conservative programs were elected (in the UK in 1979, in the USA in 1981, and in Germany in 1982). In Asia, the principles of liberal economics and politics were successfully grafted to post-war Japan; mainland China was moving away from a command economy to a free market economy while thousands of Chinese students were studying in liberal democratic countries; South Korea had become an industrialized society with an educated middle class, and so on. Thus, according to Fukuyama, free market capitalism is a powerful, if not the only, vector for democracy, while free market capitalism is the only system able to sustain long-term growth advantageous for increasing the standard of living of the majority. Thus free market capitalism was increasingly seen by Third World countries as the best economic system for growth, a sustained improvement of living conditions of the majority and internal stability. Most of the Latin American markets were liberalized during the 1980s⁷⁶

According to Fukuyama, political liberalism and democracy are not synonymous. Political liberalism is characterized by the rule of law and rights conferred upon a more or less important number of individuals: civil rights (freedom of possession, by the citizen, of himself and his property), religious rights (freedom of religion and expression of religious opinions) and political rights (other freedoms that do not affect the welfare of the community as a whole). Democracy, on the other hand, is a political system in which citizens elect, by right of citizenship, the government in periodic secret-ballot multiparty

⁷⁴ Idem, p. 134-135.

⁷⁵ Idem, p. 39-40.

⁷⁶ Idem, p 41-42.

elections.⁷⁷ Liberalism and democracy are not always linked, as History proves, but the idea of liberal democracy, born more than two centuries ago out of the American and French revolutions, now became unchallenged at the turn of the 1990s, although not necessarily applied. Thus it is safe to assume that we have reached the endpoint of Human History. Liberal democracies will suffer from internal problems (poverty, exclusion, drugs and so on), but they will not invalidate the idea of liberal democracy.

Thus Fukuyama theorizes that from now on, Liberal democratic regimes will multiply until they are integrated into the "Universal Homogenous State". Over the last two centuries, from 1790 when authoritarian regimes were the norm and only three states were democracies (France, UK and USA), they indeed have multiplied and today most of Europe is democratized and integrating at a rapid pace, authoritarian regimes now being the exception; a similar trend is at play in Latin America and can be found in Asia and in Africa. Liberty and equality embodied in liberal democracy is a universal product of the human consciousness. Thus, according to Fukuyama, the world is divided between the bloc of post-historical systems (liberal democracies) and the bloc of historical systems (States that are not liberal democracies). Liberal democracies may relapse into some form or other of authoritarianism, but this will threaten neither liberal democracy as the endpoint of rational development nor the global liberal democratization of the world in a "Universal Homogenous State". We must now turn to the process that led to the idea of liberal democracy, the struggle for recognition.

1.2) Thymos: the struggle for recognition

Following Hegel, Fukuyama argues that Man strives for recognition from other men but also as *Man*. Freedom does not and cannot exist in the state of nature; freedom is the antithesis of nature.⁷⁸ In his natural state, Man engages in bloody battle for prestige and it is only out of the willingness to risk one's life that Freedom can exist. It is from the desire for recognition, conceptualized by Plato as *Thymos*, that leads to the original brutal war that opposed man to man, the war that Thomas Hobbes so feared. The battle for prestige divides humanity between masters and slaves, and in this social division, the master is truly superior to the slave, freer than the slave, because of the master's constant willingness to risk his life and the slave's constant willingness to preserve his.⁷⁹ For Hegel, and Fukuyama, contrary to Hobbes, this brutal war, and the willingness to risk one's life in war are positive because they are the first steps in the

⁷⁷ Idem, p. 42-43.

⁷⁸ Idem, p 152,

⁷⁹ Idem, p 155-156.

emancipation of reason. The struggle for recognition is the engine of history and as such is innate, necessary and unavoidable.

Thymos can be understood as the assessment of oneself, or one's society. From it, spawns two stands: Megalothymia, the desire to be recognized as a superior unequal, and Isothymia the desire to be recognized as the equal of others.⁸⁰ Society cannot exist and develop without *Thymos*, but as a self-conflicting individual and collective passion, it needs to be nurtured and trained. For most of history, the warring aristocracy embodied Megalothymia, individually fighting among each other, and collectively oppressing the peasantry, both for domination, prestige and wealth.⁸¹ But the fundamental paradox of lordship is that it is the consequence of the struggle for recognition as *man* but that the one who recognizes the other's superiority is inferior, and thus not a complete man. Thus, a slave-based society can satisfy neither the master nor the slave.⁸²

A master has no imperative to change or education; all his needs being provided for. On the other hand, the slave agrees to work for his master in order to preserve his life, but gradually work becomes an ethic and through this work he can alter the natural states of things, discover and educate himself. In other words, he can change and actually changes. Work was freed from nature, and from it stems freedom.⁸³ Owning property satisfies both the needs and desire for recognition. But the slave is not free; he needs to conceptualize freedom and by doing so he becomes superior to his master. This conceptualization is a lengthy process through which representations of the world they live in are elaborated into ideologies.⁸⁴

First, he reconciles himself to his lack of freedom by trying to explain and rationalize it. Of all these tries, Christianity is the most elaborate and the most central in Hegelian History. Its central principle is the universal equality of man under God, and this equality stems from the moral and religious choices that face all men. But Christianity held that equality was not to be enjoyed in life, i.e., on Earth, but in the Afterlife. According to Hegel, God was created by the slaves to embody freedom. Thus Christianity alienated Man because it made him accept his earthly serfdom in the hope of freedom in Heaven. But only Man can emancipate himself; he is therefore alienated and dissatisfied.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Idem, p. 182.

⁸¹ Idem, p. 185.

⁸² Idem, p. 193.

⁸³ Idem, p. 194.

⁸⁴ Idem, p. 195.

⁸⁵ Idem, p. 196-197.

The French Revolution made universal equality an earthly principle and secularized Christianity in the modern liberal democratic State. By rising up and overthrowing the King and aristocrats, the serfs and bourgeois, i.e., the slaves, collectively risked their lives. Napoleon through war and conquest disseminated the revolutionary principles of earthly freedom and equality throughout the whole of Europe.⁸⁶ This new revolutionary State gave and rested upon the equal recognition of all men by granting them universal rights; there can therefore be no improvement on the idea of liberty. Reason having found its fully emancipated form in the liberal democratic State, history as such is at its end. Unlimited accumulation, stemming from desire and channelled by capitalism and modern science, and recognition are the engines that made liberal democracy and the emergence of its ultimate form, the "Universal Homogenous State", inevitable, one could say preordained.

Over time, the aristocracy became less willing to fight to the death over prestige and instead chose the life of the peaceful pursuit of wealth. This process was universal and marks the triumph of *desire* upon *Thymos*. Rearguard actions were and continue to be fought, mainly in the Third World, by the descendants of the glorious warriors of the past in order to preserve the way of life derived from Megalothymia, but in the long run it is unsustainable.⁸⁷ As stated in the *Federalist Papers*, representative government is the only one that can accommodate all interests just as it channelled and simplifies *Thymos* to the desire to be heard.⁸⁸ Two centuries later, the supranational liberal democratic European Community is the embryo of the coming "Universal Homogenous State".

Fascism and then Communism, as ideologies and systems, challenged liberal democracy during most of the 20th century, because of its shortcomings. In the end their failure was more catastrophic than the shortcomings of liberal democracy they sought to remedy. With the fall of Fascism in 1945 and of Communism in 1989, no alternative can reasonably challenge liberal democracy, and more precisely the Spirits of 1776 and 1789. Thus, as proclaimed in 1806 more than two centuries ago, liberal democracy will inevitably spread and universalize. The universalization of liberal democracy will bring about an age of "peace and prosperity", where man could become more content with his comfortable status of *bourgeois*, thus relinquishing his citizenship.⁸⁹ *Thymos* is threatened, while Man is increasingly *without*

⁸⁶ Idem, p. 199.

⁸⁷ Idem, p. 186.

⁸⁸ Idem, p. 186-187.

⁸⁹ Idem, p. 300.

chest, without pride.⁹⁰ It is better that Man has no chest, than that he, just as in his natural State, engages in a duel for prestige.

2) Critical review of the "*End of History*"

2.1) A complex history

2.1.1) World War II: alliances of ideologies

According to the Hegelian interpretation of history, conflicting ideologies, i.e. contradictory conceptions of "freedom", are poised to go to war. Only one can triumph, because it is both rationally and materially superior.⁹¹ But WWII was made possible by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between National-socialist Germany and Communist USSR and by the reluctance of liberal democracies to engage in any European war. Earlier, the liberal democracies did not intervene to protect the Spanish Republic in 1936, while Germany and Italy directly backed Franco's insurrection and even militarily took part in the war. Franco's victory was unquestionable, although the Republic fought until its last breath with undertrained and underequipped militias that only ideological fervour held together. Western Europe feared war because war almost destroyed it two decades before. The French poet Paul Valéry concluded in the aftermath of the Great War, that "nous autres, Civilisations, nous savons maintenant que nous sommes mortelles" (Variété 1, 1924).

On the other hand, WWII was won by the alliance of the prime liberal democracy, the USA, and of the Communist USSR, an impossible alliance according to this evolutionary conception of history. It is commonly held that this "unholy" alliance between freedom and totalitarianism was sealed only because Nazism was the most important immediate threat to Western civilization. But they also saw each other as a mortal threat to Civilization.⁹² Germany waged an ideological war to prove the superiority of its system and the superiority of the Aryans.⁹³ But was the war fought on ideological grounds by the Allies? The USSR sought acceptance into World Affairs as an equal in the early 1930s while it shelved the dogma of International revolution. Yet, it apparently stood for the opposite of Nazism, while Germany was Russia's

⁹⁰ Idem, p. 329.

⁹¹ HEGEL, G. W. F., *La philosophie de l'Histoire*, trad. Bienenstock, Myriam, Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2009, p. 64.

⁹² HOBBSBAWM, Eric, *The Age of Extreme, The Short Twentieth Century: 1914-1991*, London: Abacus, 1995, p. 162.

⁹³ Idem, p.143.

traditional contender over dominance in Eastern Europe.⁹⁴ For the past century, Germany had been France's main territorial rival over competing interests. The UK always sought an equilibrium on the continent while it was unchallenged on the seas⁹⁵, but a strong and aggressive Germany on land and on sea was threatening its dominance over world affairs. The USA, on the other hand, never took part in European affairs but always wanted Europe to lose its dominance.⁹⁶

In the 1930s, all liberal democracies were weakened by the Great Depression, brought about by laissez-faire capitalism. Liberal democracies did not wish to disturb their internal power relationship, especially since the USSR had a growing economy that was inspiring many within their own working classes. Massive unemployment spawned unrest. Germany, defeated and humiliated at Versailles a decade earlier, facing massive inflation as a result of the war reparations, which worsened during the economic crises, was ripe for mass movements. The nationalist populist Nazi Party gained the upper hand and was asked by President Hindenburg to form the government in 1933. Unlike Communism, Nazism was not a threat to capitalism and to the socioeconomic order. The fact that a decade earlier the Nazi-led Munich Coup had failed demonstrated that people are not moved by ideas alone; they need the proper loam.

If Hitler's victory had taken place in Vienna rather than Berlin, would it have had the same international impact? Most of Eastern and Southern Europe was under the heel of right-wing dictatorships, and Mussolini's 1922 *March on Rome* did not affect the balance of power in Europe. But Italy is not Germany. Germany was a large, populous and highly industrialized country, and this is what mattered most. Communist revolutionaries⁹⁷ had hope for the German revolution, because they, like Marx⁹⁸, claimed that only in a developed country, overwhelmingly proletarian, could socialism be built and that only such a country could be the engine of the World Revolution and the powerhouse of the future socialist world they were fighting for. Communism in Russia did not spawn World Revolution. Instead, Nazism took over, and Germany conquered most of continental Europe in a few years.

⁹⁴ WOLIKOW, Serge, "Aux origines de la galaxie communiste: l'Internationale", in DREYFUS et al. (Ed.), 2004 p. 312.

⁹⁵ HOBBSBAWM, Eric, *The Age of Revolution 1789-1848*, London, Abacus, 2003, p. 129.

⁹⁶ MONROE, James, *President's Annual Message*, December, 1823, Archives of the Library of Congress, <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=041/llac041.db&recNum=4> (Accessed on May 23, 2011).

⁹⁷ LUXEMBOURG, Rosa, *Notre programme et la situation politique* - (Ligue) Spartakus, 31 décembre 1918, in *Œuvres II (écrits politiques 1917-1918)*, Paris, Maspéro, 1969, p. 103.

⁹⁸ MARX, Karl, ENGELS, Friedrich, *Manifeste du parti communiste*, Paris, Flammarion, 1998. p. 88-89.

Ideologies are conceived by men and they need men to be fulfilled, but they are not confined to the mind and cannot be. Context, inherited, given and unavoidable objective conditions, upon which men have little or no say, is the loam upon which men built their present and their future. But Communism and Nazism, and liberal democracy for that matter, did not exist a millennium ago; they are therefore historical phenomena. The development of socialism paralleled, but with a slight delay, that of the industrial society and of the urban proletariat, from the second half of the 19th century onward, while Fascism grew out of the frustrations of the Great War. Ideologies are therefore part of the context and, as such, objective conditions. Thus, writing about history without taking into account events or context is highly questionable. If we must agree with Hegel that Napoleon was no ordinary individual, "world-soul (Weltseele)" in his own words⁹⁹, we must also acknowledge, perhaps against Hegel, that these were no ordinary times either.

2.1.2) The Cold War: a great number of issues

A brief depiction of the Cold War was outlined in the previous chapter. This War was fought on multiple levels. The USA and its mainly Western European allies fought to contain Communism, often compared to an ideological pandemic. However, the USSR did not approve of the Yugoslavian revolution and the Chinese revolution, while it actively supported the establishment of People's democracies, on the model of the Popular fronts of the 1930s, rather than Soviet-style communism. Of course, they were to be Moscow's first line of defence, and Moscow ruled over them,¹⁰⁰ just as in the 1930s, Moscow sought international recognition, not confrontation. If there was any ideology in the USSR, one could say passion, it would be Russian patriotism, or nationalism, as exemplified by the Great Patriotic War, the name it gives to its war against Germany. Communism, or at least revolutionary Communism, does not seem to be the only preoccupation of Soviet leaders and its people. Locked in ideological struggle with the U.S., the USSR tightened its grip upon its satellites. The regimes accepted its model, but more as a result of imperial domination than ideological expansion.

⁹⁹ HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, "Hegel an Niethammer, 13 Oktober, 1806" in *Weltgeist zwischen Jena und Berlin, Briefe*, Herausgeben und ausgewählt von Harmut Zinser, Frankfurt/M, Berlin, Wien: Ullstein Materialien, 1982, p. 57-58.

¹⁰⁰ HOBBSBAWM (1995), op cit., p.232.

The USA also aggressively defended its strategic and economic interests: first by advocating decolonization to weaken Europe¹⁰¹, and secondly by supporting regimes, often dictatorships, sometimes at the expense of democratically elected governments, to ensure its economic and political dominance. Anti-communism oscillated from unreasonable apprehended threat to justification, or hypocrisy. In fact, most of the struggle was against nationalist-minded governments or movements. But the USA had been military intervening in Latin America since the end of the 19th century under openly imperialist pretexts. WWII transformed the USA from regional hegemony to global superpower. But WWII made imperialism less justifiable. Anti-communism thus became its rhetorical cloak.

2.1.3) An era of political transitions

What connection could there possibly be between the decolonization of the early post-WWII years and the democratizations of the last two decades of the Cold War? For nearly a century (1860-1960), most of the non-European world was under direct, or indirect, European domination.¹⁰² These modern colonial empires were highly centralized, hierarchical and violent. Nonetheless, they needed indigenous personnel to fill many of the lower positions of the colonial political, economical and military structures. They required professional training and education, thus becoming a learned indigenous elite, growing increasingly critical of both colonialism and imperialism, while yearning for independence, national sovereignty and development. The two World Wars demonstrated the weakness of the colonial powers while a dramatic population growth increased the number of dissatisfied.¹⁰³ The situation was ripe for independence. Long and costly colonial wars in specific colonies made it virtually impossible to enforce colonial rule throughout their empires. Most colonies peacefully gained independence while the few wars were lost by the metropolises.

Decolonization is revolution because it aims to transform the colonies into unified Nation-States. This worldwide and relatively rapid process was to be paralleled with the Spanish American wars of independence (1809-1829) against Spain. But it must also, and perhaps more decisively, be paralleled to the failed 1848 wave of revolution, known as *the Spring of Nations*, which shook most of Europe. This latter wave was exemplified by two types of struggle: 1) failed national attempts to overthrow the ruling monarchies; 2) failed attempts by minorities to gain their independence. In all cases, the aim of the

¹⁰¹ Idem, p.358; although the increasing world division led it to abandon an openly anti-colonialist position.

¹⁰² HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 22-23.

¹⁰³ HOBBSBAWM (1995), op cit., p. 344-345.

revolutions was to establish national sovereignty.¹⁰⁴ They looked upon the French revolution as the universal model for achieving national sovereignty. This struggle spilled over from colonies to nominally independent States such as China, Egypt and most of Latin America, particularly during the Cold War. They were only nominally independent because they were politically and economically dominated by the US, France or UK, which were ready to use force to ensure their interests. Nation-building was central to independence and national sovereignty, thus the wish to free themselves from the Eastern or Western influence during the Cold War.

The democratic transitions of the 1970s and 1980s must be separated into two trends: first Southern Europe, then Latin America and Eastern Europe. Most Latin American States were satellites of the USA; and Eastern European States were satellites of the USSR. Although their political systems were diverging and relying more or less upon nationalism¹⁰⁵, distrust toward Russia and the USA, the traditional regional threats and hegemons, were higher than ever.¹⁰⁶ Economic crisis and inflation were the dominant aspects of the two decades prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Growing discontent led to opposition that neither the satellite regimes nor the superpowers could suppress. National sovereignty was the passion that led to these transitions, the Soviet overlord and its satellite regimes having lost credibility in their abilities to solve the multiple problems. If they became democratic, it was both a consequence of the power struggle between the competing interests and of the democratic façade that pre-transition regimes exhibited, which could be mobilized (e.g., the senate at the end of the 1980s in Poland).¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, the former Central Asian Socialist Republics made the transition to another form of authoritarianism, because popular opposition was minimal.

If there is a dominant force in 20th century politics, and for that matter for the last two centuries, it is national sovereignty and its corollary, Nation-building. Newly independent States were either *National-authoritarian*, like Kemalist Turkey, or *National-democratic*, like Czechoslovakia in the wake of the Great War. Most Nation States (the State claims to draw its legitimacy from an organized people on a delimited territory) for the past two centuries were of the first type, and in the wake of the Russian revolution and the rapid industrialisation of the USSR, they adopted economic dirigism over free market

¹⁰⁴ HOBBSBAWM, Eric, *The age of Capital 1848-1875*, London: Abacus, 2003, p. 103.

¹⁰⁵ TODOROV, Antony, "À l'Est, tentatives de réforme, échec, effondrement", in DREYFUS et al. (Ed.), 2004, p. 440-441.

¹⁰⁶ HOBBSBAWM (1995), op cit., p.445.

¹⁰⁷ Idem, p.489.

policies. National-authoritarian States were more suited for this form of economics. In 1789, National sovereignty gained ground with the French Revolution but faced considerable odds. In 1989, after a long struggle, all States were Nation-States founded upon National sovereignty. If 1989 marks the end of a process, it is that of the universalization of the Nation-State (Communist regimes cannot be Nation-States for the very fact that they claim to draw their legitimacy from and claim that they are led by the working class).

The history of ideologies, and their struggle, cannot in itself account for the historical succession of events. First ideologies are born in an historical context, then they need the proper loam to grow. This loam is also the result of historical events. Hegelian history, and Fukuyama, cannot account for the development of the rival ideologies that were Communism and Fascism. Acknowledging their subsequent apparent failure, Fukuyama concluded that they were inconsequential from the start. It is a moral judgment rather than a political analysis. Even more questionable on his part, he dismissed all that does not fall within the scope of the Liberal-Communist ideological war. Fukuyama's demonstration ridiculously simplifies the complexity of the post-WWII era.

2.2) The question of ideology

We must now turn to the central point of Fukuyama's thesis, that of Liberal democracy. Most criticism, positive or negative, has revolved around this point. The first criticism that needs to be mentioned is the one of Zygmunt Bauman, which cannot easily be categorized as either positive or negative: because Communism aimed to entirely submit nature to Man's control, it was the most modernist of all ideologies. Its success would have heralded a new stage of human social evolution, but its demise abruptly ended modernity. But as such, is the "end of modernity" the "End of History"? Bauman does not think so.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, as post-moderns would phrase it, the end of modernity spells the end of meta-narratives.¹⁰⁹ The negative criticisms¹¹⁰, among which the most interesting are Jacques

¹⁰⁸ BAUMAN, Zygmunt, *Intimations of Post-modernity*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1992, p. 179.

¹⁰⁹ CHARLES, Sébastien, "Penser la fin de l'histoire: le Débat entre Rationalisme Universaliste, Relativisme Civilisationnel et Postmodernisme" in *Exchorésis*, no 2, Décembre 2002.
http://exchorésis.refer.ga/article.php?id_article=47 (Accessed on June 6, 2011).

¹¹⁰ ERIKSEN, Thomas Hylland, "Review of *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama" in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), p. 472-473.

FRITZSCHE, Peter, "Review of *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama" in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992), p. 817-819.

HAGE, Jerald, HOLLINGSWORTH, Rogers, "The End of History, or a New Crisis?" in *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Mar., 1993), p. 199-202.

Derrida¹¹¹, Anthony Giddens¹¹², and David Held¹¹³, point out that inequality of opportunity, socioeconomic inequality, poverty, environmental destruction and the like have not disappeared either with capitalism or with liberal democracy, and most have worsened, as the North-South divide shows. Moreover, both display internal contradictions in practice, if not in theory. Liberalism and capitalism, therefore, must continue to be analyzed, criticized and challenged.¹¹⁴ Anarchism¹¹⁵, Feminism¹¹⁶, Environmentalism¹¹⁷, Marxism¹¹⁸, Social-democracy¹¹⁹, Post-Modernism¹²⁰, and others, many of them still to come, will never cease to be mobilized as analytical models, and other ideological challenges will manifest themselves¹²¹, although different authors favour different analytical and ideological frameworks over others.

On the question of the former Communist World, British historian Eric Hobsbawm goes as far as saying that Soviet reformers idealized liberalism and capitalism without being acquainted with their reality, while neither they nor U.S. and Western European economic advisers had knowledge of the real mechanisms of the Soviet economy. Both liberalism and capitalism were to be implemented through a

JEANNEY, Jean-Noël, "La "Fin de l'histoire": faribole ou forfanterie?" in *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, No. 69, Numéro spécial: D'un siècle à l'autre (Jan. - Mar., 2001), p. 95-104.

¹¹¹ DERRIDA, Jacques, *Spectres de Marx*, Paris: Galilée, 1993, 279p.

¹¹² GIDDENS, Anthony, "Modernity, History, Democracy" in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 22, No 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 289-292.

¹¹³ HELD, David, "Liberalism, Marxism, and Democracy" in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 22, No 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 249-281.

HELD, David, "Anything but a dog's life? Further comments on Fukuyama, Callinicos, and Giddens" in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 22, No 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 293-304.

¹¹⁴ KERLIN, Michael J., "The End of History, Specters of Marx and Business Ethics" in *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 17, No 15, Promoting Business Ethics: The Third Annual International Vincentian Conference (Nov., 1998), p. 1717-1725.

HAGE, Jerald, HOLLINGSWORTH, Rogers, "Review: The End of History, or a New Crisis?" in *Contemporary Sociology*, Mar. 1993, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 199-202.

¹¹⁵ BAILLARGEON, Normand, *Les chiens ont soifs: critiques et propositions libertaires*, Montréal: Lux, 2010, p. 28-29.

¹¹⁶ HELD, David, "Liberalism, Marxism, and Democracy" in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 22, No 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 249-281.

¹¹⁷ LÖWY, Michael, *Qu'est-ce que l'Écosocialisme?* in *La Gauche*, Dimanche 6 Février, 2005, <http://www.lagauche.com/lagauche/spip.php?article1146> (Accessed on June 6, 2011).

¹¹⁸ CALLINICOS, Alex, *The revenge of history: Marxism and East European Revolutions*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 8.

¹¹⁹ HELD, David, "Liberalism, Marxism, and Democracy" in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 22, No 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 249-281.

¹²⁰ CHARLES, Sébastien, "Penser la fin de l'histoire: le Débat entre Rationalisme Universaliste, Relativisme Civilisationnel et Postmodernisme" in *Exchorésis*, no 2, Décembre 2002. http://exchorésis.refer.ga/article.php3?id_article=47 (As of 06/06/11).

¹²¹ VAN STEENBERGEN, Bart, "'The end of history" as a self-denying prophecy" in *Futures*, September 1992, p. 711-716.

shock therapy, which made the situation even worse.¹²² Today's Russia, according to Sergei Prozorov among others, is somewhat removed from the liberal paradigm, while Putin's Russia is built upon the rejection of ideological narratives and a strong yearning for internal and external stability.¹²³ Some even stipulate that Fukuyama's objective is to stifle any debate about Liberal democracy, capitalism and the State of the world, and therefore it is highly ideological in itself considering his rigid and controversial definitions.¹²⁴ According to his theory, how can we account for countries like Singapore, a successful authoritarian capitalist country, or, and this may be a better rebuttal, the one-party system People's Republic of China, which became the world's second economy in 2010 in terms of GDP.

There are also critics of democracy of a different kind, the reactionaries: for Plato, inevitable divisions in democracy leads to tyranny¹²⁵; for Aristotle, power to the poor and the hungry will tear the city apart¹²⁶; for Hobbes, human passion inevitably leads to *bellum omnium contra omnes*¹²⁷; for Joseph de Maistre, democracy lacks the necessary order to sustain society¹²⁸; for Tocqueville, the ever present risk of the tyranny of the majority¹²⁹; and, finally, for Leo Strauss¹³⁰ and Allan Bloom, liberalism leads to relativism which leads in turn to nihilism, the gateway to totalitarianism¹³¹. For these authors (even for Tocqueville, considering that the only form democracy he knew relied on census suffrage), democracy is unsustainable while liberalism destroys what is most noble in man. These critical approaches are interesting, especially since Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom were two of Fukuyama's mentors. For University of Calgary political science professor Shadia B. Drury, Fukuyama dreads the "End of History" rather than celebrates it. Thus Fukuyama is closer to Heidegger than to Hegel, making him one of the latest avatars of "European *Kulturpessimismus*": the Last Man, the fully democratic Man, is not a Man,

¹²² HOBBSAWM (1995), op cit., p. 492.

¹²³ PROZOROV, Sergei, "Russian postcommunism and the end of history" in *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 60, (May, 2008), p. 207-230.

¹²⁴ DUNN, Michael, "Review of *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama" in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 698, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 354-355.

¹²⁵ PLATON, *La République*, Trad. BACCOU, Robert, Paris: Flammarion, 1966, Livre VIII, p. 326.

¹²⁶ ARISTOTLE, *Les Politiques*, Trad. PELLEGRIN, Pierre, Paris: Flammarion, 1993, Livre IV, 4, 1292-a, p. 294-295.

¹²⁷ HOBBS, Thomas, *Leviathan*, London: Penguin, [1651] 1985, p. 185.

¹²⁸ DE MAISTRE, Joseph, *Contre Rousseau (De l'État de nature)*, Paris: Mille et Une Nuits, [1870] 2008, p. 14.

¹²⁹ TOCQUEVILLE, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, Paris: Flammarion, 1981, p. 348.

¹³⁰ STRAUSS, Leo, *On Tyranny*, New York: Free Press, 1991, p. 22-23.

¹³¹ BLOOM, Allan, *The Closing of the American Mind*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, p. 352.

because Man can only prove his worth in mortal combat. The emphasis on violence, according to Drury, makes his philosophy "fascistic" [sic].¹³²

In another trend of criticism, the practical universality of liberal capitalist democracy is challenged. For instance, Zeev Maoz¹³³ opposes the totality of the concept because his research, covering the post-Vienna Conference period until 2002, leads him to think that if "trade polarization" and "economic interdependence" limit the tendency to open confrontation, "alliance polarization" and "strategic interdependence" have the opposite effect. Kim Hyung Min and David L. Rousseau find that, for the 1960-1988 period, expanding political participation and increasing economic integration did not avert international conflict. Quite the contrary, international conflicts usually put an end to economic interdependence. But, when all parties are economically interdependent democracies, conflict is averted, thus confirming part of the liberal hypothesis, especially since democracies have a higher tendency to trade between themselves than with non-democratic States.¹³⁴

Thus, the evolution of the international system is multileveled. Yet, what about the theoretical universality professed by Fukuyama? In terms of economic integration, Catherine Sutton-Brady, Ranjit Voola and Ulku Yuksel¹³⁵ argue that a standardized approach might lead to the loss of the competitive edge of transnational corporations in emerging markets, thus greatly limiting the expansion and strengthening of the global market. Susan Olzak's assessment is more tragic because it deals with globalization's effect on civil wars: cultural globalization that inevitably accompanies economic globalization tends to increase the number of fatalities in ethnic conflicts, while "sociotechnical aspects" of globalization tend to increase fatalities in non-ethnic conflicts.¹³⁶ Foreign policy, still a monopoly of the State, is a central aspect of world politics, yet, even for liberal capitalist democracies, it seems that no

¹³² DRURY, Shadia B., "The end of history and the new world order", in *International Journal*, winter 1992-1993, Vol. 48, p. 80-99.; "I will argue that [Fukuyama's End of History] thesis, wittingly or unwittingly, encompasses a fascistic [sic] celebration of violence and struggle as ends in themselves." (p. 80-81).

¹³³ MAOZ, Zeev, "Network polarization, Network interdependence, and International conflict, 1816-2002" in *Journal of Peace Research*, 2006, Vol. 43, no. 4, p. 391-411.

¹³⁴ KIM, Hyung Min, ROUSSEAU, David L., "The classical liberals were half right (or half wrong): New test of the "Liberal Peace", 1960-1988" in *Journal of Peace Research*, 2005, Vo. 42, no. 5, p. 523-543.

¹³⁵ SUTTON-BRADY, Catherine, VOOLA, Ranjit, YUKSEL, Ulku, "Fukuyama's End of History thesis: Are western marketing theories the end point of marketing theory evolution?" in *Journal of Business & Economics Research*, July 2010, Vol. 8, No. 7, p. 37-45.

¹³⁶ OLZAK, Susan, "Does globalization breed ethnic discontent?" in *Journal of Conflict resolution*, 2011, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 3-32.

State relies on a single theory of the international system: Takashi Inogushi¹³⁷ argues that if the USA encourages increased global integration and global participation, the "Philadelphian" paradigm, it is at the same time staunchly "Westphalian" in the way that it fends back any proposition that it should itself participate and be submitted to the common decisions of the International community, but it is also "anti-utopian" because it does not shy away from intervening in what it considers "failed States".

On the other hand, of those who defend Fukuyama's *"End of History"* theory, some, such as Gregory Curtis, do not challenge the contradictors' assessment of the worrisome state of the world or the problems that face liberal capitalist democracies,¹³⁸ while others, such as New York Times' journalist Thomas L. Friedman¹³⁹ and Financial Times journalist Martin Wolf¹⁴⁰ even question their relevance. Nonetheless, they assert the unquestionable victory of liberalism and capitalism because its two latest mortal enemies, Fascism and Communism, failed and that it is highly unlikely that any ideological challenge will present itself in the future, although this last statement remains undemonstrated. Nevertheless, *Freedom House's* "Democracy's Century: A survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century", written by a team of six, notably Seymour Martin Lipset, Fareed Zakaria and none other than Francis Fukuyama himself, concludes that at the turn of the 21st Century more than half of the World's States are democracies, accounting for more than half the World's population, when there were none a century before¹⁴¹: the rapid fall of the right wing and left wing authoritarian regimes, from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, marks the beginning of a New World Order. But perhaps the most worrisome appraisal is that victory is still equated with superiority, just as in Lafontaine's *Le loup et l'agneau*: "*La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure*". Furthermore, most claim that the combined action of economic and political liberalism, the former being an essential condition for the latter in most accounts, have proved to be the only effective remedy to socioeconomic problems, and will prove to be so as long as the tide is not reversed, which is for them highly unlikely.

¹³⁷ INOUCHI, Takashi, "Peering into the future by looking back: The Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Paradigms" in *International Studies Review*, Summer 1999, Vol.1, No. 2, p. 172-191.

¹³⁸ CURTIS, Gregory, "Review of *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama" in *Population and Environment* Vol. 14, No. 14 (March 1993), p. 401-411.

¹³⁹ FRIEDMAN, Thomas L., *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, London: HarperCollins, 2000, p. xviii.

¹⁴⁰ WOLF, Martin, *Why globalization works*, Yale and London: Yale University Press, 2005, p. 308.

¹⁴¹ Freedom House, *Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century*, 2003, <http://web.archive.org/web/20050307102714/http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html> (Accessed on June 8, 2011).

Most of the positive criticisms of Fukuyama's thesis start with the following premise: liberal democracy and capitalism are the most desirable political and economical forms. But, just like his contemporary negative critics, they treat ideologies as static narratives. But, if we take Catholicism, for instance, we can easily identify an evolution of the doctrine: the Gospels, written in the 1st century; the first Council of Nicaea, in 325; *The City of God* written by Augustine of Hippo, between 413-426; *Summa Theologiae* written by Thomas Aquinas, between 1265 and 1274; the Counter-Reformation at the turn of the 17th century; the Second Vatican Council at the beginning of the 1960s, and the policy of reconciliation with the traditionalist Catholics initiated by Pope Benedict XVI in the 2000s. And, of course, many other lesser known moments that theologians and historians of religions are more suited to point out. As such, there cannot be ahistorical truths, if one accepts the very possibility of "truth".

If ideologies are dynamic, what has then been the evolution of liberalism, especially since Fukuyama opposes a *bad* Anglo-Saxon liberalism, with individualism at its core, and a *good* continental liberalism, with community at its core¹⁴²? Ellen Meiksins Wood, in *The Origin of Capitalism: a Longer View*, explains that by the mid-17th century, England was the only full-blown agrarian capitalist country, and most of its population was systematically subjected to the imperatives of competition production, maximization of profit, surpluses reinvestments and improvement of labour-productivity.¹⁴³ The Crown had centralized all military and judiciary powers, thus leaving land-owners without their privileges and the coercive means to exploit their peasants. Most communal lands were then enclosed and leased for a monetary rent, thus transforming the land-owners, mindful of the improvement their property, into capitalists. This situation was more profitable than public service or commercial trade.¹⁴⁴ It is out of this situation that John Locke's theory of economic and political individualism is derived, in other words English liberalism.¹⁴⁵ The English revolution was the product of a power struggle between the capitalist landlords, former nobles, and the Crown.

On the other hand, when the French Revolution broke out, French land-owners still retained some of their military and judiciary powers, and, above all, their privileges. The *bourgeoisie* was an educated commercial and urban elite that had nothing in common with the English capitalists. They were integrated into the absolutist bureaucracy and derived a lot of their income from the State. The power struggle that

¹⁴² FUKUYAMA (2000), op cit., p 200.

¹⁴³ WOOD, Ellen Meiksins, *The Origin of Capitalism, a Longer View*, London, New York: Vintage, 2002, p. 75-76.

¹⁴⁴ Idem, p. 101-102.

¹⁴⁵ Idem, p. 110-115.

unfolded here was between the *bourgeoisie* and the nobles and it is from it that continental liberalism developed.¹⁴⁶ Many conflicts of interests dominated the revolution, which went through numerous governments and political structures, Napoleon being victorious in the end. The French writer Chateaubriand (1768-1848) judged him more severely than Hegel: "La Révolution, qui était la nourrice de Napoléon, ne tarda pas à lui apparaître comme une ennemie; il ne cessa de la battre."¹⁴⁷

If the question of ideologies is addressed without understanding the conditions in which they developed, mobilized opinion, and served as the basis of political systems and policies, it can only be through moral judgments. In the same way, how to speak of political systems and policies without scrutinizing their origin, evolution and demise, other than by way of moral judgement? Fukuyama displays crude ignorance, and vaunts it as theoretical necessity.

2.3) The question of historicism

To acknowledge the succession of historical events, to interpret history and to identify trends is different from speculating on its destiny. Fukuyama does such speculation, arguing that universal liberal democracy is the inevitable end point of history. Therefore, Communism and Fascism are nothing more than accidents, ideologies that were not supposed to be. If Fukuyama's interpretation of history is already overly simplifying, the fact that he speaks of history as a deterministic evolutionary process with a known endpoint is most perplexing because it diverges from what is actually observable. He bases his assertion that history is both directional and deterministic upon the inevitable development of modern natural sciences.¹⁴⁸

To linear history, some oppose a cyclical history among which we could mention the realists of the International Relations subfield, in particular Hans Morgenthau¹⁴⁹ and E. H. Carr. They argue that, because Man and States are inevitably subjected to laws of nature that force self-preservation, competition is the spontaneous characteristic of world politics. History goes through phases of equilibrium, when a balance of power is voluntarily achieved, and disequilibrium, when the international Statu Quo is challenged. Neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz¹⁵⁰, go even further in the cyclical logic:

¹⁴⁶ Idem, p. 182-189.

¹⁴⁷ DE CHATEAUBRIAND, François-René, *Mémoire d'Outre-Tombe*, Paris, Flammarion, tome 3, p. 647.

¹⁴⁸ FUKUYAMA (2000), op cit., p. 72-73.

¹⁴⁹ MORGENTHAU, Hans J., *Politics among nations. The struggle for power and peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 4-15.

¹⁵⁰ WALTZ, Kenneth, *Theory of international politics*, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 74-77; 91.

breaking away from the "human nature" premise, they postulate instead that the structure of the international system (anarchy), by shaping the national interests of each State, leads in itself to equilibrium. Yet, a lasting equilibrium can only be achieved with two or more hegemons, preferably two, acting as the stabilizing agents within the world system, around which lesser powers bandwagon.¹⁵¹ Thus, history is limited to the cyclical rise and fall of Great Powers. Waltz anticipated in 1993 a return to multipolarity, thus to a period of uncertainty, within the next quarter of a century.¹⁵² Another cyclical approach to history is the one adopted by those we could call the "civilizationists", who share a lot with neorealists by arguing that history is the succession of "Great civilizations", which encompass more than one State, but whose dominance lasts centuries, if not millennia. Among these "civilizationists", Oswald Spengler¹⁵³ argued that Civilizations followed an inevitable course that led from birth to rise, from rise to decline and finally from decline to a violent death, giving way to a more youthful civilization. A century ago, Spengler was convinced that the West was drawing closer to its death.

A hybrid approach, combining both linear and cyclical characteristics, is the one adopted by George Modelski and William R. Thompson¹⁵⁴ who argue that since its establishment, which they date around the time of the Portuguese and Spanish discoveries at the turn of the 15th century, the global political system followed a course of constantly expanding integration (political, economic, social....) but in phases that systematically favoured the bandwagoning of an ever greater number of States around the most democratic and internationally integrated State. Each phase is characterized by the identification of a "major problem" that only this State can meet. A less integrated and less democratic State will be its main challenger, who until now has always initiated hostilities and failed. The transition from one phase to the other, in other words from one leadership to the other is always peaceful. Now that a majority of States are democracies integrated into the world system, democratic procedures will increasingly become the global norm, supranational institutions will increasingly structure international relations while a global public opinion will lead to a global civil society. But the global democratic coalition is not as yet without challenge, which implies a future and superior evolutionary phase in which a more integrated and more democratic leader and coalition will exist. Yet for our phase, whether the solution to the challenge will be

¹⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 132-133.

¹⁵² WALTZ, Kenneth, "The emerging structure of International politics" in *International Security*, 1993, no 18, p. 44-79.

¹⁵³ SPENGLER, Oswald, *The decline of the West, Form and Actuality*, tr. ATKINSON, Charles Francis, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1918 p. 31.

¹⁵⁴ MODELSKI, George, THOMPSON, William R., "The long and short of global politics in the twenty-first century: An evolutionary approach" in *International Studies Review*, Summer, 1999, Vol. 1, No. 2, Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures about the Next Millennium, p. 109-140.

violent, like in the previous phases, or peaceful, which a global democratic majority makes possible, is the major uncertainty.

The question remains: can we really predict with exactitude what is to come? As surprising as it may be, Karl Popper, the famous opponent of long term historical predictability, in his 1957 preface to *The Poverty of Historicism*, lays down five statements to refute historicism that are also based on the development of modern natural sciences, the very same natural sciences on which Fukuyama bases his teleological understanding of history:

- 1) The course of human history is strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge;
- 2) We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our scientific knowledge;
- 3) We cannot therefore, predict the future course of human history;
- 4) This means that we must reject the possibility of a *theoretical history*; that is to say, a historical social science that would correspond to *theoretical physics*. There can be no scientific history theory of historical development serving as a basis for historical prediction.
- 5) The fundamental aim of historicist methods is therefore misconceived; and historicism collapses.¹⁵⁵

According to Popper, we can only account for what has passed and yet, the further we look back, the more patchy our knowledge of human history becomes. Nevertheless, this does not negate the possibilities of trends, if they are not assimilated to universal laws. Fukuyama, in his afterword to the 2006 edition of *The "End of History" and the Last Man*, defends his historicism by saying that it is "only weakly deterministic". And yet, he does not forgo the *"End of History"* and the inevitable coming of the Universal Homogenous State.¹⁵⁶

The French philosopher Jacques Derrida reminds us that the topic of the *"End of History"* was very popular in the 1950s.¹⁵⁷ Fukuyama's thesis is therefore closer to a messianic religious doctrine, with a strong emphasis on providence, a disincarnated force that will convert all to liberalism and capitalism either by itself or through the actions of men, unopposed.¹⁵⁸ And yet, the study of the past century shows that nationalism, national sovereignty, nationhood and nation-building were probably the strongest forces

¹⁵⁵ POPPER, Karl, preface to *The Poverty of Historicism*, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, [1957] 2005.

¹⁵⁶ FUKUYAMA (2000), op cit., p 354.

¹⁵⁷ DERRIDA, Jacques, *Spectres de Marx*, Paris: Galilée, 1993, p.37.

¹⁵⁸ Idem, p 104-105.

of that historical period. The concept of Nation implies a shared language, a shared culture and a shared past, or so are we told.¹⁵⁹ Finally, John Gray argues that it would be downright naïve to believe that economic development in non-Western States is entirely the consequence of the adoption of Western Liberal principles and institutions, but that each society draws from multiple influences.¹⁶⁰ In a 1995 article, Francis Fukuyama acknowledges that inherited formal and informal social structures, regardless of ideology, have a part in a country's economic development.¹⁶¹ Yet this question of culture is absent from his "End of History" thesis, while it is the basis of Samuel P. Huntington's "*Clash of Civilizations*" thesis, developed in opposition to Fukuyama's "*End of History*". It is to this thesis that we must now turn.

Conclusion: History is still unfolding

Fukuyama's history is directional and with a definite endpoint: the history of mankind is the "discovery" and realization of freedom. Ideologies go through a process of opposition and synthesis, yet today only one ideology stands out. Liberal capitalist democracy is the last stage of this process, because the ideas cannot be improved as the sudden fall of the USSR proves. Yet, the study of the 20th century gives a more complex picture of the historical processes that took place, not to mention the interactions between apparently totally opposed ideological actors (e.g., the Sino-American rapprochement during the Nixon administration and Mao's Cultural Revolution). Furthermore, ideologies do not move people by themselves; they need the proper loam, the proper objective conditions at play. Thus ideologies are born and developed in definite historical conditions. Nevertheless, the idea of an evolutionary history, let alone the assumption that not only does ideological and regime change take place but that it affects the behaviour of States in the international system, is closer to what can empirically be observed than is realism with its State-centrist approach and its assumptions of an immutable State nature. Yet, the course of human history is linked to the accumulation of human knowledge. Because we cannot accurately predict future knowledge, we cannot accurately predict the development of human history. At the time of Hegel, the main conflict was between Christianity and Liberalism; he could not have predicted the development of Socialism. Similarly, Fukuyama cannot be taken seriously when he argues that we have reached the "End of History".

¹⁵⁹ HOBBSBAWM, Eric, *Nations et nationalisme depuis 1780, programme, mythe et réalité*, Paris: Folio, 1992, p. 191.

¹⁶⁰ GRAY, John, "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Present" in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1998, Vol. 74, No. 1, p. 149-163.

¹⁶¹ FUKUYAMA, Francis, "Social Capital and the Global Economy" in *Foreign Affairs*, Sept.-Oct. 1995, Vol. 74, No. 5, p. 89-103.

3) Samuel P. Huntington's "*Clash of Civilizations*"

Samuel P. Huntington first wrote about his "*Clash of Civilizations*" in the summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs* under the title "The Clash of Civilizations"¹⁶² and further developed in his 1996 best-selling book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.¹⁶³ In spite of the fact that for the last four centuries until 1989, most conflicts, military or not, were internal to the West (between princes in the 17th and 18th century, nations in the 19th, and ideologies in the 20th), the fall of the USSR and Communism should have reminded policy makers, among others, that the West no longer dominates the world. In particular, Political Islam was propelled to the status of global actor with the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the victorious Mujahidin resistance against the Soviet army in Afghanistan during the 1980s. The Rest is no longer a passive subject of history. Thus, for the first time in history, the undivided West faces challenges from outside its immediate geographic area.

3.1) A world of civilizations

During the Cold War, the world was divided along the lines of economic and political systems: the Capitalist First World, the Communist Second World and the neither Capitalist nor Communist Third World. Now that the Capitalist-Communist division has become irrelevant, a new analytical framework is required. In the post-ideological world, cultures and civilizations are more than ever fundamental. Although each level of human organisation from local to global (villages, regions, provinces, nations, ethnic groups, religious groups and so on) have distinct cultures from one another, they share common traits making them part of always greater cultural groupings. However, there is no single global culture; the largest groupings are civilizations. A civilization as such is the largest cultural grouping to which individuals feel they belong. Thus civilizations are not delimited by geography or demography, nor by a minimal number of Nation-States. But above all, Civilizations are born, evolve and die over time.

Although there has been much speculation about the emergence of a universal civilization, i.e., a single global civilization, as a consequence of modernization, industrialization, urbanization and especially by the Westernization of the national elites and the spread of Western-style consumption patterns, all these changes do not change non-Western attitudes towards the West.¹⁶⁴ Since, most media,

¹⁶² HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilizations" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), p. 22-49.

¹⁶³ HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

¹⁶⁴ Idem, p. 56-58.

communication and telecommunication systems being Western-controlled, non-Western populist politicians have taken the habit of the denouncing Western cultural imperialism. The central feature of civilization being language and religion, the emergence of a universal civilization should be paralleled with the emergence of a universal language and a universal religion.¹⁶⁵ Such is not the situation, in fact the trend is more to babelization, i.e., the multiplication of daily use-languages, while religious fundamentalism is on the rise.¹⁶⁶

Although Nation-States are, and will likely remain for some time, the main global actors¹⁶⁷, they are part of "seven or eight major civilizations": Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and "possibly" African. The immutable inherited cultural differences between civilizations are central to their identities, while the ever-increasing level of interaction in a globalized world exacerbates them. On the other hand, globalization, modernisation and urbanisation are paralleled not only by receding local but also national identities, a gap that is quickly filled by the civilizations' core religion, especially in its fundamentalist form.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, non-Western civilizations increasingly challenge the universalism of Western values and ways while intra-regional trade is on the rise, facilitated by cultural proximity. Civilizations are thus more than likely to clash at a micro-level, armed conflict opposing groups on the fault-lines between them, and at a macro-level between their leading Core States who seek greater influence in world affairs.

3.2) The "Clash of Civilizations"

The macro level of conflicts is between the core States of each civilizations: i.e., China-USA (Deng Xiaoping even talked of a new Cold War), Japan-USA and so on. The conflict is neither economic nor racial; it is cultural. Intra-civilizational economic conflicts, like the ones between the USA and the European Community, are not lived as intensely as with States of other civilizations. Of course there is a wide range of possible interactions, the most probable incorporating varying degrees of violence. They will tend to support their civilizational relatives: during the war in Yugoslavia, Germany helped Croatia; Russia and Greece helped Serbia; while Saudi Arabia and Turkey helped Bosnia. In the Gulf War, Muslim countries diplomatically rallied with expansionist Muslim Iraq against the Western coalition that

¹⁶⁵ Idem, p. 59.

¹⁶⁶ Idem, p. 64.

¹⁶⁷ Idem, p. 135.

¹⁶⁸ Idem, p. 36.

came to liberate Muslim Kuwait. Nevertheless, all out war between Civilizations or Core States of Civilizations is most unlikely.

The micro level conflicts are on the borders of civilizations. The Cold War lasted while the Iron Curtain divided Western and Eastern Europe along ideological and political lines. With its dismantling, Europe became divided along religious lines: Western Christianity in the West facing Orthodox Christianity and Islam in the East. The Europe of 1990s and beyond is the one of the 1500s. The peoples of Western Christianity (Catholics and Protestants) went through the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, making them better off than their Eastern neighbours who lived for centuries under the rule of the Tsars and the Ottomans. And as the dissolution of Yugoslavia showed, the division lines are soaked with blood. On the other hand, intra-Civilizational boundaries are most likely to remain peaceful.

The other division is with Islam in the South and South East, a conflict lasting for more than a millennium. With the retreat of the West from its colonial empires, the likelihood of confrontation is on the rise. The danger comes from Arab nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, oil-dependency towards the Middle East and so on. While development empowers democratic forces in the authoritarian Arab world, anti-Western forces are likely to be the foremost beneficiaries of democratization. The sustained population growth and immigration from the Arab world to the West are answered by animosity and racism. Islam's borders are the bloodiest in Orthodox Europe, Hindu India, and Christian Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, Confucian China has an ongoing dispute with its Central Asian neighbours, while its policies toward Muslim Uyghurs and Buddhist Tibetans are harsh. Ethnic cleansing is more likely to happen between civilizations than within them.

3.3) A new brand of international politics

Thus, according to Huntington, for the first time in history, the West is undivided, peaceful, while facing no economic and military challenges from other civilizations. It dominates all international institutions and, through them, dictates its will to the world, posing as the world community. The Rest feels growing resentment towards the West's universalistic tendencies, seen as blunt imperialism and arrogant ethnocentrism. In fact Western values (individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets and the separation of Church and State) have spread to all other civilizations, but they often come into conflict with their core values. The very idea of

universalism is of Western design, while many civilizations stress the uniqueness of their culture. Non-Western democracies are most of the time the result of Western colonialism. Three possible courses of action now face the Rest, and henceforth will dominate international politics: Westernization; isolation, with the high costs associated; and economic and military balance while cooperating with other non-Western States.

While multicivilizational countries are very likely to break apart in the coming years, some relatively homogenous countries are divided upon whether they are Western or non-Western (e.g.: Mexico, Russia and Turkey). Their leaders are searching for greater cooperation and integration with the West while their populations share a greater attachment to another civilization.¹⁶⁹ At the same time, other forces want to emphasize other and closer intercivilizational connections, for example, Russia with the Muslim Caucasus and Central Asian republics. To operate such a civilizational redefinition, the country's economic and political elite, as well as its population, must agree to it, and so must the future recipient civilization. Above all, do the country and the recipient civilization speak the same political language?

The civilizational distance between a civilizational core State and lesser States of other civilizations will influence the lesser State's abilities to join and integrate the core State's civilization.¹⁷⁰ The integration of Latin American and Eastern European States in the West would be easier than for Orthodox States, and the most difficult for Islamic, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist States. Although Japan is a civilization of its own, it is strongly associated with the West. On the other hand, countries which cannot join or which refrain from joining the West develop in order to counterbalance the West while seeking cooperation with other non-Western States. With the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, most Western countries are limiting their military capabilities. On the other hand, non-Western States such as China, North Korea and Middle-Eastern States are increasing theirs, through trade or domestic programs.

During the Cold War, the West's goal was to contain and then roll back both Communism and the USSR's influence, thus engaging in arms races. Now that the Cold War is over and Russia a lesser threat than the USSR was, the West's new goal is to prevent the emergence of non-Western challenges by any means necessary. Non-proliferation is actively advocated by its main beneficiary, the West, while it

¹⁶⁹ Idem, p.139-154.

¹⁷⁰ Idem, p. 139.

threatens with sanctions, economic or not, those States who engage in activities that it deems violate non-proliferation.¹⁷¹ Its wrath is usually directed against those actually or potentially hostile to it. To counter the West, military, scientific and technological exchanges and agreements will link States of the same civilization with its core State, link non-Western civilizational core States or core States with lesser States of another civilization.¹⁷²

One such connection is the Confucian-Islamic connection.¹⁷³ China is actively pursuing the development of its military capabilities by importing arms and technology from former Soviet republics and domestic programs. It aggressively seeks dominance in the South China Sea, thus sparking a regional arms race. It has established trade links with Islamic countries, exporting military equipment and nuclear know-how. An arms race opposes the Confucian-Islamic alignment with the West. One side seeks improved military capabilities while the other seeks only to counter arms building in the challenger States.

3.4) The West and the Rest

The West was the first civilization to modernize, introducing industrialization, urbanization, mass education, high literacy and so on. This is the product of Western Christianity, first Catholicism then, and predominantly, Protestantism. No other civilization has ever inherited as much from a previous civilization as it did from the now defunct classical civilization (Greco-Roman). Only in the West did a majority of languages emerge that are still used today. The separation of Church and State is central to its identity, and absent from other civilizations. Only in the West are the ideas and materialization of Rule of Law, social pluralism, representative bodies, individualism and so on, native. The West is thus a civilization like no others, where living conditions are matched nowhere.¹⁷⁴

The West is increasingly de-Westernized and on "the brink of decay", especially the evermore secularized Europe, showing signs of "moral decline, cultural suicide and political disunity." Minorities tend to reject assimilation within their host nation and civilization, e.g.: Latinos in the USA and Muslims in Europe. That makes them cleft countries, prone to internal strife. Strong faith in the USA makes it more resilient, but the USA remains nonetheless under threat from multiculturalist intellectuals and publicists, who wish to incorporate foreign cultural elements into Western civilization, and supplant the

¹⁷¹ Idem, p. 192.

¹⁷² Idem, p. 185.

¹⁷³ Idem, p. 189.

¹⁷⁴ Idem, p. 68-72.

American creed with individual rights. The rejection of the American creed would mean the end of the USA, and, as its core, the end of Western civilization.¹⁷⁵

Europe being the only source of liberal democracy, Western States must: actively promote their inherited Western values; contain, if not rollback, non-Western cultural affirmation within their borders; increase their level of integration and integrate Eastern Europe; increase the Westernization of Latin America; prevent the development of non-Western challenges; maintain close cooperation with Japan; recognize Russia as the core of the Orthodox civilization; and refrain from interfering within other civilizations. Only at this price, will the unique civilization that is Western civilization survive and strive.

4) Critical review of the "*Clash of Civilizations*"

4.1) Politics of Civilizations?

Huntington's model of inter-Civilization relations, where Civilizations are loose confederations of States united by core values around a "core State", is clearly derived from classical realism's inter-State relations model, up to the emphasis on the "voluntary" equilibrium. To analyze Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations", or any interactions between civilizations for that matter, we must first acknowledge the existence of civilizations. For a critical review of Huntington's thesis, we have to use the "seven or eight" civilizations that are the basis of Huntington's framework: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American, and "possibly" African. To speak of civilizations as global political actors, we must identify historical examples of intercivilizational interactions, among which, of course, clashes should be central. Already, we face a theoretical problem: how to conceptualize intercivilizational interaction, if States remain the main actors? Max Weber in *Politik als Beruf* gave one of the most well-known definitions of the State: "an organized human community within a delimited territory that successfully claims for itself the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence."¹⁷⁶ Upon reading such a description, one cannot but think of the somewhat modern Nation-State. Notwithstanding, until the mid-20th century, large Empires were historically more common than Nation-States.

¹⁷⁵ Ibidem, p. 304-307.

¹⁷⁶ WEBER, Max, *Le savant et le politique*, Paris: 10/18, [1959, 1962] 2005, p. 125.

Thus, we must distinguish Empire from Nation-State. The very idea of Nation is of recent design. According to British historian Eric Hobsbawm, the Revolutionary State in France created the French nation, notably by imposing a regional dialect as the official language to a population that spoke a wide variety of dialects.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, what was France prior to the Revolution? It was the Kingdom of France, where the powers of the rulers were granted by God. As such, it had no defined population, or territory for that matter. The European nobles, notwithstanding the rivalries between kingdoms, had more in common with each other than with their serfs, the semi-enslaved people they ruled over. They also worked to lessen the differences among themselves while deepening their differences with their serfs, notably by speaking a common language: French, the language of the noble elite of the most powerful kingdom at the time. On the other hand, the serfs attached to a noble had little contact with serfs attached to another noble; distances and means of transportation further limited contacts with the far-reaching corners of the kingdom. They had more in common with the serfs in their own region, which could be split among more than one power.

Until well into the 19th century, European States had no linguistic or ethnic unity, and therefore no cultural unity. Even religion was not universal within kingdoms, although religious affiliations were mostly regional and remain so to this day, thus there were internal religious civil wars such as the 1572 Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre and continental religious civil wars such as the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Divine Right rule and religious diversity are not compatible, therefore, religious civil wars threatened stability, thus the need for compromise. As a result, most European countries were and are, in the words of Huntington, "cleft countries".¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, European kingdoms and their political systems lasted for almost a millennium, demonstrating the resilience of such political systems.

European States were peasant societies with a minimal level of integration. It is therefore no surprise that the national revolutionary impulses that drove most of the 19th and 20th century originated from urban centers, mainly the European or regional capitals¹⁷⁹. Urban centers are densely populated over a limited territory, with a common language, a majority religion and, therefore, a common culture. Urban centers are also characterized by a high level of trade professionalization and non-traditional social stratification. The capital city being the State's political center, it is usually the largest urban center with a

¹⁷⁷ HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations et nationalisme depuis 1780, programme, mythe et réalité*, Paris: Folio, [1990] 1992, p. 47.

¹⁷⁸ Idem, p. 24.

¹⁷⁹ DUBY, Georges, *Atlas historique, l'histoire du monde en 317 cartes*, Paris: Larousse, 1987, p. 83.

Third Estate political professional elite. Revolutions were the product of urban insurrections in times of crisis, and revolutionaries were engaged in remaking the identity of the territory and its population in the image of the capital city's identity that they felt was both evident and universal.¹⁸⁰

Thus, an Empire, compared to a State, is a grouping of States under a single political authority. It does not have a homogenous language, culture and religion, except within the political structures that bound the Empire together. Such was the Carolingian Empire, the Roman Empire and, before that, the Macedonian Empire. On the other hand, a territory with a more or less homogenous language, culture and religion, such as Latin America today, can be made of numerous States. The rise of national consciousness among the majority of a State's population is linked with the rise of public education, often centrally organised around common symbolism, language, interpretation of history, civic virtues and so on. Thus, national revolutions of the past two centuries fostered public education to create and shape a collective consciousness. To speak of Civilizations with "immutable core values" is a blatant distortion of reality.

4.2) A Western civilization?

Prior to the mid-19th century, most interactions in Europe were between States, especially between monarchs and nobles, because nations were still in the making. According to Huntington, Christianity unified Europe. Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire under Theodosius I in 392 A.D and spread throughout Europe in the centuries following its fall in the 5th century. Not until the 10th century, can we consider Europe Christianized. To some extent, the Christian church inherited the political structure of the Roman Empire and-expanded it. Christianity sustained itself through the dynamic relation of dogma and institution. Nevertheless, it suffered numerous schisms: the 11th century Western and Eastern schism that followed the Western and Eastern Roman Empires dividing line; the turn of the 14th century split in the Western church between Avignon (Antipope), France, and Rome (Pope), among other religious centers; the 16th-century reformation and the subsequent multiplication of Protestant churches. Thus Europe displays no religious unity, although most religious currents stemmed from the same origin. Notwithstanding, religious unity never prevented war as the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) proves.

¹⁸⁰ HOBBSBAWM (1992), op cit, p. 35.

If we are to acknowledge the leading role of civilizations, civilizations must have some form of intracivilizational political unity or a political hegemon. One cannot deny that for most of the past millennium, most conflicts have taken place within the civilizational borders identified by Huntington, as Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker, among others, have demonstrated.¹⁸¹ Civilizational interactions accelerated with the advent of the Age of Discovery in the 15th through 17th centuries, facilitated by the improvement of maritime transport, but only became sustained from the 19th century onward with the expansion of European colonial empires.¹⁸² Even the common borders of Western Christendom and Islam, although mostly separated by an inland sea, if such a broad ensemble can be acknowledged, were relatively peaceful compared to their internal divisions. Toledo, Spain, and Sicily, Italy, in the Middle Ages were peaceful cosmopolitan centers that enjoyed intellectual ferment. Intercivilizational borders became bloodier in times of expansion, religious or not.¹⁸³

Huntington's civilizations, with the exception of Japan, have no political unity, although Europe has been slowly politically integrating since the 1950s, and South America for over a decade. Political integration seems more easily accomplished by democracies¹⁸⁴, as the absence of political integration in the Arab world shows, and is even more difficult in the Muslim world. Arab nationalism promoted by National-authoritarian States in the 1950s and 1960s never led to a lasting united Arab republic encompassing all Arab States. The only attempt was the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria founded on February 22, 1958; it lasted only three and a half years.¹⁸⁵ Defence treaties and arms sales can link states within and between civilizations, but in the age of Nation and Nationalism it is simplistic to assume these links are civilizational connections.

Nevertheless, in the absence of political unity, can we identify civilizational political cores? Yet again, a dynamic hierarchy of States would be more appropriate to define intracivilizational relations: the USA as main hegemon of the West; but France and Germany form a hegemonic couple within the

¹⁸¹ HENDERSON, Errol A., TUCKER, Richard, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict" in *International Studies Quarterly*, June, 2001, p. 317-338.

¹⁸² Western historical periods that cannot be assimilated into a universal history.

¹⁸³ LEBÉDEL, Claude, *Les croisades, Origines et conséquences*, Rennes: Ouest-France, [2004]2006, p. 31-21.

¹⁸⁴ Which is an extension of the "democratic peace" paradigm, which argues that war between democracies, are highly unlikely, even between States of different "Huntingtonian Civilizations" as Z. Maoz demonstrates (MAOZ, Z., "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" in *International Security*, Summer 1997, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 162-188.)

¹⁸⁵ PALMER, Monte, "The United Arab Republic: an assessment of its failure" in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1966), p. 50-67.

European Union and so on. But relations have not been confined within civilizations; during the Great War, the Central powers enlisted the help of the Ottoman Empire, and the Allies the help of the Arab tribes, while the Empire of Japan overran the German colonies in China. It seems that civilizations can only with difficulty explain modern global relations, let alone historical global relations.

4.3) Yugoslavia, case study of the "*Clash of Civilizations*"?

Huntington asserts that the war in Yugoslavia (1991-1995) exemplifies the "Clash of Civilizations": Croatian Catholics, Serbian Orthodox and Bosnian Muslims fighting each other. Before the Great War, the Balkans were an area of nationalist ferment. National consciousness grew in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. National liberation wars pushed back the borders of the Ottoman Empire, while the national groups had no delimited territories. Infighting and ethnic cleansing was inevitable.¹⁸⁶ It is in the Balkans that the first act of the Great War took place when a Serbian nationalist, protesting the occupation of Serbian land by Austro-Hungary, shot dead the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.

The war forced the unity of the Balkan nationalities and their subsequent unification with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which became dictatorial. Inter-ethnic tensions rose while World War II split the wartime affiliations along ethnic groups: Croats allied themselves with the Third Reich while the Serbs allied themselves with the USSR. Tito, a Croat, and his Soviet-backed partisans liberated Yugoslavia and established a federation built upon ethnic lines: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, with majority ethnic groups, and Bosnia-Herzegovina with a strong Muslim population but without a majority ethnic group.¹⁸⁷

Until 1980, the year Tito died, equality of all constituent nations was imposed at the expense of the strong Serbian constituent and unity promoted at the expense of the constituent States. The 1970s saw the rise of nationalist movements that were later stifled.¹⁸⁸ The death of Tito, the paramount leader, left a political void that could only be filled by unsatisfied nationalist aspirations.¹⁸⁹ The War in the 1990s did not oppose civilizations: the federation dissolved along its constituent State borders. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most violent but it was the federated republic with the least national homogeneity.

¹⁸⁶ HOBSBAWM (1992), op cit, p. 304.

¹⁸⁷ Idem, p. 307.

¹⁸⁸ Idem, p. 308.

¹⁸⁹ Idem, p. 306, 308.

Thus it was not a "*Clash of Civilizations*", but a clash of nationalisms within an existing State, their borders being today peaceful and the newly independent States awaiting integration within the European Union.

Overall, researchers such as Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, Michaelene Cox¹⁹⁰, Errol A. Henderson, Richard Tucker¹⁹¹, Jonathan Fox¹⁹², Giacomo Chiozza¹⁹³, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch¹⁹⁴ not only conclude that inter-civilizational borders are not bloodier than they were, even before the Cold War, but also that Civilizations, or religions for that matter, were not a determinant factor in most inter-State conflicts. Furthermore, the democratic peace paradigm holds valid according to most while inter-States wars have been on the decline. Yet, tensions remain, according to Sean Bolks and Richard Stoll¹⁹⁵, even intercivilizational tensions, although their occurrence is decreasing since the end of the Cold War, according to Glynn Ellis.¹⁹⁶ On the other hand, civilizational identification is stronger among minorities¹⁹⁷ and active identification by one or more belligerents in a civil war makes negotiated settlement unlikely¹⁹⁸. Yet, as Amartya Sen reminds us, it is more than often coupled with material poverty and inequality.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, it seems geographically localized because foreign rallying is more modest than Huntington would lead us to think²⁰⁰, although cross-border spill over is not impossible.

A minority, such as Nicholas Charron, would disagree even if they acknowledge the very small amount of data available (i.e., the small number of inter-State wars since the End of the Cold War). And

¹⁹⁰ RUSSET, Bruce M., ONEAL John R., COX, Michaelene, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà vu? Some evidence" in *Journal of Peace Research*, 2000, Vol. 37, No. 5, p. 583-608.

¹⁹¹ HENDERSON, Errol A., TUCKER, Richard, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict" in *International Studies Quarterly*, June, 2001, p. 317-338.

¹⁹² FOX, Jonathan, "Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions, Which is a more determinant of ethnic conflict?" in *Ethnicities*, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 295-320.

¹⁹³ CHIOZZA, Giacomo, "Is there a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement" in *Journal of Peace Research*, 2002, Vol. 39, No. 6, p. 711-734.

¹⁹⁴ GARTZKE, Erik, GLEDITSCH, Kristian Skrede, "Identity and Conflicts: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide" in *European Journal of International Relations*, 2006, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 53-87.

¹⁹⁵ BOLKS, Sean, STOLL, Richard, "Examining Conflict Escalation Within the Civilizations Context" in *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 2003, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 85-109.

¹⁹⁶ ELLIS, Glynn, "Gauging the Magnitude of Civilization Conflict", in *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 2010, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 219-238.

¹⁹⁷ FOX, Jonathan, "Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions, Which is a more determinant of ethnic conflict?" in *Ethnicities*, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 295-320.

¹⁹⁸ SVENSSON, Isak, "Fighting with Faith, Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Dec. 2007, Vol. 51, No. 6, p. 930-949.

¹⁹⁹ SEN, Amartya, "Violence, Identity and Poverty", in *Journal of Peace Research*, 2008, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 5-15.

²⁰⁰ NEUMAYER, Eric, PLÜMPER, Thomas, "Galton's Problem and Contagion in International Terrorism along Civilizational Lines" in *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 308-325.

given they rely solely on statistical data, they are at a loss when "civilizational intent" needs to be proved: Islam, Orthodox Christianity and the West (especially an Anglosphere, a rallying of English-speaking countries around the USA for Srdjan Vucetic²⁰¹) are seen as most likely to clash with other Civilizations.

²⁰² Still, the question remains: are they truly symptomatic of a "'Clash of Civilizations'"?

4.4) The essence of Civilizations?

Reading Huntington, one cannot but deduce that the essence of Civilization is religion. And yet, the content of the enumerated religions is never described, though it is suggested that they are mutually exclusive. Religion, and therefore civilizations, are most of the time addressed as static narrative, with the exception of Christianity which gave birth to Protestantism, the source of what is best in the world: democracy, liberalism, rule of law and so on. Thus he calls the East Asian civilization Confucian. This being said, can Confucianism be considered a religion? Taoism and Buddhism are also fairly common and are part of the Chinese cultural background as is Islam and, especially in the West, Turkish nationalism. If there is no civilizational unity at one point in time, how can there be historical civilizational unity?

China would still be a Confucian country although the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s was unleashed to destroy all that prevented the building of the New China, especially Confucianism. Nationalism and, to a lesser extent, Communism are important cultural backgrounds as is Confucianism, among others. Furthermore, the economic reforms at the end the 1970 shook China to its core like no other movement in the century, or even in recent history. In fact, China has transformed more in the last thirty years, than in the previous hundred years.²⁰³ Similarly Korea is also said to be part of the Confucian civilization, yet the peninsula is divided between two ethnically and linguistically Korean States sharing the most militarized border in the World, while any possible interaction between the two is kept to a minimum.

How about Africa? If it is "possibly" a single civilization, what would be the common religion and language? Until the colonisation, except for North Africa, there were no majority languages, no

²⁰¹ VUCETIC, Srdjan, "Bound to follow? The Anglosphere and US-led coalitions of the willing, 1950-2001", in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 27-49.

²⁰² CHARRON, Nicholas, "Déjà Vu All Over Again: A post-Cold War empirical analysis of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" Theory" in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2010, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 105-127.

²⁰³ FENBY, Jonathan, *The Penguin History of Modern China, The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850-2009*, London: Penguin, [2008] 2009, p. 674-675.

majority religions and very few States. Writing was mostly unknown at the time. It was because of this absence of unity that Africa became extremely culturally diverse, and still is today.²⁰⁴ Western European colonial powers carved up Africa in the 19th century, artificially setting the borders of the future States, imposing their administrations, their institutions, and their languages as administrative and institutional tools. The colonies artificially united what was dissimilar. Even in North Africa, but not as obviously, the unifying forces behind decolonization were only the language, the administration and the institutions of the colonizing power. As in Europe, urban centers played the greater role behind this revolutionary drive. Sub-Saharan Africa is today mainly split between French-speaking, English-speaking and, to a lesser degree, Portuguese-speaking administrations and institutions. In other words, it was not only religion but the inherited colonial languages, institutions, administrations and practices that shaped modern-day African States. On the religious front, Islam pushes southward as much as Christianity pushes eastward and northward, further transforming the regional polities.²⁰⁵

Nonetheless, African regional trade blocs mostly group countries with the same institutional languages: the monetary union using the Franc CFA are former French West and Equatorial African colonies who also form a free trade area and a custom union with one of the highest levels of integration in the region; while the East African Community, another free trade area and custom union, is primarily composed of former British colonies. Finally, the Arab league, although sharing a dominant language, religion and ethnicity, did not integrate further than a free trade area. On the other hand, during the 1980s, the institutionally French-speaking Senegal and the institutionally English-speaking Gambia, totally landlocked by Senegal, both predominantly Muslim countries, formed a loose confederation that dissolved in less than a decade (1981-1989).²⁰⁶ The difference of institutional languages was probably the main cause, but insufficient levels of democracies might have also played a role. The low level of integration between French- and English-speaking Africa compared to the somewhat higher level of integration of countries speaking the same institutional language is worth researching, especially since Huntington identifies similar trends in the Caribbean.²⁰⁷ According to historian C. L. R. James, the very

²⁰⁴ POURTIER, Roland, "Afrique, vers une identité noire?" in *L'Atlas des Civilizations*, Hors Série, Le Monde, 2009-2010, p. 114.

²⁰⁵ Idem, p. 113.

²⁰⁶ UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE, "1 janvier 1982. Entrée en vigueur de la confédération de Sénégal et de Gambie" in *Perspectives Monde*,

<http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve?codeEve=613> (Accessed on May 10, 2010)

²⁰⁷ HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. (1996), op. cit., p. 131; although to speak of the former Caribbean British colonies as a single civilization might be farfetched especially since they are some of Haiti's major partners (Haiti is also a

idea of an African identity, Aimé Césaire's negritude, could only grow within the slave communities of the West Indies and their descendents. Tribes, languages, religions and so on would fuse, slavery being the most effective of all melting pots, while the opposition between black slaves, or a black underclass, with dominant whites gives them a collective black/African identity that Africa lacked in the face of the colonising powers.²⁰⁸

Furthermore, the Muslim world, a better word than civilization, although supposedly unified by religion is not integrated. Arabic is the main language West of Iran and South of Turkey and Kurdistan. However, Turkey, Iran and Kurdistan are not Arab entities. Furthermore, the Muslim world is divided by East Asia, the majority of Muslims living in South and South-East Asia, both being neither Arab nor speaking Arab. Islam is split among numerous branches, although Iran is one of the most influential Muslim States, and a theocracy; it is also the only country to have a majority of followers of a minority branch of Islam, Shia Islam. Such analysis could go on and on. For instance, of the major conflicts in the past three decades: the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, was fought for regional political dominance; the 1991 Gulf War, to protect Kuwaiti and Saudi oilfields; the 1994 Rwandan Genocide was sparked by ethnic and nationalist passions; the short 2008 Russia-Georgia war, over geostrategic interests; and, finally, the ongoing crisis over Kashmir is a product of the colonial era rather than a religious clash, the borders of India and Bangladesh being relatively peaceful.

4.5) A world of Civilizations?

According to the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, civilization is "1 a: a relatively high level of cultural and technological development; specif: the stage of cultural development at which writing and the keeping of written records is attained b: the culture characteristic of a particular time or place 2: the process of becoming civilized 3: a: refinement of thought, manners, or taste b: a situation of urban comfort."²⁰⁹ Civilization is thus both a highly relative and highly subjective concept. Therefore, is it legitimate to carve up the world as Huntington does? According to this definition, the World, Europe,

member of the Caribbean Community;

http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/heads_of_government.jsp?menu=community (Accessed on May 25, 2011)).

²⁰⁸ JAMES, C. L. R., *The Black Jacobins, Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, New York: Vintage Books, [1938, 1963] 1989, p. 394.

²⁰⁹ MERRIAM-WEBSTER, *Collegiate Dictionary*, Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 10th edition, 1999, p. 210.

France, Corsica, sub-regions and so on could qualify as civilizations. For most of history, civilization was opposed to barbarity. Inhabitants of a particular time and place, with their own language, religion, institutions, customs, dress and so on would consider uncivilized the inhabitants of another time and place, with different languages, religions, institutions, customs, dress and so on, and vice-versa. Civilizations probably exist, but solely as historical phenomena: they are born, they live, they die, they merge, they divide, they evolve. Thus, a civilization cannot be limited to a single predominant factor, such as religion.

If we look at Huntington's civilizations, with the exception of the Western and Islamic civilizations, they are all circumscribed geographic regions: African in Sub-Saharan Africa; Confucian in East Asia; Latin American South of the Rio Grande; Orthodox in Eastern Europe and Siberia; and Japanese, an island country. The Buddhist world is divided into three subcivilizations, also three distinct geographical areas: Mongolia, Tibet, and most of continental South-East Asia. When one looks to past civilizations, one cannot fail to see that in many cases Empire and Civilization are often used to describe the same situation. A simple example: Roman Empire, Roman Civilization and, even, Roman World are used to describe the same historical situation. An Empire is a multicultural political entity with a dominant culture. Thus the reach of the dominant culture extends to the borders of the Empire, being militarily enforced, and beyond, in the form of influence. The Romanization of the elites of the subjected peoples and of the Germanic tribes immediately beyond the *limes* spawned a number of Latin-derived dialects that are still used as national-languages in Europe. Nevertheless, the Greek civilization was not an Empire until the Macedonian conquest, and yet all Greek States shared commonalities, on both sides of the Aegean sea. Therefore, the reach of a civilization would be the furthest limit of sustained interactions from its core or cores, powerful entities within a given region at a given time.

Distance, and thus the speed of the means of transportation, would limit the extent of a civilization, so would natural obstacles such as mountain chains, rivers, seas, oceans and deserts. The reach of a civilization changes over time. Thus the improvement of maritime technologies in the 15th and 16th centuries permitted regular contact between some Coastal European States and all the Coastal Areas of the World, the Americas becoming the first non-European region to be ruled by Europeans. With the Industrial Revolution, in the late 18th and 19th centuries, most of the non-European landmass came under European control. Europe could be seen as a civilization, but so could the colonial powers themselves. If in the Age of Capitalism independent States, mostly European States, traded together, and thus started their integration, colonies and dependent States could only trade with their metropolises. It is only with

decolonization that trade, in its broadest meaning, was liberalized, while the dissolution of the Eastern bloc further liberalized trade. States tend to trade with their immediate neighbours, forming intraregional, regional, and even continental trade blocs. Countries on opposite sides of the world trade with each other daily. Since capitalism must expand and find new markets to thrive, its logic leads to the merchandization of everything, even culture and religion. Distances and natural obstacles remain; however, they are nowadays crossed with ease, rapidity and low cost.

The French historian Fernand Braudel describes capitalism as a World-economy²¹⁰. The world is more integrated than ever but, just as the Great War proves, economic integration does not diminish the likelihood of conflict. Capitalism stratifies States as much as the societies of these States into various categories: underdeveloped countries, developing countries and developed or industrial countries, some now even qualified as being post-industrial. This hierarchy is often simplified in the form of the North (Rich countries) - South (Poor countries) divide while the dependency theory argues that the North economically dominates the South. This carving up of the world, contrary to Huntington's, can explain economic, diplomatic, scientific and military connections between developing countries from different regions other than on a basis of some loose "civilizational connection". As early as 1931 the French poet Paul Valéry said that "le temps du monde fini commence" (*Regards sur le monde actuel*, 1931). Now, more than ever, can we consider the existence of a global civilization, of which Huntington's civilizations are no more than subdivisions.

Conclusion: The limits of a civilizational model

Huntington sees the world divided among a finite number of civilizations with unique and homogenous cultural cores. With the end of the ideological Cold War, civilizations become more impervious, raising the level of tensions among them. A Statu Quo can be assured only if civilizations agree and respect their engagement not to intervene in the affairs of others, thus bringing about a Civilization-based Westphalian Peace. Yet, the West, because of relativism and multiculturalism, is on the verge of disappearing into the abyss if nothing is done to rollback "non-Western" influences. Democracy is mostly possible only on Christian land. History has not been not kind to Huntington's model; only a few civilizations are politically integrating for now, their constituent States being mainly democracies. Furthermore, democracies can be found in all of the Civilizations he mentions. Finally, there

²¹⁰ BRAUDEL, Fernand, *La dynamique du capitalisme*, Paris: Flammarion, 1985, p. 84-87.

seems to be a consensus that conflicts between civilizations were not and still do not seem to be a major trend in inter-State wars²¹¹. Nevertheless, the merit of Huntington is to bring back the cultural variable into a debate that had mostly been hijacked by the liberals since the end of the Cold War who argue, seeing no alternative to the liberal capitalist democracy as being viable in their eyes, that most of the world will increasingly Westernize, the West (and an already Westernized Japan) having already reached the "End of History". Yet, because political traditions, one variable among others, are not as homogenous as he argues, Huntington's model does not give an accurate picture of the modern behaviour of States. This debate should be reopened.

²¹¹ HENDERSON, Errol A., TUCKER, Richard, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Jun., 2001, p. 317-338.

Chapter 3: Complex societies

This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part shows that, although apparently different, Fukuyama's and Huntington's theses share many commonalities, because they are tributary not only to traditional U.S. foreign policy but also to U.S. myth. The West is the New Jerusalem for both of them; the opposition revolves around the exportability of the model. The second part shows the complexity of State and Nation building as well as the dynamics of interactions between polities, a complexity and dynamic that neither Fukuyama nor Huntington seem aware of, regardless of the time period.

* * *

The end of the Cold War spawned two new controversial explanations of international relations: Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"* and Samuel P. Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"*. The previous chapter shone light upon their limits, thus the need to refine the understanding of modern international political behaviour. Such a task in the field of international relations must take into account the twin concepts of history and culture. Notwithstanding, before engaging in such an endeavour it is necessary to show the commonalities between both theories. It is to this that we must now turn.

1) The commonalities between the *"End of History"* and the *"Clash of Civilizations"*

This section is organized into two parts: the first is a recapitulation of the main criticisms and their limits; the second is our own contribution to the debate.

1.1) Recapitulation of the criticisms and their limits

Most of the criticisms around Fukuyama's "End of History" and of his triumphant Liberalism challenge them on the same grounds: which ideology brings the most universal freedom? Fukuyama and his proponents argue that an ideology that promotes and realizes universal rights and liberties in the political sphere cannot be improved on. The USA and Western Europe are the very embodiment of the "End of History". His detractors argue that as long as there will be socioeconomic inequalities and privileges, socio-political inequality and privileges will *de facto* remain and be enforced. This debate is not new. As early as 1843, in *On the Jewish Question*, Karl Marx was already underlining the inner contradictions between *formal* equality and real (i.e., *material*) inequality.²¹² The issue here is the one of the engine of history: 1) is it, as Hegel argues, inner contradictions within the dominant ideology that leads to a new and superior ideology until a final ideology is formulated that contains no inner

²¹² MARX, Karl, *Sur la Question juive*, Paris: La Fabrique, [1843] 2006, p. 62-63.

contradictions at all?; or 2) as Marx argues, social contradictions that lead to a new and superior society until a final society is born that contains no inner contradictions? History of ideas or material history? But can there really be ideologies or societies without inner contradictions? Change within societies is most of the time not the result of a conscious process but of the aggregate of collective decisions and actions within the ever evolving multiple intersecting structures that knit society together. Because objective conditions are always changing outside of total rational control, as Popper reminds us, is it really scientific to engage in futurology or should we just limit ourselves to identifying trends, albeit temporary?

In opposition to historical phases with their own rules, morals, social organizations, customs, dreams and fears, and so on, realists would argue that individuals and Nation-States alike always behave in similar ways towards each others, when there is no central authority. In other words, there is no true international "social change" for realists; there can only be phases of equilibrium and disequilibrium. If the individual States alternate in position within the international system, the international system does not change. Huntington substitutes a *universal* "nature" for *particular* "cultures": the international system is not bound by a single set of fixed interactions but is divided among regions (civilizations), each bound by a unique set of fixed interactions. In each civilization, Nations-States bandwagon around the core State while the core State regulates the interactions within the civilization. It is the incompatible sets of fixed interactions and the resulting incomprehension that causes "clashes". Most civilizations do not undergo profound change as a result of the immutability of their core values. In other words, to each core State its own unchallenged area of influence is the only way to sustain intercivilizational peace.

The concept of history implies the existence of profound and irreversible change. Most historians would acknowledge the existence of such change, even in the international system, both in terms of ideologies (and culture) having a profound impact on societies and societies changing independently of ideology (and culture). Huntington acknowledges change but only within the "Western civilization": according to him, it is the only civilization whose core values (Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian) allow for a profound evolution and the emergence of modernity (democracy, liberalism and capitalism). So far no core State has agreed to limit itself to its civilizational area of influence. We should thus observe an increase in the number of "Clashes of Civilizations". Most of the proponents and opponents have turned to statistics in order to assess their number and intensity. Although most do not find an increase in international conflicts between civilizations as compared to within civilizations, a minority does. What statistics cannot do is identify the nature of the conflict: "Clash of Civilizations" or merely conflict

between regions? Furthermore, the "democratic peace" argument seems to hold so far: conflicts between democracies do not escalate to war and while democracies exist in all "civilizations", outside the "Western civilization" the ratio of democracies is lower. Thus multiple and parallel sets of interactions seem to exist within the international system: 1) between democracies, 2) between democracies and non-democracies, 3) between non-democracies, 4) between powerful states, 5) between powerful states and lesser powers, 6) between lesser powers, 7) within and between regions, 8) within and outside of International organizations and so on. Therefore, it is obvious that the international system is not only bound by a single set of fixed interactions but also by multiple sets of interactions. Furthermore, because democracies and permanent International organizations are relatively new, profound changes in the nature of Nation-States affect the nature of the international system over time.

Finally, it becomes obvious that Fukuyama's "End of History" and Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations", as well as their contemporary critics, are too simplistic in regard to the actual unfolding of historical events: Universal (and now Immutable) Ideology vs. Material Forces vs. Immutable Cultures vs. Immutable Nature; directional history vs. cyclical history; Changing World vs. Immutable World, and so on. It seems that it is the *Universality* and *Immutability* of the variables that must be challenged, not the variables themselves. Thus, only by taking into consideration the twin concepts of history and culture can the study of international relations be refined. It follows that it would also be simplistic to limit international relations to inter-State relations or to a show of force in a self-help system. Just as people are not identical, it must follow that a Polity has personality: its political traditions. The question that needs to be answered is: how are the political traditions of a given Polity historically constituted, taking into account internal and external conditions, such as neighbouring polities with their own evolving political traditions? What better case study to once more prove the existence of political traditions than to demonstrate the commonalities of the internal logic of Fukuyama's "End of History" and Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" in relation to US history?

1.2) The commonalities

Fukuyama's and Huntington's theses seem to be mostly contradictory and their bitter exchanges seem to confirm their lack of commonality. The "*End of History*" can be summarized as follows: History is linear and unidirectional, with liberal capitalist democracy as its endpoint. It is inevitable that all Nation-States will one day reach this point and integrate into the Universal Homogenous State, thus inaugurating a limitless era of peace and prosperity, an everlasting Golden Age. The West was the first to

reach the End History, while the ever increasing political integration in Europe forms the embryo of the Universal Homogenous State. Existing States are thus sorted out according to their institutional distance from the liberal capitalist democratic State. Because Western States are liberal capitalist democracies, non-Western States are therefore sorted out according to how similar or dissimilar they are to Western States.

The "*Clash of Civilizations*" can be summarized as follow: the World is divided among a definite number of civilizations, each with a unique core of values, often linked to religion. This unique religious core of values cannot change; it can only be destroyed along with its population. Mutual understanding between different civilizations is impossible because their core values determine the identity of the members of a given civilization. Civilizations being homogenous and unified, the rise of a universal civilization is thus improbable while confrontation between civilizations is most probable. Accordingly, the distance between the core values of different civilizations increases the likelihood of confrontation. Among all existing civilizations, the West is the only one that has attained a high level of individual freedom and living conditions. Nevertheless, its core values are threatened from within by relativism, secularization and multiculturalism; and if the core values of a civilization are lost, the civilization is lost. Therefore, to save its civilization, the constituent States of the West must actively impose Western values and roll back diversity. If the USA is less at risk, it is because it is more religious than other Western States.

Optimism in the first thesis, pessimism in the second thesis; what can therefore be the commonalities between them? First, the West is central to both analyses, either as the "most desirable" civilization (Huntington)²¹³ or as "the" civilization (Fukuyama)²¹⁴. Secondly, "liberal democracy" and "civilization" are treated not only as static narratives but also, and more importantly, as deterministic essences, in which context has no play at all: all States are inevitably drawn to become liberal democracies; thus liberal democracy determines human behaviour in the post-ideological world (Fukuyama); a civilization determines the behaviour of its constituent States and members in the post-ideological world (Huntington). Thirdly, their views of the future of Western civilization are reminiscent of the historical attitudes in US foreign politics: universalism versus exceptionalism of American society, politics, economics and so on.

²¹³ HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 69-72.

²¹⁴ FUKUYAMA, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, [1992] 2000, p. 49-51.

Universalism implies that one particular system is believed to be applicable everywhere, regardless of context. A particular system believed to be universal is also often believed to be better, if not the best, among all other existing systems. For Fukuyama, the model of the future Universal Homogenous State is the secular European Union, it is thus the heart of Civilization.²¹⁵ The 19th and 20th centuries have seen numerous wars fought in the name of civilization: uncivilized people had to become civilized, by force if necessary. As long as they were not civilized, they had no rights; civilized people were free to do whatever they deemed necessary to civilize the world. A moral imperialism defended in the UK by such authors as Rudyard Kipling in *The White Man's Burden*²¹⁶ or in France by such as Jules Ferry in his speech to the National Assembly on July 28th, 1885²¹⁷. The idea that civilization was inevitable was not dominant in the age of colonisation. Fukuyama, in stating that liberal capitalist democracy is inevitable, adds a new dimension to war: imposing liberal capitalist democracy by force is not a rupture of a country or people's history, but an acceleration of it.

Exceptionalism not only implies that one particular system is believed to be applicable only where it has emerged, but more importantly that it is better than any other. This ideology implies that such a system is always threatened: foreign cultural imports can only change the system and society for the worse, altering its identity, and thus becoming another system, or destroying it altogether. Isolationism, political, economic, cultural and so on, is the only mean whereby a country can preserve its identity. Huntington adds another dimension: civilizations have particular non-exportable cultures and a geographical core. Countries with multiple cultures are cleft countries and they are the most likely candidates for dismemberment. If a civilizational core becomes a cleft country, then it is the entire civilization that will probably be lost. All civilizations but the West are united and homogenous, in other words, strong. Multiculturalism is creeping in in the USA, facilitated by relativism and secularism; Europe is on the verge of being overrun, especially by Islam, because it has gone too far in upholding relativism, secularism and multiculturalism.²¹⁸ Only religion is keeping the USA together, and thus civilizational orthodoxy and the rollback of all non-Western influences is the key to the survival of the West.

²¹⁵ Idem, p. 203.

²¹⁶ KIPLING, Rudyard, *The White Man's Burden*, 1889,
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kipling.html> (As of 06/16/11).

²¹⁷ FERRY, Jules, Discours à la Chambre des députés, le 28 juillet 1885,
<http://www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article177> (As of 06/16/11).

²¹⁸ HUNTINGTON (1996), op cit., p. 304-305.

Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"* and Samuel P. Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"* represent the two sides of a same coin. They both write from the standpoint of the West, and simplify international relations to the relations between the West and the Rest. They judge the historical development of modern States, historical events and, above all, the very history of the Cold War period as irrelevant. Their explanations are not corroborated by historical events and development. The historical, political, social and cultural context of political entities are deemed irrelevant: they will inevitably become liberal capitalist democracies, one way or another (Fukuyama)²¹⁹; Civilizations are so different that clashes are inevitable because they are totally interiorised from an early age, and knowing other cultures will not affect the likelihood of clashes but threatens our own civilization (Huntington)²²⁰. Edward W. Said, in an article in *The Nation* of October 4th, 2001, referred to Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"*, because of Huntington's blatant ignorance about the other, and its potential political consequences, because of the ignorance of political actors about the other, as the "clash of ignorance".²²¹ The clash of ignorance could just as well describe the consequences of Fukuyama's *"End of History"* because it justifies interventionism by Western nations, especially a narrow-minded interventionism where the other does not count because he is bound to become Western.

If the analysis is pushed further, one cannot fail to notice that Fukuyama's "End of History" with its universalistic consequences, and Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations", with its isolationist consequences, are more than a revival of traditional U.S. foreign policy, but a revival of the founding myths of the U.S. nation. According to Élise Marienstras, the Founding Fathers created a national identity for a people that was not yet a nation: a chosen people²²², though of European descent, but with a different identity forged by conditions met nowhere else²²³, by the means of revolution, on a new world still largely unstained by European corruptive influence²²⁴, that broke away from history²²⁵. thus enacting a new beginning for Humanity.²²⁶ From this myth stems two contradictory but complementary beliefs: 1) the

²¹⁹ FUKUYAMA ([1992] 2000), op cit., p. 338-339.

²²⁰ HUNTINGTON (1996), op cit., p. 21-29.

²²¹ SAID, EDWARD W., "The Clash of Ignorance", in *The Nation*, October 4th, 2001.

²²² MARIENSTRAS, Élise, *Les mythes fondateurs de la nation américaine, essai sur le discours idéologique aux États-Unis à l'époque de l'indépendance (1763-1800)*, Paris: Maspéro, 1977, p. 90.

²²³ Idem, p. 53.

²²⁴ Idem, p. 48.

²²⁵ Idem, p. 63.

²²⁶ Idem, p. 85.

USA must convert the world to the new system, which is unequalled anywhere and cannot be²²⁷; 2) only with the chosen people can the new system work, because of the difference of cultures²²⁸, that cannot be bridged in any way, and thus the belief in superior and inferior cultures, that soon becomes a hierarchy of races²²⁹.

As the similarities between Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"* and Samuel P. Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"* seem to show, political traditions appear to have an important impact not only upon academic work in political science and foreign relation, but also upon the functioning of the State, institutions, and the elaboration of national and foreign policies. In other words, political tradition appears to be central in any polity. Nevertheless, the question of the constitution of political traditions must be addressed, and that of its homogeneity or heterogeneity. It is to that question that we must now turn.

2) Dynamics of international relations

2.1) Internal heterogeneity of civilizations

According to Francis Fukuyama, liberal capitalist democracies can only multiply²³⁰, yet he gives no description of an ideal type liberal capitalist democracy in the Weberian sense (observation-derived synthetic concept).²³¹ He only refers to abstract principles of liberal capitalist democracy, principles that differ little from platonic ideas (abstraction-derived concept).²³² In other words, sound principles spawn sound regimes, regardless of context. Because liberal capitalist democracy, the inevitable endpoint of intellectual development and therefore the soundest of all ideologies, faces no viable ideological alternative, it becomes what it was meant to be, absolute truth. Once the principles of liberal capitalist democracy are accepted as absolute truth, which should be a universal phenomenon in no time, the establishment of a liberal capitalist democracy would be almost automatic. Yet again, what is a "liberal capitalist democracy"? According to Fukuyama, only the truth of the principles of liberal capitalist democracy matters.²³³ It seems that the Niccolò Machiavelli is not part of his intellectual background. In *The Prince*, written in 1532, analyzing the political situation of the Italian polities, Machiavelli came to

²²⁷ Idem, p. 95.

²²⁸ Idem, p. 173.

²²⁹ Idem, p. 226.

²³⁰ FUKUYAMA ([1992] 2000), op cit., p. 338-339.

²³¹ GRAWITZ, Madeleine, *Lexique des sciences sociale*, 8e édition, Paris: Dalloz, 2005, p. 211.

²³² Idem, p. 212.

²³³ FUKUYAMA ([1992] 2000), op cit., p. xi.

the conclusion that teleological concepts, however sound and generous they may be, played little role in politics. On the contrary, conflicts of interests, power relations and pragmatic ends are central to politics.²³⁴

Nevertheless, the world has changed since the Renaissance and we must agree with Fukuyama that liberal capitalist democracies have multiplied since the Battle of Jena in 1806. In 1989, all Nation-States in Western Europe were liberal capitalist democracies and the fall of the Berlin Wall was followed by the rapid democratization of Eastern Europe. Yet there is no single model of liberal capitalist democracy: parliamentary monarchies, constitutional monarchies, presidential republic, semi-presidential republic, parliamentary republics and so on. Furthermore, there is no unity of infra-type of regimes, e.g. the Belgian, British, Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, Spanish and Swedish constitutional monarchies, or the German, French, Portuguese and U.S. republics, no Constitution being identical.²³⁵ Marxist-Leninist regimes also had their differences: Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Mengitsu Haile Mariam's military Communism in Ethiopia (1974-1991), the PRC, the USSR and so on.²³⁶

There are no identical polities; each Nation-State has its particular variant and, within a federation, all federated polities may have their own particular organization. Principles may guide the establishment of a political system, yet they are not the only factor, as the diversity of related political entities tends to demonstrate. Furthermore, political systems evolve over time. Although the continuity from 1776 until now is undeniable, one of the longest periods in history in which no regime change took place, the USA of 2010 is incomparable to the USA of 1776 (Declaration of Independence), of 1861 (Civil War over slavery in the territories), of 1865 (Slavery is abolished in the Union), or even of 1954 (first blow to official segregation). The same principles are interpreted and reinterpreted over and over again. Slavery and ethnic cleansing were deemed compatible with the Spirit of 1776 well into the 20th.²³⁷ As the first chapter showed, rapid social change in the mid-20th century pushed for new interpretations to the Spirit of 1776: desegregation, civil rights, women's rights, gay rights, children's rights, increased autonomy of

²³⁴ MACHIAVEL, Nicolas, *Le Prince*, Paris, Librio, 2003, p. 75-76.

²³⁵ GROSSMAN, Emiliano, SAUGER, Nicolas, *Introduction aux systèmes nationaux de l'UE*, Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2007, p. 11.

²³⁶ PERRAULT, Gilles, "Communisme, les falsifications d'un "livre noir"", in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Décembre 1997, <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1997/12/PERRAULT/9660> (As of 06/10/11).

²³⁷ *Plessy v. Ferguson* (No. 201) 163 U.S. 537, May 18, 1896.

young adults, multiculturalism, affirmative action, animal rights, protection of the environment and so on. These changes and demands Francis Fukuyama deems unacceptable, contrary to the principles of liberal capitalist democracy and, therefore, he claims they threaten the very existence of liberal capitalist democracies.²³⁸ He sees these demands as either the product of an idle pampered youth seeking excitement²³⁹ or a left-wing plot to undermine liberal capitalist societies.²⁴⁰ This very conservative conclusion is not far from Huntington's own conclusion.²⁴¹ They both tend to demonstrate a lack of understanding of the social changes at play.

Marxist-Leninist regimes were also subject to change as the evolution from Lenin's USSR, to Stalin's, to the *Détente* under Khrushchev, to Brezhnev's and, finally, to Gorbachev demonstrates. The PRC, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Cuba also have easily identified evolutions. This leads to another question: if the interpretations and reinterpretations of the same principles lead to differences in regimes and their evolutions, are the principles the same to begin with? Even Fukuyama speaks of two trends of liberalism: Anglo-Saxon and Continental.²⁴² Yet, he speaks of these principles in such vague terms that no wonder there are contradictory interpretations. Even totalitarian states share some principles with liberal democracies: democratic republic, people's democracy, assemblies, elections, judiciary court, written law and so on. If ideologies are the product of history, so are their interpretations. To speak of history as a single, unified and directional process with an endpoint cannot account for the differences in existing or historical regimes, other than with moral judgements: good, bad, better, worse, closer to, farther from the universal ahistorical liberal capitalist democracy. As previously shown, even Fukuyama's thesis echoes U.S. mythology. To further challenge Fukuyama's claim of unchallenged principles of liberal capitalist democracy, the *Freedom House* 2010 report is entitled "Erosion of Freedom Intensifies".²⁴³

What about Huntington's analysis that democracy can only prosper on Christian and especially Protestant land? Church and religion had always been opponents of liberalism and democracy until only a few decades ago.²⁴⁴ In the heyday of religion, Europeans had limited political and economic rights.

²³⁸ FUKUYAMA ([1992] 2000), op cit., p. 295-296.

²³⁹ Idem, p. 330.

²⁴⁰ Idem, p 296.

²⁴¹ HUNTINGTON (1996), op cit., p. 304-307.

²⁴² FUKUYAMA ([1992] 2000), op cit., p. 144-145.

²⁴³ FREEDOM HOUSE, *Freedom in the world 2010: Erosion of Freedom intensifies*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Tables_and_Graphs.pdf (Accessed on October 10, 2010)

²⁴⁴ PLANT, Stephen, "Christians were late converts to the joys of democracy", *The Times*, September 4, 2004.

Franco's Spain, Pinochet's Chile, Salazar's Portugal and many other right-wing authoritarian regimes, or lesser authoritarian right-wing regimes such as Duplessis' Quebec, enjoyed strong links with the religious establishment.²⁴⁵ Their official aim was to uphold tradition and, especially, religion. Modern States were born out of the opposition to traditional power; it is thus at the same time rupture and continuity. Therefore, religion or culture only partly explains democratization. On the other hand, this does not mean that Church and religion do not play a role in today's Western democratic society. Politics are not and never can be culturally bland as Fukuyama and even Huntington, in many aspects, seem to believe.

According to Huntington, liberal democracies are more sustainable in Christian, and especially Protestant, countries. Yet, according to the *Freedom House* 2010 report, electoral democracies are found in all the civilizations he identifies, and not only within his very controversial Western civilization: most of the West, the Holy See being the only exception; most of Orthodox Europe, Belarus and Russia being the only exceptions; most of Latin America with Cuba, Honduras and Venezuela as the foremost exceptions; in the Islamic civilization Bangladesh, Indonesia and Turkey; in the Confucian civilization South Korea and Taiwan; Japan obviously; in the Hindu civilization India and Sri Lanka; in the Buddhist civilization Mongolia; and, finally, in the African civilization, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cap Verde, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zambia.²⁴⁶ These countries demonstrate that culture and religion are not absolute and that they do not hinder change, just as in Europe. In fact, the history of Europe should prove that change and evolution is inevitable. However, what this change will be, as Karl Popper pointed out, we cannot rationally predict.²⁴⁷

The simplistic narratives of Francis Fukuyama's *"End of History"* and Samuel P. Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"* cannot account for the complexity of the post-Cold War world. They cannot account for the complex internal heterogeneity of the historical evolution of polities. And yet both have raised interesting facts: 1) Nation-States have particular identities, if not multiple identities, 2) Nation-States are trading among themselves and through trade technologies and ideas are exchanged. Thus, a thorough analysis of international relations cannot forgo the context in which Nation-States are born and are evolving. And it is to such an explanation that we must now turn.

²⁴⁵ FUKUYAMA ([1992] 2000), op cit., p.18-19.

²⁴⁶ Idem.

²⁴⁷ POPPER, Karl, preface to *The Poverty of Historicism*, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, [1957] 2005.

2.2) The permeability of civilizational boundaries

Modern Nation-States are defined as a politically organised population on a delimited territory.²⁴⁸ Such a definition, and reality, imply the continuity of institution, formal and informal rules, borders and so on. Continuity implies the duration, shorter or longer, of structures and practices, otherwise no structure, institution, practice, etc. would last; yet it does not mean they last because they are the most "rational" or most "adapted".²⁴⁹ Most Nation-States have lasted for more than a generation, and in many cases the structures, institution and practices, etc. are inherited, derived and built upon those that were constituent of the polities that preceded them. This is especially visible in the decolonized polities that had to work with the colonial structures. As the French revolution, and especially the American Revolution, showed²⁵⁰, new political elites must work with, reform, and build upon the existing structures. To create *ex nihilo* or simply *de novo* political structures, institutions, practices, etc. is most improbable. To some extent, this implies the rigidity of structures, institutions, practices, etc. and of the interests linked to them, an element that neither Fukuyama nor Huntington took into consideration in elaborating their models.

For example, when the Greek civilization was nascent in the 7th century B.C., Ancient Egypt had seen the succession of twenty-six dynasties spanning virtually three millennia.²⁵¹ What characterized the Egyptian civilization for centuries was near political, cultural, religious, scientific and linguistic immobility.²⁵² For most of Antiquity, Egypt had a polytheist religion, while each God had its own terrestrial administration. Of all the religious administrations, the one attached to Amon (the Sun God) was the most powerful. But in the 14th century B.C., the Pharaoh Amenothep IV, imposed the predominance of the monotheist cult of Aten (the Solar disc), even taking up the name of Akhenaten, the effective spirit of Aten. He disbanded the administrations attached to the traditional Gods and built a new capital, Akhet-Aten, on the site today known as el-Amarna.²⁵³ After his revolutionary reign (1353-1336

²⁴⁸ WEBER, Max, *Le savant et le politique*, Paris: 10/18, [1959, 1962] 2005, p. 125.

²⁴⁹ The first part of the proposition is the core of neo-institutionalism, which seeks to identify the interrelation between institutions and behaviour (individuals or groups), while the second part suggests a sociological or "cognitive" dimension which does not discriminate between formal and informal institutions.

HALL, Peter A., TAYLOR, Rosemary C. R., *La science politique et les trois institutionnalismes* in *Revue française de science politique*, 47e année, no 3-4, 1997, p. 469-496.

²⁵⁰ HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., *Political Modernization: America vs Europe*, World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Apr., 1966), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 378-414.

²⁵¹ ERMAN, Adolf., RANKE, Hermann, *La civilisation égyptienne*, trad. MATHIEN, Charles, Payot: Paris, [1948, 1952] 1988, p. 739-742.

²⁵² Idem, p.7.

²⁵³ LE ROBERT DES NOMS PROPRES, *Akhenaton*, Le Robert: Paris, [1974] 2002, p. 30.

B.C.), the traditional interests, still strong, defaced and destroyed all he had accomplished while trying to erase his very existence from history. The cult of Aten was buried in the sands of history as the city of Akhet-Aten was buried in the sands of the desert.

And yet, while Egyptian culture survived Persian, Greek and then Roman subjugation, it is now scattered in the desert and owes its revival to Egyptologists. On the other hand, Christianity and Islam spread over large parts of the world in a few centuries, with their own institutions. The Church has been an official structure for more than fifteen centuries. History, which is not and cannot be linear and directional, is marked by rupture and continuity. Continuity is not immobility; all structures undergo change at a faster or slower rate over time, and so do the interests that are linked to them, as the evolutions of Modern-States over the past centuries prove. These evolutions are parallel, convergent, divergent etc. over time and in different places as the rich variety of institutions, languages, cultures, religions etc shows.²⁵⁴ Structures not only express continuity; they are the vector of continuity: family, school, temples and, more recently, mass media. Nation-States have created and imposed national identities; only in the past can the elements of an identity be found, however artificially constructed. Since language has always been a vehicle for culture, tradition, history and worldviews²⁵⁵, imposing a single official language was central to create a Nation-State.²⁵⁶ Contrary to what Fukuyama and Huntington seem to argue, State-building and Nation-building are not unbroken straight line processes, a dialectic of continuity and discontinuity is at play.

The size of polities grew over time through technological improvements, especially in the field of transport that allowed sustained political control over greater territories (e.g., Roman Empire).²⁵⁷ The development of the Roman Empire demonstrates how complex the interaction of the forces of religion, language and trade can be. Tradition says that Rome was founded in 753 B.C. by the union tribes that lived in the hills along the banks of the Tiber River. In a few centuries, it conquered all the Mediterranean Basin. It dominated the Western Mediterranean until 476 A.D. and the Eastern Mediterranean until 1453. What accounted for Roman identity? Latin was the *lingua franca* of the Roman world, but Greek was its

²⁵⁴ For the European Union, see the member states description:

http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (Accessed on June 7, 2011).

²⁵⁵ FANON, Frantz, *Peau noire, masques blancs*, Paris: Seuil, [1952] 1971, p. 14.

²⁵⁶ Université Laval, "La Révolution française: la langue nationale (1789-1870)" in *Histoire du français*, http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/francophonie/HIST_FR_s8_Revolution1789.htm (Accessed on June 7, 2011).

²⁵⁷ DIAMOND, Jared, *Guns, Germs and Steel, the Fates of Human Societies*, New York: Norton, [1997] 2005, p. 267.

learned language.²⁵⁸ Greek eventually became the *lingua franca* of the Eastern Roman Empire.²⁵⁹ Ancient Greece was the ideal of Ancient Rome, while Ancient Rome became the ideal of the Renaissance. It adopted innovations of their defeated enemies, which made its army more efficient. Rome went from a monarchy, to an aristocratic republic and finally an Empire. Until Theodosius I, the Roman Empire was polytheist and integrated the cults of its subject peoples. Theodosius made Christianity the official and only religion. And yet, the Empire remained a multicultural and multilingual polity. In contrast to Huntington's affirmations, civilizational cores are constantly redefined.

The Roman Empire is no more, yet comparable situations can be identified in contemporary times. In India, the core of Huntington's "homogenous" Hindu civilization, according to the 2001 population census, if Hindus are the majority with 80.5% of the total population, Muslims with 13.4% account for more than a 100 million, Christians with 2.3% for more than 20 million, Sikhs with 1.9% for close to 20 million, Buddhists with 0.8% for more than 5 million, Jains with 0.4 for more than 4 million, and other denominations for more than 6 million. Even if their proportion is smaller compared to the majority of Hindus, their actual numbers challenge Huntington's claim to homogeneity.²⁶⁰ Furthermore, as of 2010, twenty-two languages are recognized in the Constitution, while Hindi in the Devanagari script is the official language, with English used for official purposes in the Union.²⁶¹ Finally, India is a Union in which its constituent States and territories have extended prerogatives. India possesses all the characteristics for classification as a cleft country. Yet, in spite of ethnic and religious tensions, India remains the largest democracy in the World and appears stable. The Indian State must and does try to rule in order not to antagonize the many religious, linguistic and ethnic groups; any official policies that would favour one religious denomination or one ethnical group over the other, would undoubtedly challenge this stability. On the other hand, to conclude, considering the long cohabitation of all these languages, religions and ethnic groups, it is highly doubtful that their evolutions were not mutually influenced to some degree and that they have not come to share commonalities. This would further negate the claims to an homogenous Hindu civilization.

²⁵⁸ Université Laval, "L'expansion linguistique du monde romain" in *Histoire du français*, http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/francophonie/hist_fr_sl_expansion-romaine.htm (Accessed on June 17, 2011).

²⁵⁹ Université Laval, *Les langues grecques*, http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/monde/langues_grecques.htm (Accessed on June 17, 2011).

²⁶⁰ Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, *Census 2001, India at a glance, Religious composition*, http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/religion.aspx (Accessed on January 31, 2011)

²⁶¹ Government of India, Know India, India at a Glance, http://india.gov.in/knowindia/india_at_a_glance.php (Accessed on January 31, 2011)

Polities are usually not isolated; they share their borders with other polities. There is more cultural and political homogeneity within the borders of a given polity than between polities. Nevertheless, polities tend to trade between themselves, both commercially (flow of goods, technologies and ideas) and politically (embassies, alliances and war). The closer polities are to each other, the more they tend to share commonalities. War itself is usually fought between immediate neighbours rather than across long distances. As of the 1st century A.D., the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire traded with each other using the Silk Road, yet distances, the speed of the means of transportation, and natural obstacles prevented wars occurring between Europe and East Asia until the 19th century.²⁶² Wars of conquest usually impose the political system of the victor upon the vanquished or a mix regime, as in the case of a protectorate.²⁶³ Depending on the character of the victor, conquest can lead to: genocide, recurrent in the Old Testament; cultural substitution, as was the case in Christian and Islamic conquests; or cultural tolerance, as the Persian and the Roman exercised.²⁶⁴ There are exceptions; for example, Alexander the Great, once he subjugated the Persian Empire in 331 B.C., adopted some elements of Persian culture.²⁶⁵ A generation before, Macedonia under Philip II, the father of Alexander, had conquered the Greek States and yet adopted Greek, and especially Athenian culture. War is thus a powerful mean of cultural exchange.

When trade links, far reaching polities, or groups of polities interact, the consequences are enormous. Yet again, war, because of the numbers and logistics it involves, has historically been the major vector of trade between far reaching polities. Almost a thousand years ago, the Christian polities of Europe took upon themselves to liberate the Holy Land from Muslim rule. When Jerusalem fell in July 1099, the city was sacked and its population massacred. Notwithstanding, the advancement of Islamic culture and science was such that it fascinated Christians: medicine, algebra, optics, engineering, etc. Furthermore, Islamic polities had been the depository of Greek classics. The Crusades ushered in an era of

²⁶² FENBY, Jonathan, *The Penguin History of Modern China, The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850-2009*, London: Penguin, [2008] 2009, p. 9.

²⁶³ CLAUZEL, Jean, "L'administration coloniale française et les sociétés nomades dans l'ancienne Afrique occidentale française" in *Politique africaine*, <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/046099.pdf> (As of 06/17/11).

²⁶⁴ *Cyrus Cylinder* (539-530 BC), trans. FINKEL, Irving, British Museum, http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/article_index/c/cyrus_cylinder_-_translation.aspx (Accessed on June 17, 2011).

²⁶⁵ PLUTARCH, *Alexander*, Chapter 45, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Alexander*/6-7.html (Accessed on June 15, 2011).

change in Europe that culminated with the Renaissance.²⁶⁶ Many centuries later, colonization shaped entire regions and decolonized polities still bear the goods and the ills of colonization. In a given region, the most powerful States tend to disseminate through trade, or impose by force, their culture, structures, institutions, religion etc., while weaker polities tend to model themselves upon them.²⁶⁷ Because power relations change over time, different polities gain the upper hand in trade at different times. History generally contradicts Fukuyama's messianic model.

But war is not the only mean of massive cultural dissemination. In 2011, when we think of Buddhism, we tend to think of the 14th Dalai Lama, the leader of the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamsala, India, since 1959, who is leading a peaceful struggle for the autonomy of Tibet from the Chinese, and especially Han rule. Buddhism revolves around the teachings of the Buddha and their interpretation. Yet Buddha, or Siddhartha Gautama as he was known before his awakening, lived in 6th century B.C. India according to tradition.²⁶⁸ The core teachings of Buddhism and the emphasis on meditation are not only tributary to the Vedic traditions but actively refer to them.²⁶⁹ Some currents of Hinduism have come to view him as the 9th earthly manifestation (Avatar) of Vishnu, although from one school of thought Buddhism reached the status of both philosophy and religion independent from Hinduism. The central dogma is that of the inevitability of suffering in life while the behaviour an individual adopted during his past life (Karma) will most probably lead to reincarnation over and over again, yet through discipline, meditation and self-denial it is possible to free ourselves from pain (Nirvana). Over the centuries, Buddhism split among numerous school of thoughts: the oldest most important is the Theravada, dating back to the mid-4th century B.C., that holds that only those who totally devote themselves to meditation and enlightenment can reach Nirvana, and especially monks; the second oldest most important school of thought is the Mahayana, of which we have no records before the 1st century A.D.²⁷⁰, holds that although monastic life remains an important path to reaching Nirvana it is not the only one. Yet monastic life puts a greater emphasis on the recitation of the Sutras than any other activity.

²⁶⁶ LEBÉDEL, Claude, *Les croisades, Origines et conséquences*, Rennes: Ouest-France, [2004] 2006, p. 109.

²⁶⁷ DIAMOND ([1997] 2005), op cit., p. 224-225.

²⁶⁸ LEVENSON, Claude B., *Le Bouddhisme*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, p. 29.

²⁶⁹ PREBISH, Charles S Ed., *Buddhism, a Modern Perspective*, University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975, p. 7.

²⁷⁰ Idem, p. 65.

From India, where these two schools were born, Buddhism spread to other parts of Asia. It is said that as early as the mid-3rd century B.C., the Buddhist Emperor Ashoka sent missionaries to neighbouring kingdoms. Following the trade routes, it rapidly and peacefully²⁷¹ spread South to what today is Sri Lanka; yet only two centuries later it had become firmly established under its Theravada form, lasting to this day²⁷², and North to Central Asia. In the South, it spread to Burma in the 1st century A.D., Siam in the 4th, Cambodia by the 10th and Laos by the 15th. In the North, following the Silk Road, China was reached as early as the 1st century.²⁷³ By the late 4th century it had reached Korea, and then Japan by the mid-5th century²⁷⁴ while Tibet was reached two centuries later.²⁷⁵ Twenty-six centuries after the awakening of Buddha, Buddhism is the predominant religion of Continental East and South-East Asia: Theravada is dominant in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Siam and Sri Lanka while Mahayana is dominant in East China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. By comparison, in India, where it first originated, it is a minority religion.²⁷⁶

Yet, although the core of Buddhism was only slightly affected, it underwent changes as it was adopted beyond the borders of India. For practical purposes, the focus will be put on East Asia: China, Korea, Japan and Tibet. In China, when Buddhism was introduced, it was seen as a Taoist current and therefore incorporated many Taoist concepts while Taoism modeled itself upon the more organized Buddhist doctrine. In regard to Confucianism, it adopted filial piety as a core aspect of monastic life.²⁷⁷ Famous schools originated in China, such as Ch'an, mainly associated in the West with Japan under the name Zen; it emphasizes a strictly personal ascetic path to awakening.²⁷⁸ Overall, Chinese Buddhism is the product of the interpretation of its core doctrine through the prism of Chinese traditional religion.²⁷⁹ Finally, in regard to art, the Bodhisattvas, who are male characters within Indian Buddhism, became feminized with the introduction of Buddhism to China.²⁸⁰ Before the introduction of Buddhism to Korea, Shamanism was dominant and it influenced its subsequent development: Shamanistic festivals are

²⁷¹ LEVENSON (2004), op cit., p. 62.

²⁷² PREBISH (1975), op cit., p.39.

²⁷³ LEVENSON (2004), op cit., p. 62-63.

²⁷⁴ SAUNDERS, E. Dale, *Buddhism in Japan*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964, p. 91.

²⁷⁵ LEVENSON (2004), op cit., p. 62.

²⁷⁶ Idem, p. 119.

²⁷⁷ PREBISH (1975), op cit., p. 192.

²⁷⁸ Idem, p. 195.

²⁷⁹ Idem, p. 206.

²⁸⁰ CH'EN, Kenneth K. S. *The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 6.

celebrated while supernatural beings were added to the Buddhist pantheon.²⁸¹ In Japan, Buddhism and Shinto are intertwined to such an extent that both are celebrated complementarily on common family altars, yet each also has its own festivals.²⁸² The development of Zen Buddhism in Japan permeated all spheres of life: the path for enlightenment was not restricted to monastic life, instead it was accessible from all walks of life through constant improvement of one's abilities, thus giving birth to martial arts, the Tea Ceremony....

At the time of the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet, all religious and political life revolved around the hereditary kingship; the kings were the direct descent of supernatural beings who came from the heavens and are the only direct link between the world of man and the heavens.²⁸³ A weakening monarchy saw in a Buddhism complemented with shamanistic elements a new base to consolidate its power. If the kingdom broke apart, the political power that was vested in the kings was transferred to the Buddhist monasteries that were organized between center and branches.²⁸⁴ Four sects competed for the central power and by the 15th century, to establish their claims, gradually avowed that their leaders were reincarnations of Bodhisattvas. By the end of the 16th century, one sect came to be backed by the Mongols who then repressed the others, and its leader was bestowed the title of Dalai Lama which combines the Mongol word for Ocean (Dalai) with the Tibetan word Lama. Tibet became a vassal State of the Mongol and then Manchu Empire and the theocracy they established has lasted to this day.²⁸⁵ Tibetan Buddhism with its tantric tradition is a branch of its own, on par with Theravada and Mahayana.

As for individuals, the identity of polities is the product of the syncretism of what is formally learned from existing structures, informally learned from sources outside the structures and informally learned from experience. But knowledge is not a question of mere accumulation; it can be transformed, lost when it falls into disuse or is eradicated by force. A polity at the moment of its creation is closer to the polity it replaces than to itself at the moment of its own demise. There is nevertheless some form of continuity from the moment of its creation to its end through structures, institutions etc, as previously shown. This is especially the case with modern Nation-States. What, then, can we say about the emergence of polities?

²⁸¹ HYUN-KEY Kim Hogarth, *Syncretism of Buddhism and Shamanism in Korea*, Seoul: Jimoondang International, 2002, p. 308-309.

²⁸² SABOURET, Jean-François, *Japon, peuple et civilisation*, Paris: La découverte, 2004, p. 65-66.

²⁸³ PREBISH (1975), op cit., p. 241.

²⁸⁴ Idem, p.242.

²⁸⁵ Ibidem, p. 246.

2.3) A Global civilization, multiple cores

Although Huntington claims that the origin of civilization is religion, others suggest that environmental factors play a major role. Humans spread from Africa and settled all over the globe, living in small bands of hunter-gatherers. Depending on the environmental abundance of resources, their lifestyle was either nomadic or sedentary. Bands have the lowest level of organization.²⁸⁶ According to Jared Diamond, the Neolithic revolution, the discovery of agriculture, especially the culture of cereals, made food surpluses possible, thus liberating part of the food producing workforce for craftsmanship, and allowing for population growth. Surpluses end up monopolized by a rising group of individuals who are not involved with agriculture.²⁸⁷ Faiths become organized religions; villages become cities; and territories under the rule of the political elites expand. This results in an ever increasing level of social complexity. Those in power cannot limit their rule to ensuring their monopoly of the surpluses; they need to police, legislate, control, administrate. In other words, they need to maintain order. They must also protect their territory and their workforce from outside threat by maintaining armies. Finally, agriculture, animal husbandry and high population density made agricultural societies ripe with germs and diseases to which they became immune, contrary to hunter-gatherers who were not in contact with them.²⁸⁸

Surpluses allowed some individuals to focus on more "intellectual" work (understanding the origin of the world, of the climate, of man, of polity, of civility, of organization, of the differences of conditions between men and so on) and of more "practical" work (improving agricultural output, weaponry, political organisation, military organization, strategy, trade, civility, law, order, construction, engineering and so on). Complex societies spawn complex organizations, thus the necessity to understand and explain both. Within a society, a single problem may spawn numbers of interpretations, while a single interpretation may likewise spawn numbers of solutions. They produce worldviews, philosophies, theories, models and so on, often with normative ends. No societies being identical, the discourses they produce cannot be identical, though they can be similar. Furthermore, the complexity brought about by the advent of agriculture spawned change at an accelerated pace, whereas pre-agricultural society did not evolve much for millennia. New questions were continuously raised and new ways to answer them were found. It is difficult to accept the idea that intellectual work limits itself to "rediscovering" the absolute truths, as the Hegelianist tradition defends.

²⁸⁶ DIAMOND ([1997]2005), p. 268-269.

²⁸⁷ Idem, p. 87.176-177.

²⁸⁸ Idem, p. 87.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet botanist Nickolai Ivanovich Vavilov (1887-1943) identified the major centers of origin of cultivated cereals. The difference between a natural cereal and its cultivated form resides in the human selection of characteristics that benefit the human over the plant. Cereals in their natural form are weeds. Cultivated cereals are characterized by a lack of diversity compared to their natural counterparts.²⁸⁹ The centers of origin are 1) Abyssinia, 2) the Andes, 3) Asia minor, 4) Central Asia, 5) Central America, 6) China, 7) the Indian subcontinent, 8) the Mediterranean Basin and 9) South-East Asia.²⁹⁰ Except for Central Asia and South-East Asia, Huntington's civilizations share many similarities with the centers of origin of cultivated plants. Thus, civilization is less the product of culture, as Huntington argues²⁹¹, than of organized society. Yet, these societies produced and produce culture.

Agricultural societies had many advantages over hunter-gatherers such as food surpluses, numbers and, last but not least, immunity to the germs they carried, to which hunter-gatherers had not likely been exposed. How did agricultural society spread? Mostly along an East-West axis, characterised by similar climates, whereas along a North-South axis the temperature differences prevent diffusion of crops. The Eurasian continent is such that crops spread further than in the Americas or Africa. Although Middle-Eastern crops spread on the banks of the Mediterranean, they could not cross the Sahara. The situation is comparable in the Americas and Asia with deserts and mountain chains that prevent the spread of crops. Water bodies are also main obstacles to the spread of crops.²⁹² Because of vast distances, lack of speed and the carrying abilities of the means of transportation, the spread of agriculture was paralleled by cultural differentiation. Except for Europe, on the one side, and Asia minor and North Africa, on the other side, trade between these civilizations was limited, if not non-existent, the Mediterranean and the Bosphorus themselves being major obstacles.

Those who developed the means of communication to safely and swiftly cross these obstacles, could conquer entire regions, if not rule the known world. Many societies have built over time such means of transportation, but only Europe pushed for more discoveries. For instance, China, under the Ming dynasty, cancelled its sea-going projects.²⁹³ Europe, in the 16th century onward, was the first

²⁸⁹ VAVILOV, N. I., *Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants*, trad. LÖVE, Doris, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1987, 1992] 1994, p. 79-104.

²⁹⁰ Idem, p. 325.

²⁹¹ HUNTINGTON (1996), op cit., p. 40-40-44.

²⁹² DIAMOND (2005), op cit, p. 87.

²⁹³ Idem, p. 251.

civilization to trade with all parts of the world, thus becoming its *de facto* center.²⁹⁴ Joseon Korea (1392-1897), Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) China, and Edo Japan (1603-1868) answered their first contacts with European expeditions with isolationist policies.²⁹⁵ For a few centuries, these societies enjoyed a high level of stability, bordering on immobility. European powers, none enjoying dominance on European battlefields, could not oppose Asian powers. Nevertheless, they swept across the Americas, destroyed the existing Empires, the cities, the temples, melted all the gold they could find, eradicated the local cultures, imposed Christianity at the tip of the blade, exterminated the locals and enslaved the survivors while European germs were reducing their numbers. These technological improvements affected regional organizations, yet Huntington still sees the world as divided by immutable civilizations.

Two centers of civilization, Meso-America and the North Andes, were erased from history, while European systems were imposed.²⁹⁶ Three centuries later, European polities were strong enough to invade the rest of the world. Yet the aims of colonization were different: non-European regions were prospective markets for European products and not just sources of raw materials and human power. China, Korea and Japan had cut themselves off from world affairs, having made the political decision not to allow innovation and change. Thus in the 19th century, they were now no match for Western powers: a single U.S. gunboat in the 1850s sparked the Meiji restoration in Japan.²⁹⁷ Japan chose to modernize at a rapid pace and itself became a colonial power in a matter of decades. The forces of change and modernization, which aimed at national empowerment, were at the same time in opposition to foreign rule and dominance but also to the traditional forces, which resisted change.²⁹⁸ In contrast to Fukuyama's affirmation, it is not only ideas that foment change, but a context that makes certain ideas popular. No idea is inherently superior or inferior, but their relation to the context implies a variety of consequences.

Europe was the first part of the world to pass through the Industrial Revolution, an event of the magnitude of the Neolithic Revolution: societies became even more complex as the rate of change accelerated. Cheap mass production became the norm; urbanization and population growth surged; industry replaced agriculture as the engine of economic growth and so on. Expansion of markets became

²⁹⁴ Idem, p. 80-81.

²⁹⁵ REISCHAUER, Edwin O., *Histoire du Japon et des Japonais, 1. Des origines à 1945*, trad. DUBREUIL, Richard, Paris: Seuil, 1997, p. 129.

²⁹⁶ DIAMOND (2005), op cit, p. 68.

²⁹⁷ REISCHAUER (1997), op cit., p. 134.

²⁹⁸ HOBBSBAWM, Eric, *The Age of Extreme, The Short Twentieth Century: 1914-1991*, London: Abacus, 1995, p. 350.

a necessity²⁹⁹; sustainable, swift, efficient, safe and cheap transportation across land and sea became both a necessity for and a product of industry. The level of integration of European polities increased, though not diminishing the likelihood of war. Decolonization, and then the fall of the USSR, accelerated the level and speed of integration and globalization. Now, all regions enjoy sustained trade both internally and externally, while most currencies and stocks are linked and vary by the second. It is difficult for a Nation-State to exit the international market, because the economic infrastructures were not developed to sustain autarky. To do so would weaken a regime while the major economic entities would place sanctions on it such that it would have no means to retaliate, or even protect itself.

Does modernization stands for Westernization? Most modernizers, non-Western and Western, were staunch nationalists. Modernization was the road to independence from the West, not homogeneity with it. The colonization of the 19th century cared little for the religious, linguistic and ethnic differences; markets and profits dominated. Yet violence remained a central component of conquest. Japan modernized while emphasizing Japanese identity. The processes involved in nation-building prevent Westernization. Notwithstanding, considering the diversity of Europe, what would a Western identity be? Karl Marx once wrote that "the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living"³⁰⁰, yet he said in the *Communist Manifesto* that capitalist society would spread to all parts of the world, while bringing them closer and binding them.³⁰¹ European society and Nation-States are still influenced by their history and political traditions. European nations express many different views, interests etc., why wouldn't it be the case for non-European Nation-States? While so far we can agree with Fukuyama that it is undeniable that a given socio-political system, capitalism, is globalizing, we cannot agree with him that liberal capitalist democracy is the only form it can take within Nation-States.

The West has dominated the world for the past two centuries, while being its center for four centuries. Europe was not predestined to be the Europe that it was and is. A set of environmental and historical conditions, synchronic and diachronic conditions, were involved. Its violent contact with Islam, especially Islamic science and techniques, philosophy etc. a millennium ago, ushered in the revival of Europe. Did Europe become Islamized because it modernized by modelling itself on its more advanced neighbour? That would be comical, the purpose of the Crusade being the Christianization of the Middle East. All polities are subject to the dual influence of historical and environmental conditions. The more

²⁹⁹ WOOD, Ellen Meiksins, *The Origin of Capitalism, a Longer View*, London, New York: Vintage, 2002, p. 152.

³⁰⁰ MARX, Karl, *18 Brumaire de Louis Bonaparte*, Paris: Éditions Sociales, [1852] 1984, p.69 (Our own translation).

³⁰¹ MARX, Karl, ENGELS, Friedrich, *Manifeste du parti communiste*, Paris: Flammarion, [1848] 1998, p. 78-79.

integrated the World has become, is, and will be, the more cultural products will be exchanged between all parts of the World.³⁰² The dominant polity exercises more weight on the system, but as history repeatedly proves, power relations constantly change. Today we may be subjected to the influence of one, tomorrow it will be another. But contrary to what has happened through most of history, polities are in a process of redefinition: international organisations, supranational unions and multinational corporations are wrestling traditional polities over the control of global affairs. This makes global affairs more complex and more dynamic. Fukuyama's *"End of History"* and Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"* are the two opposite poles of the continuum of international relations, yet ideal poles that do not materialize in reality.

What would best define the culture of a given polity today and, for that matter, as long as polities existed? Heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is the product of dynamic internal and external interactions during the course of history. All Nation-States today share commonalities, though their commonalities are stronger in their immediate region. More than ever, Marx's remark about history holds true: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past."³⁰³ It is now time to exemplify this paradigm with a case study.

Conclusion: Heterogeneity of political traditions in a globalizing world

When the actual relations between polities are taken into consideration, it becomes obvious that the closer polities are to each other, the more they tend to trade and the more this trade shapes their political culture and institutions. Polities are born and develop in specific conditions that cannot be predicted over the long term. They develop individual cultures and institutions that are redefined over time. The earliest polities were born where domestication of cereals was possible. The geographical limits to the spread of cultures become the geographical limits of world regions. Within these regions, the strongest polities have the greatest influence upon the others, yet the strongest changes over time. In contrast, contact between regions was limited if not non-existent. Only with the development of transport technology able to cross oceans could the different world regions come into contact. Since the 16th century, all regions have been in contact, often through violence, and are increasingly trading with each

³⁰² WOOD (2002), op cit., p.3.

³⁰³ MARX, Karl, *18 Brumaire de Louis Bonaparte*, Paris: Éditions Sociales, [1852] 1984, p. 69 (Our own translation).

other. Nation-States will increasingly share commonalities, and yet they will not become more homogenous. Furthermore, historically, integration has not limited the likelihood of war.

Chapter 4: Heterogeneity of political traditions in practice: Maoist China (1949-1976)

What both Francis Fukuyama or Samuel P. Huntington failed to do was to give compelling illustrations of their theories. Both deliberately chose to use vague expressions to address one of the most compelling questions: how do polities interact? They usually dismiss historical analysis, Fukuyama more than Huntington. The fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989) and 9/11 (September 2001) gave their theses wide popularity. Is it deserved or only luck? The only way to prove or disprove Fukuyama's *"End of History"* and Huntington's *"Clash of Civilizations"* or the *dynamics of international relations* is through the use of case studies. Because it is said that international relations have changed with the end of the Cold War, the study of a Cold War example is central because not only international politics but also national politics were said to have been entirely subjugated to the opposition between Liberal capitalism and Communism, as well as to the geostrategic ideological interests and choices of the core states of each bloc. But was it entirely so? Maoist China, being the first non-Western Communist regime, makes an interesting case study to identify the heterogeneity of political traditions, in this case traditional Chinese philosophy and Marxism.

1) A wind of change

On October 1st, 1949, after almost four decades of Civil War and occupation and thirty years after its founding (1921), the Communist Party of China (CPC) liberated all of mainland China. For most of the first half of the 20th century, China was in turmoil: partially occupied by foreign powers (England, France, Germany, Japan and Russia) and split among warring factions. For millennia, China had been ruled by a powerful bureaucratic State presided over by the Emperor.³⁰⁴ In parallel, most dynasties imposed Confucianism, a conservative ideology that justified an established rigid social hierarchy, codified the social relations between inferior and superior all the way to the Emperor, emphasized obedience, and, ultimately precluded any social evolution that would threaten the social order.³⁰⁵ China was stricken with immobility and stuck in the past when in the mid-19th century Western States, after easy victories, imposed the Unequal Treaties.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ FAIRBANK, John King, *La grande révolution chinoise 1800-1989*, trad. DREYFUS, Sylvie, Paris: Flammarion, [1986]1989, p. 22-23.

³⁰⁵ LEVI, Jean, "Le modèle confucéen: obéissance et réussite" in GENTELLE, Pierre et al., *Chine, peuples et civilisation*, Paris: La découverte, 2004, p. 168.

³⁰⁶ FAIRBANK (1989), op cit., p. 138.

Before the Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860), the system had no incentives to modernize.³⁰⁷ The Wars not only imposed the need for change but also challenged the State's legitimacy. A deeply interiorized concept was that of the mandate of heaven bestowed upon the Emperor, which could be lost. Ruptures in the natural order were a sign that the ruler was deemed unfit to rule. In this situation, the opposition between the Han subjects and the Manchu ruling minority was exacerbated. Change had become a necessity, yet it was a threat to the established social order and was thus restrained. The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a messianic religious movement, endeavoured to overthrow the Empire and reorganize all society. It left behind it close to twenty million dead when it was finally crushed with the help of the English and the French. According to journalist Edgar Snow, the crushing of the Taiping Rebellion postponed the revolution for sixty years.³⁰⁸

The Qing empire weakened at an accelerated pace because it opposed most reforms. The Xinhai Revolution (1911) was initiated by Han nationalist military officers. China was then split among warlords and the Guomindang (Nationalist party), around the open-minded Sun Yat-Sen and later the anti-communist Chiang Kai-Shek, in the South. China could not resist the 1919 Versailles Treaty, ending the Great War, that transferred the German colonies to Japan. This event radicalized the intellectuals, who were holding onto tradition, and especially Confucianism, for the weakening of China. It is from this radicalization that the CPC was born. For the next two and a half decades, the relations between the CPC and the Guomindang alternated between alliance and war. The disunion of China made it ripe for invasion by the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s. And choosing to fight the Japanese invaders rather than their fellow Chinese, the CPC became more popular than the Guomindang, who saw in the CPC a greater threat. After the Anti-Japanese War, which was fought by an alliance of the two, the CPC won the Civil War in 1949, forcing the Guomindang to retreat to Taiwan.

2) The Communist revolution

2.1) Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics

The successful Chinese revolution was an earthshaking event: a second Communist revolution in one of the largest countries, and with the largest population. Suddenly, almost half the world population lived under Communist rule, its majority in China. Since the 1930s, Mao Zedong had been the central figure of the CPC, though not its first leader like Lenin, Ho Chi Minh or Kim Il-Sung in their political

³⁰⁷ Idem, p. 147.

³⁰⁸ SNOW, Edgar, *Red Star Over China*, New York: Grove Press, [1938] 1968, p. 19.

organizations. He shaped the Party as much as he shaped the institutions of the New China after 1949. He is remembered as a tyrant, especially for his blunders, the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), which left millions dead, being one of his worst. The only precedent in Chinese history, or world history for that matter, was the Taiping Rebellion.³⁰⁹

One moment has become emblematic of the Chinese revolution. The year is 1966, thousands of university and high school students wearing battle dresses with red armbands, on which 红卫兵 (*hong weibing* - Red Guard) is written, and a green military cap adorned with a red star flood Tiananmen square. With the Little Red Book containing the quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong in their raised right fist and carrying large posters of Chairman Mao, they shout "*mao zhuxi wan sui*", "long live Chairman Mao". The aging leader atop the main Gate of the Forbidden City, the palace of the former all-powerful emperors that ruled China, himself wearing battle dress and a green military cap adorned with a red star, waves to them and encourages them to destroy everything that stands in the way of the New China. This movement was known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. One of its aims was nothing less than to change the way the Chinese had been thinking for centuries. The old and long corrupted ideas, theories and worldviews were to be erased and replaced by the "laws" of Marxism-Leninism, especially Mao's interpretation of these "laws" compiled in 1964 by General Lin Biao (1907-1971) in the Little Red Book.³¹⁰

In the months that followed, violence erupted; culture, monuments and intellectuals were victims of this revolutionary ferment. Chaos spread; some even spoke of a State of Civil War.³¹¹ The Cultural Revolution, as it is more commonly called, is also remembered for the forced relocation of students and intellectuals from urban centers to the countryside. They were to be re-educated by the true revolutionary mass, the peasants. For almost a decade, education and innovation were meagre. Yet, obligatory learning sessions were routinely organized, but only to study the quotations from Chairman Mao. During this period, Chairman Mao, the great revolutionary leader, came to be revered as a living God.

Ironically, Mao Zedong's political ideas are the result of his own upbringing. At the time of the Xinhai Revolution Mao Zedong was about 18 years old. A son in a rural well-off family, he was prepped for the Imperial examinations, the main track for social promotion. The Imperial examinations, in use for

³⁰⁹ SHORT, Philip, *Mao Tsé-Toung*, trad. LAHARY-GAUTIÉ, Colette, Paris: Fayard, [1999] 2005, p. 442.

³¹⁰ *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, bilingual edition, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press 1966, p. 135.

³¹¹ SHORT, Philip ([1999]2005), op cit., p. 492.

more than a millennium, tested the knowledge of Chinese classics (philosophy, poetry, history, literature, etc.), among which the Confucian tradition was dominant. Education at the time was nothing more than learning by heart under constraint.³¹² The principles and practices were gradually interiorised, Mao himself constantly referring to the Classics all his life. The *Little Red Book*, the weapon to rectify China is sprinkled with quotations from the Classics that exemplify Mao's own Marxist-inspired ideas.³¹³

One of the central ideas of Confucianism is that of "good example" by those in power, i.e., respecting the "right" principles and practices will not only spawn good government but also lead the people to rectify themselves of their own will.³¹⁴ Mao expresses the same idea in "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party"³¹⁵, written in December 1929, and in "Combat Liberalism"³¹⁶, written in September 1937 which enumerate the behaviours a "good" party cadre should avoid. Both texts emphasize the need to educate with the "right" principles and practices the party cadres, whose example greatly influence the people. The people themselves are also to benefit from the study of these right principles. This implies the use of formal structures to educate and test those who wish to occupy official functions.

These "right" principles and practices could not formally be the Classics, but the "laws" of Marxism-Leninism, interpreted by Mao himself, interpretations relying nevertheless on the Classics. For instance, the Confucian idea of hierarchy and duties attached to one's function is paraphrased in "Combat Liberalism": "Not to obey orders but to give pride of place to one's own opinion. To demand special consideration from the organization but to reject discipline. This is a fourth type [of liberalism - i.e., bad behaviour]".³¹⁷ The very design of the Little Red Book has a lot in common with the *Analects*, i.e., a list of short and easy to remember principles to regulate one's own thinking and conduct. Maoism, Mao's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, was to replace Confucianism, using the same structures and practices that enabled the latter's institutionalisation and continuity.

2.2) The Revolutionary State

³¹² Idem, p. 27.

³¹³ *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, bilingual edition, 1966, 419.

³¹⁴ CONFUCIUS, *The Analects*, London: Penguin books, [1979], Book II, 3, p. 63.

³¹⁵ MAO Zedong, "L'élimination des conceptions éronnées dans le Parti" in *Oeuvres Choiesies*, T. 1, Beijing: Éditions des Langues Étrangères, 1976, p. 115-128.

³¹⁶ MAO Zedong, "Contre le libéralisme" in *Oeuvres Choiesies*, T. 2, Beijing: Éditions des Langues Étrangères, 1977, p. 25-28.

³¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 26 (Our own translation).

To shape the Party, and then society, according to his own ideas, Mao needed an organization devoted to him. The Xinhai revolution and the events leading to it made a return to monarchy unthinkable. Yet the fragmentation of China in the wake of the revolution made necessary the reunification of China under a single authority, especially after the Diktats of the Versailles Treaty, for three reasons: 1) the triumph of the revolution, 2) independence, and 3) the unification of China that occurred early in its History (221 B.C.) and remains the ideal. The 1917 victorious Russian Revolution, in a country not that dissimilar from China (recent imperial past, agrarian economy and backward compared to Western Europe and Japan), became a model for both the Guomindang and the intellectuals that would found the CPC. Both parties were gradually reorganized around the principles of democratic centralism³¹⁸. Yet, although the CPUS won the Russian civil war, it had to be rebuilt from top to bottom, limiting the democratic element in favour of rigid discipline.³¹⁹ Thus, it was the post-Russian civil war Party that served as inspiration for all revolutionaries. A highly centralized paramilitary organization with a strong membership is very effective against its less organized and less numerous opponents, as the April 1927 Guomindang-led repression against the Communists and union members demonstrated.

While his theories on violent peasant war as the engine of revolution in China³²⁰ were somewhat unorthodox for mainline Communists, Mao was not the first Party leader who saw the workers as the only revolutionary class. Just as today, power was split between Beijing (political) and Shanghai (economic). A workers take-over could happen only in Shanghai, thus limiting its political impact. Furthermore, the peasantry was the largest social class. The failed and repressed 1927 Shanghai General strike, gradually put the spotlight on Mao and his ideas. His successful guerrilla organization and warfare in the following decade made him the leader of the revolution (1935). The high degree of centralism in the Party and the profound belief in Marxism-Leninism of its cadres, combined with the need for discipline during the Civil war and the Anti-Japanese war, increased the power of the leadership and Mao.

Although most of the Party came to accept Mao's views on the importance of the peasantry, all did not share his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The wars, first against the Guomindang and then the Japanese, made the Yan'an revolutionary base a safe haven for many intellectuals, critics, students and

³¹⁸ FAIRBANK (1989), op cit., p. 446.

³¹⁹ LABICA, Georges, BENSUSSAN, Gérard, "Centralisme démocratique" in *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme*, Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, [1982] 1999, p. 162-163.

³²⁰ MAO Zedong, "Sur l'enquête dans le Hounan à propos du mouvement paysans" in *Oeuvres choisies*, T. 1, Beijing: Éditions en Langues Étrangères, 1976, p. 22.

the like.³²¹ The Party membership surged at the time, thus multiplying the political stances. The success of Mao's ideals strengthened his political leadership. However, Mao judged that all interpretations not in line with his were threatening the revolution itself. The Yan'an Rectification Movement (1940-1942), initiated by a politically strong but ideologically weak Mao, purged the lower ranks of those who had interpretations of Marxism-Leninism conflicting with his own by requiring the colleagues and friends of the purged cadre to criticize, accuse and humiliate them.³²² Thus he inspired fear from the bottom up, imposing his line and becoming the unquestionable leader of the Party and the Revolution.

Mao's behaviour then and throughout his rule is consistent with Confucian philosophy: the need for an "enlightened ruler" with absolute power which spawns an "enlightened rule", thus ensuring harmony. Mao saw himself as this "enlighten ruler". Yet he also found inspiration in the philosophy of Xun Zi (312-230 B.C.), who saw man as vile and ready to adopt the dissolute mores of his time, especially when the times are troubled.³²³ He argued the need for a strong political leadership and organization to discipline man, teach him the proper values and repress bad ideas and practices.³²⁴ He kept watch over his inner circle by purging the lower ranks through the use of the political police led by the devoted Kang Sheng (1898-1975).³²⁵ The system had been build in a such way that open discussion was nearly impossible and thus unity of the Party, the State and the country rested upon him, as it had rested on the Emperors. He ruled as Emperors had ruled since the Han dynasty (207 B.C. to 220 A.D.), with the twin means of rigid ideology and repressive State. The Yan'an Rectification Movement and all the subsequent political movements strengthened Mao's grasp on the Party, yet his domination over the higher ranking members was less assured.

When it became obvious that the Great Leap Forward was a catastrophe, criticism started in his inner circle and Mao himself had to submit to a self-criticism. Mao had lost his aura of infallibility.³²⁶ He thus lost some of his power over the Party to other high ranking members such as Zhou En Lai (1898-1976), Liu Shao Qi (1898-1969) and Deng Xiao Ping (1904-1997), "capitalist road takers" according to Mao. The Anti-Japanese war and the victory in the Civil war had made Mao, even more than the Party,

³²¹ SHORT (2005), op cit., p.336.

³²² SHORT (2005), op cit., p. 338-339.

³²³ XUNZI, "Xunzi, Chapitre IV: Honneur et déshonneur" in *Philosophes confucianistes*, trad. LE BLANC, Charles et MATHIEU, Rémi, Paris: La Pléiade, 2009, p. 749

³²⁴ XUNZI, "Xunzi, Chapitre IX: Une administration royale" in *Philosophes confucianistes*, trad. LE BLANC, Charles et MATHIEU, Rémi, Paris: La Pléiade, 2009, p. 835.

³²⁵ SHORT (2005), op cit., p. 360.

³²⁶ Idem, p.435.

beloved by the masses. Although he remained the unquestionable leader of the Party, the balance of power was shifting against him. To reclaim his former status, he had to mobilize support outside the Party by criticizing the Party, or rather some corruptive elements within it. This was done with the May 16, 1966 decree of the Central Comity of CPC.³²⁷

The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) profoundly changed the power relations. The Party hierarchy could not officially denounce Mao; it thus had to side with him. The Red Guards, the mobilized and radicalized students legitimized by Mao himself, used violence against anyone or anything they deemed threatening to the revolution, or Mao, and thus were a powerful weapon he could pitch against his enemies. The army, indoctrinated by General Lin Biao, was absolutely devoted to Mao and thus inherited a central role in Chinese politics.³²⁸ In this apparent chaos, compulsory Maoism, an informal structure, and the army, a formal structure, held China together, as it had been during most of the past centuries. Mao, cloistered in the walled Zhong Nan Hai, the workplace and residence of high Party members in the vicinity of the Forbidden City, was the cornerstone that held ideology and the State together. He enjoyed a level of power unequalled since the last days of the Qing dynasty. A living God is infallible.

2.3) International relations

The de-Stalinization initiated by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union strained the relations between the USSR and the PRC; they finally split apart at the turn of the 1960s. In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, Mao elaborated a new theory of international relations: the Three Worlds Theory.³²⁹ It was defended by Deng Xiao Ping on April 10, 1974 at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly.³³⁰ The USA and the USSR, as the richest and most nuclearized States, form the First World; the developed States, kept in check by the superpowers, form the Second World; the formally dependent States that achieved independence and comprise most of the world's landmass and population, form the Third World. The First World is bent on domination and exploitation. Thus, the USSR can no longer be called socialist, and hence there was no longer a socialist camp. Also, because hegemony cannot be shared, the likelihood of global nuclear war between the two superpowers is high. Therefore,

³²⁷ *Circulaire du Comité Central du Parti Communiste de Chine*, 16 mai 1966, <http://chinepop.chen-alice.fr/chinepop/chine3.html> (Accessed on October 10, 2010).

³²⁸ SHORT (2005), op cit., p. 502.

³²⁹ MAO Zedong, *On Diplomacy*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1998, p. 454.

³³⁰ DENG Xiaoping, *Speech by the Chairman of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1974.

according to this theory, the Third World must work together to develop economically in order to preserve its political independence from both superpowers and also from their former colonial metropolises.

This theory also claimed that the Third World, like the proletariat in a Marxist analysis, is the most revolutionary force in international politics. Since Third World revolutions would spark revolutions in the Second and First Worlds, international relations will increasingly be conducted on an equal basis by all sovereign Nation-States, while putting an end to the nuclear threat. This theory, although using a Marxist-Leninist concept, is closer to nationalism.³³¹ This is no surprise, considering the fact that the revolution was sparked by nationalist demands. The uneasy relationship between the CPC and the USSR can be dated as far back as the late 1920s. Moscow pushed for the Guomindang-CPC cooperation that led to the weakening of the CPC and the 1927 Shanghai Massacre. Furthermore, how could a movement that had just liberated the land from foreign intervention accept anything less than an equal status in all dealings with the USSR? On the other hand, just as in the case with Tito's Yugoslavia, the USSR knew that an independent minded communist China would undermine its hegemonic tendencies.

Alastair Iain Johnston goes even further, saying that the foreign policy of Maoist China displays neither a behaviour consistent with Marxism-Leninism or traditional realism. It displays rather what he calls hard realpolitik: all external or internal challenges are perceived as high security threats that must be dealt with by violence. Maoist China dealt with apprehended threats through violence more than 60% of the time³³², the most known events being the Korean War (1950-1953), the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1955-1956), the Sino-Indian War (1962) and the Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969). This behaviour can be traced back to the heyday of feudalism in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (770-221 B.C.), reflecting the anarchy of the system at the time. For most of recorded history, China has been united and the strongest actor in Asia, and yet it still behaves the way the feudal Chinese polities did two millennia ago. Johnston calls this cultural realism: it is realist because it deals with foreign relations in terms of equilibriums of power, yet its behaviour is not dictated by pragmatic ends but by an inherited culture.³³³

³³¹ Levine, Stephen. 1995. "Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press, p 41.

³³² Johnston, Alastair Iain Johnston. 1996. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 252.

³³³ Idem, p.217.

Conclusion

The central actors of the Revolution were for their most part born in the last decades of the Empire and lived through the tumultuous years of the Republic. Although they opposed the structures and values which they deemed responsible for the weakening of China, they were also a product of these structures and values. Although the 1917 Russian revolution with the Leninist party became a model for a successful independence struggle, which was their main objective, it was adapted to the Chinese situation by mobilizing Chinese political traditions, especially Confucianism. In international relations, two trends were followed: 1) nationalism and support to national liberation movements, to weaken the traditional world powers; 2) all challenges are culturally seen as high security threats regardless of the situation. Maoist China is a good example to demonstrate that the post-WWII period cannot only be seen through the lens of an ideological conflict between two conflicting ideologies. Quite the contrary, the violent contact of the West with an already complex culture and complex institutions led to an even more complex game of reformulation, transformation even substitution of some of their aspects even though, in some cases, it had no apparent effect.

Conclusion

One of the fundamental questions in politics is how States interact with each others. For most of the 20th century, a clash between Liberal capitalist democracy and totalitarianism, first Fascism and then Communism, was said to dominate international relations. The sudden fall of the Eastern bloc ended the stalemate between Liberalism and Communism that dominated most of the latter half of the century, taking many analysts by surprise. International relations were greatly affected, thus new models and new predictions had to be made. Two authors who broke away from traditional realist models that limit international relations to inter-State relations had a major influence: Francis Fukuyama with his 1989 *"End of History"* theory, arguing that now that Communism has fallen Liberalism will spread, thus allowing lasting peace and prosperity; and Samuel P. Huntington with his 1993 *Clash of Civilizations* theory, in answer to Fukuyama's, arguing that the great blocs that are Civilizations will increasingly clash over their static core values now that no ideological struggle holds them together.

Peace vs. war, optimism vs. pessimism; these explanations seem too simple and normative. The idea behind this thesis was to look into the possibility that international relations were more dynamic: polities are not the result of either their own political traditions or foreign influences, but a product of both. To this end a brief description of the Cold War era was central in order to understand whether it was solely a conflict of ideologies or that international relations were more complex than is usually believed. Only then was it possible to judge the validity of Fukuyama's analyses and then that of Huntington's. Finally, an attempt was made to refine the post-Cold War paradigm, refinements that had to be sanctioned by the analyses of case studies. And what better case study than a powerful Capitalist country, such as the PRC, that is criticized by the so-called International Community, mainly Western States, for not abiding by its rules.

1) Summary of the context

The sudden fall of the USSR-led Eastern bloc and the demise of Communism at the turn of the 1990s took the academic and diplomatic community by surprise. The Cold War models of international relations focused on the opposition of two antagonistic economic, political and social worlds. The first reaction to the end of the Cold War was that liberal capitalist democracy was undoubtedly superior to Communism and Socialism, thus, at last, disproving the Marxian analysis. Francis Fukuyama went even further in his 1989 thesis *"The End of History"* by arguing, after the 19th century philosopher Georg

Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, that the engine of human history was the conflict of ideologies to fulfil an unavoidable destiny. According to Fukuyama, by the beginning of the 20th century, only two competing ideologies remained, Liberalism and Communism, while no other could emerge. Therefore, the fall of the USSR and of the Eastern Bloc while the PRC and Vietnam were becoming capitalist signifies that Liberalism faces no contenders, while it is highly unlikely that any other could take up the challenge. At the turn of the 1990s, history had ended, which meant that only Liberalism could spread, thus ensuring sustained peace and prosperity, ultimately creating the Homogenous Universal State.

While the post-communist transitions were more or less peaceful, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia disintegrated during a particularly violent civil war (1991-1995). Croats, Bosnians and Serbs fought for the total or partial control of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the latter two. Ethnic cleansing became routine on all sides. According to Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 thesis, *The Clash of Civilizations*, the war was not fought for territorial control but for civilizational reasons. Croats are Western Christians, and were backed by France and Germany; Serbs are Orthodox Christians, and were backed by Greece and Russia; finally Bosnians are Muslims, and were backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Therefore, contrary to the optimistic assessment of Fukuyama, Huntington foresees a gloomy future where violent civilizational conflicts replace the ideological stalemate of the past. The world is divided among a finite number of Civilizations, each with a unique core of values that cannot change by themselves. They can only be altered, thus giving birth to a new civilization, or destroyed along with the civilization. For centuries, the West had been the dominant civilization; now other civilizations are on the rise, increasing the likelihood of intercivilizational conflicts, while the emergence of a global civilization is most improbable.

Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington seem to give two different understandings of the post-Cold War international relations. Yet, these two models are linear, starting with a single premise and ending with a single result. Both are simplistic narratives that, if they inspired foreign policy, would increase tensions between States: first by considering that liberal capitalist democracies can impose their views on non-liberal capitalist democracies, or States that the former consider as such; secondly by postulating that the differences are so great that understanding is impossible, thus resorting to aggressive defence or even isolationism. Similarly, Western politicians, policy makers and diplomats are often only trained in Western political thought, while non-Western political traditions are not usually taught in

Western politics or international relations departments, which could lead to deeper misunderstanding with tragic consequences when the West has rising rivals.

2) Summary of the analysis

Any factual analysis of the Cold War period disproves the simplistic model of two competing ideologies, Liberalism and Communism, clashing. The liberation struggles and subsequent decolonisation of Africa and Asia do not fall within the two world theory; many of the new decolonized countries, as well as other sovereign States for that matter, chose to align with neither the Western bloc nor the Eastern bloc, thus becoming a Third World. Some even chose to create a new organization to protect the Third World from either blocs' pressure, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that still exists today. Nationalism was central to the 20th century, from the Balkan wars of the 1910s to the Balkan wars of the 1990s, even in the Eastern bloc. The fact that many national liberation movements or national revolutions enlisted the help of the Eastern bloc does not confirm the two world model; it only proves that the Western bloc was not entirely liberal. The many authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, even Franco's Spain, were praised as bulwarks of the Free World, thus further questioning the liberal nature of the Western bloc. If there was indeed an impressive wave of political transitions during the 1980s and 1990s, all were not democratizations. When the context is taken into consideration, it is obvious that Fukuyama's thesis is built upon shaky ground.

As for Huntington and his *"Clash of Civilizations"*, most of the homogenous Civilizations he identifies are still not politically or even economically united. Furthermore, it is doubtful that an entity sprawling over more than two continents could be homogenous as the Muslim world proves with its: Arabic component in the West; its Sunni and Shia branches; strong States like Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey that do not speak the same languages and share the same political systems, and so on. Europe had seen its share of wars and few of them opposed civilizations; most of them were fought within the same one. Furthermore, the great wars of the last centuries saw intercivilizational alliances: England and the Arab tribes fighting against the Germans and the Turks in Palestine. On the other hand, it is true that Europe and, to a lesser extent, South America, are politically and economically integrating. Yet it seems that integration is easier among democracies but, contrary to Huntington's assessment, democracies are found in every civilizations and not just Western Christianity. Thus, when the context is taken into account, Huntington's thesis does not seem as convincing.

Societies develop their own political culture that may or may not be optimal to their context. Political culture, and the structures that convey it, change over time, at different rates of speed while changes in the context require and lead to further changes. Furthermore, structures are associated with interests that can slow or accelerate change. Although polities may look culturally homogenous, they are actually in a process of construction and expansion. Thus, political culture and structures are the products of construction, accumulation, loss, assimilation and so on. Polities are neighboured by others and tend to trade with them. Trade ranges from the exchange of goods to diplomacy, including war. Ideas and practice are exchanged; stronger polities being more influent while weaker polities model themselves on them. The furthest extent of sustained trade is conditional to the speed of the means of transportation and the ability to efficiently cross large distances and obstacles.

Complex societies only developed as a consequence of the discovery of agriculture, especially the culture of cereals. Because crops evolved in certain specific climatic conditions, it is easier for them to spread on an East-West axis rather than a North-South axis. Obstacles such as mountain chains, deserts, large bodies of water and so on, isolate certain regions where crop culture and therefore large populations are sustainable, not very different from Huntington's civilizations. Contacts between these regions were, until a few centuries ago, limited, if not non-existent. A better definition of civilization should not put the emphasis on culture but on trade: the furthest extent of sustained trade constitutes the limit of a civilization. And within these limits, where one or more polities may exist, unique cultures are created that over time came to share commonalities.

With the Age of Discovery at the turn of the 16th century, Europe reached and traded with all regions. In the 19th century, the West came to dominate most of the World, often through violence, thus spreading its values, culture, structures and so on. To the present, all regions came to trade while the Industrial Revolutions improved the speed, carrying capacities and cost of transportation. The world being ever more integrated, the rate of trade is continuously rising. Ideas, worldviews, models and so on are exchanged and all regions come to share similarities. It is not far-fetched to speak of a global civilization. Similarity is not synonymous with homogeneity; the world did not Westernize under Western domination, although it did modernize. Now that the West has rising rivals, it is no longer the sole model. This does not mean that the world will become more peaceful; before the Age of Discovery most wars took place within these world regions, rather than between them. History is still unfolding in front of our eyes.

The PRC as a rising non-Western world power during the Cold War is an interesting example of this heterogeneity of political traditions. The PRC under the leadership of Mao Zedong is considered a hotbed of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary idealism and practice. Yet Mao's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism cannot be understood without taking into account his Confucian upbringing. In matters of foreign policy rhetoric, nationalism plays a greater role than Marxism. More important still, there has been continuity in the practice of foreign policy starting more than twenty-two centuries ago, when China was in the midst of centuries-long feudal wars. Changes in the context, unification of China and its subsequent regional domination did not affect the way it was conducting foreign policy, thus stressing the importance of the cultural element. Political traditions are central to any polity, yet they are affected by endogenous and exogenous factors as well as foreign influences and traditions, thus their heterogeneity. Even Fukuyama's and Huntington's conservative assessments of Western culture and their models of future international relations are tributary to U.S. mythology.

3) Further research

To firmly prove this model of dynamic international relations leading to the heterogeneity of national political traditions, and ultimately to refine it, more national political traditions, and their evolution, need to be studied. For instance, Communist Indochina is puzzling in many aspects. The year 1975 shook the World: the mighty USA was forced to retreat from Indochina. In April, first Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, fell to the Khmer Rouge, and then Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam to the Vietcong; in August, Vientiane, the Laotian capital, fell to the Pathet Lao. All of the former French Indochina was under Communist rule. In a few years, Cambodia, as a result of Khmer Rouge policies, became a mass grave for almost a fourth of its pre-Communist population, while revolutionary terror and Communist policies in Laos and Vietnam did not lead to such catastrophic consequences. In 1979, Communist Vietnam invaded Communist Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge. The same year, a short war opposed Communist China and Communist Vietnam. Today, Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy, while Laos and Vietnam remain under Communist party leadership, although with a different economic system. Communism cannot account for all that happened under Communist rule, and would thus be a good test for the model proposed in this thesis.

To refine the understanding of international relations is only a first step. The second step is to elaborate policies according to this refined understanding. Western policies influenced by the *End of*

History will more or less aggressively promote or impose Western models as *the* universal model and could thus be understood as imperialism. On the other hand, Western policies influenced by the "*Clash of Civilizations*" will more or less aggressively defend Western models from other influences and could thus be understood as protectionism. These two policy currents can lead to an increase of tensions between the West and the Rest, and dire consequences. No longer can polities be simplistically treated as satellites or foes, international relations being more complex and dynamic. Even if democracy and human rights have for the most part the West for origin, this does not imply incompatibility with other political traditions, nor does it rule out the possibility of any contribution from non-Western political traditions, just as non-Western polities have been influenced by Western political traditions. It also means that liberal capitalist democracy, or any current political tradition for that matter, cannot be considered the highest stage of intellectual and social development. Western policy makers, and indeed any policy maker, must acknowledge that as much as the others can learn from us, so can we learn from them, especially when the global balance of power is shifting.

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